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Environmental pollution and income inequality are among the main problems threaten-
ing a global sustainable future, and both are strongly intertwined with the unprecedented
rise in economic prosperity since the industrial revolution. Both issues lead to similar
questions. The first question is: Does economic growth, without any intervention, even-
tually lead to lower levels of pollution and economic inequality? The second question
is: If not, what are the strategies that should be followed? Broadly speaking, this thesis
revolves around these questions.
The next section formulates more precisely the questions, which are the topic of this
thesis. In Section 1.2, a concise summary of the main hypotheses and the results are
presented. Final section of this chapter provides the main implications of the thesis, and
elaborates on the relation between environmental pollution and income inequality.
1.1. Questions
Our first quetion is: Should governments intervene to prevent excess increase in pol-
lution or income inequality. If the advantages of economic growth can lead to lower
levels of pollution and economic inequality, then there is no need to worry about their
consequences on pollution or income inequality. In this case, governments do not face a
trade off in optimizing their economic policy by accounting for pollution or income in-
equality. This idea initiated a substantial literature called the Kuznets Curve following
Kuznets (1955) where the focus is on income distribution. One decade later, Grossman
and Krueger (1991) suggest the same hypothesis for environmental pollution, and name
their hypothesis as Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). More precisely, it is hypothe-
sized that although income growth leads to higher pollution and income inequality at the
initial stages of economic development, once a turning point is reached, we should see
a decline in pollution and income inequality, leading to an inverted-U shaped relation.
1
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Hence any growth enhancing policy is a win-win strategy: While promoting economic
growth, the turning points of environmental pollution and income inequality is brought
forward.
This thesis starts with an empirical investigation of the Kuznets Curve hypothesis for
environmental pollution. Next, the attention is directed to the second question where
the focus is again on environmental pollution. The question is that what should be
done if there is no Environmental Kuznets Curve. One of the most interesting answers
to this question comes from Porter and Van der Linde (1995). Similar to the EKC
hypothesis, according to Porter and Van der Linde (1995), there is no trade-off facing
the governments in their environmental policies. That is, Porter and Van der Linde
(1995) also suggests a win-win strategy. However, in contrast to the EKC hypothesis,
Porter argues that more stringent environmental regulations can enhance, not only the
environmental outcomes, but also the economic outcomes. The focus in this thesis is on
the effect of environmental regulations on aggregate innovation. The question is: How
can environmental regulations increase, not just the green, but overall innovation.
The last chapter turns back to the Kuznets Curve, but this time for income inequal-
ity. This chapter investigates one of the most important potential factors which might
be consequential for a Kuznets Curve in income inequality which is political transitions.
According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), industrialization in the pre-transition pe-
riod increases inequality. However, increasing inequality leads to social unrest forcing
the elites to adopt democracy where income redistribution targets the poor. This leads
to a lower income inequality in the post-transition period. This might suggest that any
country following an industrialized growth path might end up in a democratics political
system leading to lower inequality levels. Therefore, it is important to understand the
forces leading to democratic transition which can be a consequence of, and also conse-





In the EKC literature, it is argued that when income increases beyond a threshold level,
environmental degradation will start to decrease. Chapter 2 proposes a new estimation
strategy in order to investigate the EKC hypothesis. A fundamental problem in the
reduced form EKC estimations is that, specifying a functional form for the time related
effects, such as linear or quadratic time trends, is consequential for the estimated shape
of the income effects. Therefore income related (scale) effects are not identified. Firstly,
following Vollebergh et al. (2009), we apply pairwise differencing strategy in order to
identify the scale effects without specifying any functional form for the time related ef-
fects. Secondly, our proposed parametric and non-parametric estimation strategies are a
combination of recent econometric techniques controlling for cross-sectional dependence,
panel non-stationarity, and non-linear transformation of non-stationary covariates. In-
deed, applying the first and the second generation panel unit root tests, we find that
our series are potentially non-stationary. Our results indicate that, although time re-
lated effects (constituting technological and compositional effects among others) of the
developed regions are negative, which mitigates environmental degradation, this is not
sufficient to create a slow-down in the regional and global level CO2 emissions.
Chapter 3 forecasts future CO2 emission pathways by extending the estimation strat-
egy proposed in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, also the time related effects are estimated by
treating them as residual data from the pairwise differencing estimation. The power of
the pairwise differencing approach in forecasting future emissions is that a potentially
non-linear relation is decomposed into its positive and possible negative components,
which enables one to extrapolate these different trends separately. It is shown that, al-
though China’s growing income is a strong contributor to the global emissions, the main
reason leading to a pessimistic scenario is that the negative trend in the estimated time
effects of the developed regions is not sufficiently strong. Therefore, even if the recent
high economic growth experienced in China would come to a halt, a slow-down in the
increase of global emissions seems to be unlikely.
The fourth chapter investigates the effects of environmental regulations on innovation.
It is hypothesized that depending on the distribution of ownership structure of firms in
a country, environmental regulations might have an innovation encouraging effect. The
3
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hypothesis is motivated with an aggregate R&D model with environmental externalities.
It is further assumed that a fraction of firms are controlled by so-called satisficing man-
agers whose only interest is to avoid bankruptcy, while the rest of the firms are governed
by owners who maximize their profits. By concentrating on these two extreme corporate
governance structures, it is possible to construct a simple country level indicator for the
ownership structure, which is the fraction of managerial firms in the economy.The im-
plications of the model are tested by using non-linear count data estimation techniques.
The estimation results show that in countries where managerial firms are more prevalent,
stricter environmental regulations are more innovation encouraging.
Chapter 5 investigates the potential link between the roles of elite-poor and intra-
elite conflict in democratic transitions. While the former paradigm places revolutionary
pressures from low income groups at the center of the analysis, the later paradigm puts
forward strategic choices of competing elite factions as a factor leading to democratic
transitions. Despite the substantial literature from these two perspectives, the potential
relation between the intra-elite and the elite-poor conflict is an untouched area. This
chapter puts forward a potential link, arguing that these two potential factors are in-
terrelated. At the center of the analysis, there is the collective action problem of the
masses and intra-elite conflict, forcing some elite factions to employ potential de facto
power of the masses. It is shown that democratic transitions due to intra-elite conflict are
not possible in relatively equal societies. Therefore, the preconditions for a consolidated
democracy, put forward by the elite-poor conflict view, which is a low income inequality,
and by the intra-elite conflict view, which is a unified elite structure, are consistent.
The setting in Chapter 5 also allows to analyze the different paths in political revo-
lutions. It is shown that depending on the intra-elite inequality, countries might follow
different paths following a revolution. Some revolutions might lead to democracies like
the French revolution. On the other hand, some revolutions might lead to more auto-




The results in this thesis, about the relation between economic activity and environ-
mental pollution, calls for strong policy interventions. Chapter 2 suggests that there is
no sign of a slow down in the carbon emissions associated with economic growth. The
future forecasts of carbon emissions provided in Chapter 3, indicates that global carbon
emissions will continue to rise steadily in a business-as-usual scenario. These results indi-
cate the importance of policy intervention in order to achieve environmental goals. The
good news is that Chapter 4 shows that the economic costs of environmental regulations
might not be very high.
The results of Chapter 5 on political transitions indicate that, not only the elite-poor
income inequality, but also the income inequality within the elite might have serious con-
sequences on the post-transition political characteristics of a country. While many polit-
ical transitions in the history has let to stable democracies where the income inequality
might be expected to decrease, many more transitions resulted in stable non-democracies,
resulting in a stable and very high income inequality.
Finally, it is important to highlight the relationship between environmental pollution
and income inequality as a future research area. A point which remains untouched is that
the ones who suffer most from environmental pollution and its possible consequence of
a drastic change in climate are those who stay at the bottom of the income distribution.
Therefore, a crucial point about the future of environmental policies is regarded with
how preferences of low income income segments of a society are translated into policy










The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC hereafter) postulates an inverted U-shaped
relationship between pollution and per capita gross domestic production (GDP). That
is to say, using the emission level of some pollutant as a proxy, pollution is assumed to
follow an increasing pattern up to a certain level of per capita income and once that level,
which is called“turning point,” is reached, pollution starts to decline. As the initial study
testing the EKC hypothesis in a panel setting, Grossman and Krueger (1991) find an N-
shaped relation by using a cubic polynomial of income in levels. Following this, the early
empirical papers investigating the validity of the EKC hypothesis use various indicators
for environmental degradation, employ different functional specifications of income, and
analyze many sub-samples of countries or regions. Although there are mixed conclusions
for many environmental indicators, most of the studies in the early literature support
an inverted U-shaped relation for the air pollutants such as CO2 and NO2.
1 In the
1For example, Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992) use log-linear and log-quadratic specifications in
addition to the cubic specification. They find supportive evidence for the EKC hypothesis that CO2
and NO2 emissions follow an inverted U-shape pattern with increasing income. Selden and Song (1994)
use a dataset mainly including the developed regions, and confirm the EKC hypothesis but with very
high turning points. Various indicators of environmental impact are used. For instance, Panayotou
(1993) uses SO2, NOX , fine particles, and deforestation, Horvath (1997) employs energy use, Komen
et al. (1997) use R&D expenditure on environmental protection, and De Bruyn et al. (1998) use sulphur
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more recent literature, these findings have been criticized because of employing possibly
unsatisfactory econometric techniques (for detailed discussion see, for example, Borghesi
2001, Stern 2004, Muller-Furstenberger and Wagner 2007, and Galeotti et al. 2009). In
this paper we focus on two of these econometric issues.2
A first criticism is that per capita income and emission series might be non-stationary,
and only if the series are cointegrated, the estimations yield reliable results. Otherwise,
we might end up with a spurious regression. Perman and Stern (2003) apply some unit
root and cointegration tests both for individual series and using panel data. They find
that sulfur emissions, GDP per capita, and its square are all I(1). However, results about
a cointegrating relationship are ambiguous. In case of no cointegration they performed
their estimations with the first differenced variables. In any case, their estimation results
do not support the EKC hypothesis. However, this approach is subject to some criti-
cisms. First, the employed panel unit root and panel cointegration tests are so called first
generation tests which rely on a very strong assumption of cross sectional independence.
Second, as argued by Muller-Furstenberger and Wagner (2007), a non-linear functional
specification of a non-stationary exogenous variable requires an appropriate estimation
technique and a cointegration test for the hypothesized relation. Wagner (2008) employs
both first and second generation unit root tests on a dataset for 100 countries over the
period 1950-2000. Results are very dependent on the type of the test chosen. Further-
more, the estimations, which do not account for cross-sectional dependence, confirm the
EKC hypothesis, while, by de-factoring the series in order to eliminate the cross sectional
dependence, Wagner (2008) finds no significant evidence in favor of the EKC hypothesis.3
emission reduction targets. See Stern (1998), for an extensive literature survey.
2Another criticism is raised by Taskin and Zaim (2000) towards the trial and error approach of the
parametric estimation of the EKC relation where one needs to assume a functional form. See also Mil-
limet et al. (2003). A further issue about the inadequacies of the early empirical studies is highlighted
by Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh (2005) who argue that in panel data estimations, the assumption of ho-
mogeneity across countries is a very strong one. See also Martinez-Zarzoso and Bengochea-Morancho
(2004).
3Galeotti et al. (2009) raises another criticism that the employed unit root and cointegration tests
do not allow the order of integration to take non-integer values. By applying fractional unit root and
cointegration tests in a panel context which allows the order of integration to be non-integer values, they
find mixed results towards the EKC hypothesis. However, as mentioned by Galeotti et al. (2009), their
method does not account for cross sectional dependence. Additionally, their estimation strategy does
8
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As second criticism Vollebergh et al. (2009) notice that an identification problem
arises when separating the effect of a time related independent variable, in our case
income, from time effects. It is argued that the restrictions imposed on the time effects
may seriously affect the shape of the income-emission relationship. They propose a
flexible identification and non-parametric estimation procedure under the assumption
that for each region there is at least one other country or region having the same time
effect. Their findings for the 24 OECD countries indicate a clear positive income effect for
all regions which is not in line with the EKC hypothesis. The time effects are more likely
to be inverted U-shaped but not enough to create an inverted U-shaped pattern in total
emissions. However, the drawback of their estimation procedure is that it assumes the
variables of interest to be stationary. Moreover, they still impose a strong assumption,
namely, that for a given country or region there exists another country or region having
the same time effect.
The aim of our paper is to deal with both these econometric criticisms at the same
time. We first refine the identification strategy proposed by Vollebergh et al. (2009).
Instead of starting from the assumption that two selected countries or regions have the
same time effect, as Vollebergh et al. (2009) do and from which they identify the income
effect, we define the income effect of a country or region, relative to another country
or region, to be what remains (as function of income) after eliminating the common
time effect. The pairwise differencing approach of Vollebergh et al. (2009), applied to a
country or region and a paired country or region, exactly takes out this common time
effect. What remains is then the difference of the two income effects of the two paired
countries or regions (with respect to each other). These two income effects are identified
and can be estimated fully nonparametrically, without imposing any functional form
restriction. The common time effects which are differenced out are allowed to be fully
flexible as well.
Each country or region can be coupled with any other country or region, generating in
each case a case-specific decomposition of total emissions into an income and a time effect
(and a residual idiosyncratic effect), relative to the coupled region. Without additional
assumptions this approach reveals that the income effect and the time effect of a country
not take into account the nonlinear terms of GDP per capita which would require a separate theoretical
framework.
9
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or a region cannot be identified. Vollebergh et al. (2009) are able to identify the income
and the time effect of a country only by assuming that for each country the selected
paired country is having the same time effects. However, in their application the actual
selection is based on a goodness-of-fit criterion. In terms of our interpretation, they do
not identify the income and the time effect of a country, but, instead, they just present
the income and time effect of a country relative to the best fitting country. We shall
proceed under this alternative interpretation.
Given a pair of regions or countries, we perform the pairwise differencing estimations
both parametrically and non-parametrically. To deal with the first criticism, and in con-
trast to Vollebergh et al. (2009), we take into account the non-stationarity properties
of the variables. For the parametric estimations, we adopt the estimation strategy “effi-
cient nonstationary nonlinear least squares”(EN-NLS), suggested by Chang et al. (2001).
Parametric estimations have the advantage of requiring smaller datasets; however, a non-
parametric approach is also desirable by having the advantage of imposing less structure
on the income effects. For the univariate case, there are some studies on non-parametric
non-stationary regressions (Wang and Phillips, 2009; Karlsen et al., 2007); however, only
recently Schienle (2011) developed an estimator for non-parametric non-stationary re-
gressions with many covariates, which fits our pairwise differencing approach. As our
final estimation strategy, we use this estimator in our pairwise differencing strategy.4
Pairwise differencing can be applied to any country or region together with a paired
country or region. In this study we explore the EKC hypothesis by focusing on two
large and important regions, namely, “Western Offshoots” (consisting of the Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and the United States, representing a developed region) and China
(representing a developing region). We pair Western Offshoots to Western Europe (i.e.,
the former EU) and we pair China to“Other Asia” (consisting of Japan and the countries
of the Middle East).5 The environmental quality is proxied by CO2 emission per capita
4However, we focus on the special case where the two-dimensional nonstationarity in the GDP per
capita levels of the paired regions turn out to be as nonstationary as in the univariate GDP per capita
levels. In this special case, Schienle’s estimator becomes the Smoothed Backfitting Estimator, see
Schienle (2011) for further details.
5The underlying data, also used by Melenberg et al. (2011), consists of a balanced panel from nine




(Marland et al., 2009). Economic activity is proxied by GDP per capita (Maddison,
2009). Using data over the period 1950 to 2006, we do not find evidence towards a
slowdown in the income effects of China relative to Other Asia and of Western Offshoots
relative to Western Europe, while the negative time effects, if present at all, do not
compensate the positive income effects. Hence, given the investigated pairs, there is
no evidence supporting the EKC hypothesis, neither when focusing exclusively on the
income effect, nor when considering the income effect jointly with the time effect.
We also compare our estimation results with other estimation approaches that can
be used under alternative identification strategies, requiring funtional form restrictions.
In line with Vollebergh et al. (2009), we find that functional form restrictions as a way to
identify the income and time effect plays a crucial role in the shape of the relation between
the economic activity and environmental degradation that one finds in an empirical
analysis.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss
our identification strategy and an alternative one based on functional form restrictions.
In Section 2.3 we present our dataset and we investigate the stationarity properties of
our data. Section 2.4 then describes the estimation strategies. In section 2.5, estimation
results, focusing on China and Western Offshoots, are provided. Section 2.6 concludes.
The Appendix to this paper, see Sen et al. (2014a), contains background information
and additional material.
2.2. Identification Strategies
In the empirical literature, investigating the EKC hypothesis, the general econometric
model is as follows:
yit = f(xit, i) + λ(i, t) + εit, (2.1)
where i stands for the cross-sectional units, such as countries or regions, and t represents
time. The emissions, denoted with yit, is driven by two effects. The first one is the so
called income effect which is denoted with f , and which is a function of xit, GDP per
capita. Secondly, λ stands for the time effect. Finally, εit stands for the idiosyncratic
error term. In this very general model, both income and time effect can also be a function
11
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of some cross-section specific effects. The functional form (2.1) can be motivated by the
so-called IPAT-equation (see, for example, Chertow, 2000), i.e., I = P ×A× T , where I
stands for the impact (in our case of carbon dioxide emission), P stands for population,
A stands for affluence, and T stands for technology. In per capita- and log-terms we get
log(I/P ) = log(A) + log(T ). Translated into equation (2.1), we model y = log(I/P ) by
taking log(A) as a function f of GDP per capita, and log(T ) as a function λ of time,
where both f and λ are allowed to be cross section unit-specific.
In order to identify and estimate the hypothesized relationship between emission and
income, we apply two identification (and corresponding estimation strategies). Our first,
and main, identification strategy (“pairwise differencing”) does not impose any additional
functional form restrictions (on top of equation (2.1), but instead interprets what can
be estimated, using equation (2.1), without additional functional form restrictions, af-
ter taking time differences of yit and ykt of two different regions i and k. The second
identification strategy (“baseline strategies”), considered for comparison purposes, im-
poses functional form restrictions. We start by first describing the baseline identification
strategies.
To identify f and λ in equation (2.1) in the baseline strategy, we impose the following
functional restrictions in (2.1):
yit = q(xit, βi) + τ (t, πi) + εit, (2.2)
with f (xit, i) = q (xit, βi) for some known function q, depending on a vector of unknown
parameters βi, with λ (t, i) = τ (t, πi), for some known function τ , depending on a vector
of unknown parameters πi, and where the error term εit is assumed to satisfy specific
stationarity assumptions. Only βi and πi need to be estimated. Identification of f and
λ is achieved by imposing functional form restrictions. This approach makes sense, in
particular, if there would be external information prescribing the functional form re-
strictions. Otherwise, these functional form restrictions potentially result in misspecified
income and time effects.
Our second identification strategy avoids imposing any functional form restrictions
(except the specification in (2.1)) by applying pairwise regional time differencing. For-
mally, consider two regions i and k collected in c = {i, k}. Then we define fc(xit, i) and
fc(xkt, k), the region-specific income effects of regions i and k, respectively, given the set
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of regions c as follows
yit =fc(xit, i) + λc(t) + εc,it,
ykt =fc(xkt, k) + λc(t) + εc,kt,
where λc(t) represents the common time effect, and where εc,it and εc,kt are the region-
specific idiosyncratic error terms. Applying pairwise differencing to these two equations
leads to the following equation:
yit − ykt = fc (xit, i)− fc (xkt, k) + εc,it − εc,kt. (2.3)
Assuming E (εc,it − εc,kt|xit, xkt) = 0, both fc (·, i) and fc (·, k) can be estimated fully
nonparametrically, without imposing additional functional form restrictions. Moreover,
because λc(t) is differenced out, it can be any function of t.
A different coupling, represented by c′ 6= c, typically will generate a different income
effect fc′(·, i) 6= fc(·, i) and a different time effect λc′(·) 6= λc(·). This shows that a
region’s income is only identified relative to another region, as given by the set c.
2.3. Description and Properties of the Data
Our underlying dataset is a balanced panel for all countries, covering the period between
1950 and 2006. CO2 emission data consists of the sum of emissions from gas, liquid and
solid fuels (based on consumption figures), and from gas flaring and cement production
(see Boden et al., 1995; Marland et al., 2009). For each type of fuel, data on annual
CO2 emissions result from three aspects: the amount of fuel consumed, the fraction of
the fuel that becomes oxidized, and a factor for the carbon content of the fuel. The fuel
types incorporated in the calculations are coal, other solid fuels, crude oil, petroleum
products, and natural gas. Total energy use and emissions per country are corrected for
exports and imports of fuels, as well as for stock changes, international marine bunkers,
and non-energy use of fuels, such as chemical feedstock. The estimation of the amounts
of CO2 released through gas flaring are based on the UNSTAT database, supplemented
by estimations from DOE/EIA. The estimations of the amounts of CO2 released from
cement manufacturing are based on figures indicating the quantity of manufactured ce-
ment, the average calcium oxide content per unit of cement, and a factor to convert the
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Note: Values of emissions is carbon equivalent.
calcium oxide content into CO2 equivalents. Data on GDP and population is taken from
Maddison (2009). All figures are expressed in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars,
using purchasing power parities.
We aggregate data on a country by country basis into nine regions: India, China,
“Other Asia”, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Former USSR, “Western Offshoots”,
Africa, and Latin America. In contrast to the division into regions by the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), we distinguish explicitly between Eastern
Europe and Former USSR, divide the “old” OECD in Western Europe (old EU) and
what we indicate as “Western Offshoots” (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the
United States), while Japan together with the countries of the Middle East are grouped
under the name “Other Asia”. Finally, we split the IPCC region ALM into Africa and
Latin America. In our empirical analysis we focus on two regions in particular: Western
Offshoots (to be paired to Western Europe) and China (to be paired with Other Asia).
In Table 2.1, some descriptive statistics for the nine regions are presented. For all
variables, it seems that there are no strong outliers. Considering only the mean, median,
standard deviation, maximum and minimum values, all variables seem to be right tailed.
We shall take logarithms of the per capita variables to correct for the skewness of the
level variables.
In Figure 2.1, GDP per capita series of the regions are presented. Three groups can
be distinguished. Western Offshoots and Western Europe have the highest income per
capita. India and Africa are always at the lowest income group. Other Asia reaches
to the middle income group steadily over the period from 1950 to 2006. On the other
hand, China achieves this starting from 1985. Eastern Europe, Former USSR, and Latin
America stay in the middle income group throughout the period, although Former USSR
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Figure 2.1: GDP Per Capita (thousand US $ - 1990)
Figure 2.2: CO2 Emission Per Capita (ton)
experiences a decline following its collapse in 1990.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the corresponding CO2 emissions per capita. Compared to
Figure 1, there are some clear differences. Firstly, Former USSR and China are very
close to the high income group in their CO2 emissions. Secondly, the more rapid GDP
rise in the high income countries observed in Figure 1 is not observed in the emission
series. Changes in emission per capita seem to be more similar across regions when
compared with changes in GDP per capita. Lastly, while GDP per capita series seem to
increase in time, the high emission countries seem to experience a decline in their CO2
emission at a point in time; however, for low emission countries this is not so clear. This
could be evidence towards the EKC hypothesis.
Next, we turn to the stationarity properties of our variables, considering our dataset
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as a panel including all nine regions. To test the stationarity of our variables in levels,
we focus on the second generation panel data unit root tests, that take cross sectional
correlation into account. Here, we focus on Bai and Ng (2004). In Sen et al. (2014a) we
also report the outcomes of other second generation unit root tests.6
Bai and Ng (2004) consider a multi-factor framework called “Panel Analysis of Non-
stationarity in Idiosyncratic and Common Components” (PANIC) where the factors and
idiosyncratic components are analyzed separately and hence allow for cross-unit cointe-
gration. Furthermore, this method allows testing the number of factors with a unit root.
Their model is as follows:
zit = dit + λ
′
iFt + Eit
Ft = Ft−1 + ηt
Eit = ρiEit + eit
where zit is the variable under consideration, with index i referring to region i and index
t to year t, where Ft is the vector of common factors, Eit is the idiosyncratic component,
and dit is the deterministic component of the data generating process which indicates
whether the model includes a constant or a trend. The disturbances ηt and eit are
assumed to be white noise processes.7
In this data generating process, one or more of the common factors might follow a
random walk. Therefore, the standard factor analysis does not apply to identify the
factor loadings. To deal with this issue, Bai and Ng (2004) suggest basing the principal
component analysis on the first differences of the series. The standard PANIC analysis
uses the selection criteria suggested by Bai and Ng (2002) to determine the number
of common factors. However, this criterion performs poorly when the cross-sectional
dimension is small, like in our case. So, in order apply these tests, we assume the
number of common factors to be at most three.
6For the sake of completeness we also present results of univariate unit root tests and first generation
panel data unit root tests in the Appendix to this paper, see Sen et al. (2014a). However, when
investigating cross sectional dependence in Sen et al. (2014a), we clearly find evidence for cross sectional
dependence (both via common factors and via idiosyncratic components).




i.i.d., where rank(C(1)) = r1 ∈ [0, r], with r1 number of I(1) factors and r− r1 the number of stationary
factors.
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Table 2.2: Bai & NG (2004) PANIC Results
In Table 2.2, the results of the Bai and Ng test are presented. The first column
indicates the given number of common factors which is assumed to be one, two, or
three. In order to investigate the number of common factors with a unit root, the Bai
and Ng (2004) method applies ADF unit root tests, labeled as “ADF” in Table 2.2. In
case of more than one common factor, individual ADF tests may over-state the number
of common stochastic trends (Bai and Ng, 2004), since only the space spanned by the
factors can be estimated. Therefore, Bai and Ng (2004) suggests two tests (MQ-f and
MQ-c), which are slightly modified versions of the cointegration tests suggested by Stock
and Watson (1998). The null hypothesis states the number of common stochastic trends
against the alternative that it is less than the stated number in the null hypothesis. The
test is applied successively by decreasing the number of stochastic trends in the null
hypothesis as long as it is rejected.
For the idiosyncratic components, Bai and Ng (2004) provide two test statistics,
one that is asymptotically normally distributed (BNN) and the other one that has an
asymptotic chi-square distribution (BNξ2). Both tests depend on pooling the p-values
from the ADF tests applied to individual idiosyncratic components
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2.4. Estimation Strategies
The results in Table 2.2 indicate that there are likely multiple common factors with a
unit root, while also the idiosyncratic components of both the GDP and emission series
seem to have a unit root, at least, when allowing for a deterministic trend. Given these
outcomes, we shall proceed under the assumption that both the GDP and emission series
are nonstationary, in line with the findings of Wagner (2008) who also applied the PANIC
analysis (and other tests) to carbon dioxide and GDP per capita, using data over 100
countries during the period 1950 to 2000.
In this section we discuss our estimation strategies. We start by first describing the
baseline estimation strategies to estimate (2.2). Next, we discuss the estimation strategies
to estimate (2.3). In both cases the estimation strategies take the non-stationarity of
our variables into account.
2.4.1. Baseline Strategies: Functional Form Restrictions
To deal with the presence of the nonlinear transformations of the nonstationary regressors
in (2.2), which requires a different asymptotic theory than the usual nonlinear least
squares, we use the ”efficient nonstationary nonlinear least squares” (EN-NLS) estimator
of Chang et al. (2001).8
Following Chang et al. (2001), we first estimate equation (2.2), using standard Non-
linear Least Squares, to get ε̂it. Secondly, for νt = ∆xt we run the following auxiliary
regression:
νt = Π̂1νt−1 + Π̂2νt−2 + · · ·+ ût,
where the lag number of ν is determined by the criterion given by Chang et al. (2001).
Now, we are ready to transform the dependent variable in (2.2) to obtain the EN-NLS.
Indicating the transformed variable with a star, the transformed dependent variable is
given as:













i,t. We are then able to estimate
8EN-NLS estimation also allows to incorporate a linear trend and stationary regressors, in addition
to multiple I(1) regressors. In our case, we do not have stationary variables, but only one nonstationary
variable and its nonlinear transformation as regressors.
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the parameters of interest efficiently, by using the transformed dependent variable in our
regression as follows:
y∗it = q(xit, βi) + τ (t, πi) + ε
∗
it. (2.4)
For both q and τ we choose polynomials, i.e., we specify (2.4) as









k + ε∗it, (2.5)
with α the constant term in this regression equation. Chang et al. (2001) provide further
details, including regularity conditions and the quantification of the sampling inaccuracy.
In equation (2.5) the cross correlation is captured by polynomials in xit and t (with
ε∗it assumed to be uncorrelated over i). Alternatively, to deal with the cross-sectional
dependence problem, Pesaran (2006) suggests the Common Correlated Effects (CCE)
estimation. In this method, the regression is augmented by cross-sectional averages of
both the dependent and independent variables, resulting in










t + εit, (2.6)
where ȳt is the cross-sectional averages of the emission series and x̄t is the cross-sectional
average of the GDP series, and where bi and dik, for k = 1, · · · , K are the corresponding
regression coefficients. The underlying logic of the CCE estimation is to proxy the
common factors in the error structure, which creates the cross-sectional dependence, by
means of the cross-sectional averages of the variables. Thus, the variables of interest are
defactored. Kapetanios et al. (2011) show that the CCE estimation also accounts for a
multifactor structure, and allows the common factors to be I(1) processes. It is important
that CCE does not require the number of factors to be estimated. It is only assumed that
the number of unobserved factors remains fixed as the sample size increases. Therefore,
if the common factors are responsible for the non-stationarity, equation (2.6) can be
estimated without requiring a cointegrating relationship, even if the original variables
are non-stationary.
We complement the baseline estimation strategies by also using EN-NLS applied
to demeaned variables, as an informal way to mitigate the effects of cross sectional
dependence.
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2.4.2. Estimation via Pairwise Differencing
In this subsection we describe our estimation strategies for equation (2.3). Next to
nonparametric estimation of fc (·, i) we shall also consider parametric alternatives. We
start with the latter.
First, when specializing fc (xit, i) as in (2.5), and assuming εc,it−εc,kt to be stationary,
we can estimate this regression with“dynamic ordinary least squares” (DOLS), suggested
by Saikkonen (1991), which deals with the efficiency problems of the OLS estimation in
a cointegration relationship. In DOLS, the regression is augmented by lags and leads of




it, · · · , xJit
)′
and βi = (βi1 · · · , βiJ)′, then
we have (suppressing the dependence of the parameters on c):
yit − ykt = β′izit − β′kzkt +
p∑
`=−q
(γ′i`∆zi,t−` − γ′k`∆zk,t−`) + (εc,it − εc,kt), (2.7)
where the terms ∆zi,t−` and ∆zk,t−` are the lagged (` > 0) or lead (` < 0) values of the
first differenced regressors by means of which DOLS deals with the efficiency problem,
and where γi` and γk` are the corresponding J-dimensional parameter vectors.
A practical problem is that, as reported in Kao and Chiang (2001), the parameter
estimates might change substantially with the chosen number of lags and leads. There are
several strategies in the literature in order to deal with this problem (see Westerlund,
2005; Kejriwal and Perron, 2008; Choi and Kurozumi, 2012). We adopt the strategy
by Choi and Kurozumi (2012), who propose a data dependent choice of the maximum
numbers of lags and leads, and the number of lags and leads is chosen based on the BIC.9
As alternatives, we use EN-NLS and a nonparametric estimator. Non-parametric
estimation techniques have the advantage of putting minimum restrictions on the hy-
pothesized functional relation, which is a very suitable property for our case. Recently,
Schienle (2011) shows how to generalize the nonparametric smooth backfitting estimation
9In selecting a model specification, using Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is a fre-
quently referred method. Another criterion is the Akaike information criteria (AIC). Both AIC and
BIC use a penalty for the increasing number of regressors. That is, they measure the tradeoff between
parsimony and goodness of fit. These two criterion differ in the degree of the penalty for the increasing
number of parameters. However, AIC is likely to choose asymptotically overparametrized models, while
BIC always selects the true model (Verbeek, 2004, p.285). Therefore, we prefer BIC when the two
criteria choose different models.
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for additive models suggested by Mammen et al. (1999) to account for non-stationary re-
gressions with many covariates. We focus on the special case where the two-dimensional
nonstationarity in the regressors of the paired regions is as nonstationary as in the
univariate regressors. For the paired GDP-s per capita this seems to be the case. If
so, Schienle’s generalized estimator is the smoothed backfitting estimator, see Schienle
(2011) for further details. An accessible description of the smoothed backfitting esti-
mator including its computation in a practical application can be found in Nielsen and
Sperlich (2005).10
In pairwise differencing we need to pair two regions. For the purpose of comparison,
we use the pairs in Melenberg et al. (2011), who propose the ”Goodness-of-Fit (GoF)
prior” in choosing the pairs. GoF prior chooses the pair for a region among all candidates,
such that pairwise differencing estimation gives the lowest sum of squared errors. This
means that we couple China to “Other Asia” and Western Offshoots to Western Europe.
In pairwise differencing estimations, it is possible to calibrate the time effects. From
equation (2.3), we obtain the emissions depending on the GDP per capita of the region
i as f̂c (xit, i) and region k as f̂c (xkt, k), where f̂c is the estimated fc from the pairwise
differencing estimations. The time effect of each region is constructed by subtracting
the income effects from the observed emissions as d̂c(i, t) = yit − f̂c (xit, i) for region i,
and d̂c(k, t) = yk,t − f̂c (xkt, k) for region k. The time effects are homogeneous across
paired regions. Therefore, in order to calibrate the time effects, we average these two
time effects.11
Except for Schienle (2011) (and possibly the CCE-estimation), the estimations require
a cointegration relationship, i.e., the residuals in the regression equations should satisfy
specific stationarity assumptions. We complement our estimation results by an extensive
cointegration analysis (presented in the Appendix). Since the available and implemented
cointegration tests do not necessarily exactly match the estimation specifications used
in this section, this cointegraton analysis is just to investigate whether cointegration
10The only drawback is that there is no bandwidth selection procedure theoretically developed yet,
although there is one for the stationary case by Mammen and Park (2005)). Therefore, we prefer to use
the common rule of thumb in order to determine the bandwidths. We prefer to use the common rule of
thumb, h = 1.06σ̂n−1/5, in order to determine the bandwidths.
11In the companion paper Melenberg et al. (2014), we model these calibrated time effects as a function
of time to generate forecasts of future carbon dioxide emissions.
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relationship close to our estimation specifications are likely or not.12
2.5. Estimation Results
In this section we present the estimation results. We focus on China (paired to Other
Asia) and Western Offshoots (paired to Western Europe).13
Baseline Estimations—We start with the baseline estimations, using EN-NLS and
CCE as the main estimation strategies without pairwise differencing. In Figure 2.3, EN-
NLS estimations for China are presented in the first three rows, where the functional form
of the individual deterministic trend is different for each row as indicated in the figure.
The corresponding estimation results can be found in Table 2.4. The number, “(#)” on
the bottom-right corner of each graph indicates the rank of preference by BIC, and the
curves for which the highest order term of the polynomial is not significant is indicated
with “ns.” The only estimation among these three, supporting the EKC hypothesis (in
terms of the income effect), is the quadratic equation with no trend. However, it is the
less preferred specification by the BIC criterion. As expected for the China case, the rest
of the EN-NLS estimations reject the EKC hypothesis. A more important result is that
the estimated shape of the income-emission relation for a given polynomial specification
changes substantially with the assumed functional form of the deterministic trends. This
result reveals the importance to put minimum restrictions on the time effects in order
to estimate the shape of the income-emission relation.14
We proceed with the baseline estimations for China with the strategies controlling
for common stochastic trends, namely CCE and EN-NLS estimation, with demeaned
variables. These are presented in the last two rows of Figure 2.3 (with estimation results
in Table 2.4). The estimated curves are very similar to those estimated by the EN-NLS
without deterministic trends. This result further highlights the importance of specifying
12The error terms in the Schienle (2011) approach also have to satisfy specific conditions. However,
we are not aware of a formal test to test these conditions.
13The Appendix contains additional estimation results, in particular, under the assumption of homo-
geneity. In addition, the Appendix also presents some estimation results of the other regions.




Figure 2.3: Baseline Estimations for China
the right functional form for the time effects.
The results for the baseline estimations for Western Offshoots are presented in Figure
2.4 and Table 2.5. None of the estimations predicts an inverted U-shaped curve for the
Western Offshoots. Even for this economically most developed region (together with
Western Europe), where a downturn in the emissions is expected to be more likely, we
find as result that the emissions seem to be rising with increasing income. This is in line
with the perspective that the income effect is a scale effect, and, therefore, a positive
effect.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the estimated income and time effects for China and Western
Offshoots by the EN-NLS estimation, without differencing, with the chosen polynomial
specification by the BIC (among all the EN-NLS estimations). For China, this is the
quadratic specification for both the income and the time effects. For Western Offshoots,
it is the fourth order polynomial with linear trend. The time effects are negative for
Western Offshoots which makes sense, since in rich regions one expects to see a decline
in the emissions due to technological progress, creating an environment-friendly industry
and due to the changes in the sectoral composition by a shift away from the pollution
intensive sectors. The overall effect is positive for most of the periods, implying that the
time effects are not sufficient to offset the positive income effect. Hence, there is no sign
of a slowdown in the total emissions. However, there is a counterintuitive pattern for
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Figure 2.4: Baseline Estimations for Western Offshoots
the time effects of China which is inverted U-shaped. This makes the pattern of income
and time effects for China very similar to the one for Western Offshoots, i.e., a rising
income effect, a declining time effect, and a rising total effect, dominated by the income
effect. As discussed previously, this could be a misleading result due to the restrictions
on the time effect. As a remedy to this problems, the pairwise differencing approach,
which puts the minimum restrictions on the time effects, is applied.
Parametric Pairwise Differencing Estimations—We continue by applying the para-
metric pairwise differencing strategy, with China paired to Other Asia, and Western
Offshoots to Western Europe. The pairwise differencing estimation does not identify the
levels of these curves. Therefore, we normalize the curves such that the level of the sam-
ple average for each curve is equal to the average level of the observed emission in that
region. The results are presented in Figure 2.6 and Table 2.6 for China, and in Figure
2.7 and Table 2.7 for Western Offshoots. Firstly, for both China and Western Offshoots,
applying EN-NLS, which controls for the non-stationarity and nonlinear transformations
of the income variable, does not change the results over the simple OLS estimation.
Secondly, the estimated curves are not in line with the EKC hypothesis (in terms of the
income effect), supporting the baseline estimations.15
15There is a striking difference between the estimations under homogeneity, see Appendix, and het-
erogeneity. The supportive EKC evidence in the panel estimations seems to be driven by the assumption
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Figure 2.5: Baseline - EN-NLS Estimation with Deterministic Trend
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Figure 2.6: Pairwise Differencing Estimations for China
Figure 2.7: Pairwise Differencing Estimations for WO
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Figure 2.8: Pairwise Differencing – EN-NLS Estimation
In Figure 2.8, for China and Western Offshoots, the estimated income and time
effects by the pairwise differencing approach with the EN-NLS strategy is illustrated
for the chosen polynomial specification by the BIC. The picture for Western Offshoots
remains the same as in Figure 2.5, while for China it is quite different. Specifically,
both the time and income effects are increasing, and the time effects are stronger than
the income effects. That is, technological and sectoral composition play a major role in
China in increasing emissions.
Nonparametric Pairwise Differencing Estimations—Our last estimation strategy
is incorporating the non-parametric non-stationary estimator (generalized smooth back-
of homogeneous income effects.
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Table 2.3: Cointegration Tests GDP-s Paired Regions
Western Offshoots - Western EU. China - Other Asia
ADF Statistics -3.524 -3.817
MacKinnon p-value 0.036 0.016
fitting) suggested by Schienle (2011) in our pairwise differencing approach. This approach
does not require to make a priori functional assumptions for the hypothesized relation-
ship.16 Also, as the EN-NLS approach, this estimator accounts for the nonstationarity
in our variables. Moreover, it fits to the pairwise differencing approach with its additive
formulation, and by allowing more than one covariate. Table 2.3 presents cointegration
tests for the GPD-s per capita in the paired regions, suggesting that there is a cointe-
grating relationship between the paired GDP-s per capita. This motivates our choice to
specialize the Schienle (2011) generalized smooth backfitting estimator to the Mammen
et al. (1999) smooth backfitting estimator, following Nielsen and Sperlich (2005) in the
implementation.
The results illustrated in Figure 2.9 mainly support the results of EN-NLS pairwise
differencing estimations. For China, the estimated income and time effects are positive,
and the time effects are stronger than the income effects. This is the same conclusion with
the results of the EN-NLS pairwise differencing estimation. For the Western Offshoots,
the income effect is positive, supporting the result of the EN-NLS estimation. The only
difference is that for Western Offshoots the time effects seem to be increasing until the
1970s and decreasing afterwards, while the EN-NLS strategy estimates a decreasing time
effect throughout the sample period. These results show that once we allow the time
effects to be fully flexible, by introducing the pairwise differencing approach and by
accounting for nonstationarity and nonlinearity, the estimated patterns for the income
and time effects, as well as their implications for the EKC hypothesis, remain robust to
using parametric or nonparametric techniques in order to estimate the income effects.
The pairwise differencing approach both with the parametric EN-NLS estimator and
the nonparametric smooth backfitting estimator of Schienle (2011) does not support the
EKC hypothesis.
16In the parametric approach, we overcome this problem by estimating polynomials up to fifth degree.
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Figure 2.9: Non-parametric Non-stationary Estimation by Pairwise Differencing
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Figure 2.10: Confidence Intervals for China
Parametric versus Nonparametric Pairwise Differencing—While the non-parametric
approach is fully flexible in the specification of the income effects, it is not as efficient
as the parametric approach. For example, non-parametric estimations may suffer from
end-of-sample biases, and out-of-sample predictions may be driven by this problem.
Therefore, one may prefer parametric estimations in making out-of-sample predictions.
However, compared to non-parametric estimation strategies, parametric estimations have
the disadavantage of imposing more structure on the income effects. Therefore, it makes
sense to check the in-sample performance of the parametric estimations. One way of
doing this is to check if our parametric estimations stay inside the non-parametric con-
fidence intervals.
In Figures 2.10 and 2.11, we present the non-stationary parametric estimates of the
income effects and the corresponding non-parametric non-stationary 90% confidence in-
tervals for China and Western Offshoots. In constructing the confidence intervals, we
follow Nielsen and Sperlich (2005) (see the Appendix for details). For China, the es-
timated income effects clearly stay inside the confidence intervals, which alleviates the
concerns about the structure imposed by the parametric specification. For Western Off-
shoots the picture is less clear. The estimated income effects do not fully fit inside
the confidence intervals. However, the estimated positive pattern for the income effects
does not conflict with the non-parametric intervals. This may raise a concern that the
estimated pattern by the parametric specification may exaggerate the positive pattern.
Cointegration—In the Appendix we complement the estimation results of this section
by corresponding cointegration tests, although these tests do not necessarily match the
estimation specifications employed in this section. Our cointegration analysis in partic-
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Figure 2.11: Confidence Intervals for Western Offshoots
ular provides some evidence of a cointegrating relationship for the pairwise differencing
regressions.
2.6. Conclusion
In this paper we deal with two econometric issues related to the traditional quantifi-
cation and estimation of Environmental Kuznets Curves (EKCs), namely the lack of
identification and the need to use estimation techniques that can handle non-stationary
data. To deal with these two criticisms simultaneously, we use pairwise differencing
to identify the income effect of a region relative to some other region and we apply
nonlinear-nonstationary parametric and non-parametric estimation techniques to esti-
mate the pairwise differenced regressions. Using estimation procedures suitable for non-
stationarity is important, since, based on the PANIC-approach proposed by Bai and Ng
(2004), we find strong evidence that carbon dioxide emissions and GDP per capita are
nonstationary, in line with the earlier literature.
We find that the estimated patterns for the income and time effects are quite sensitive
to the specification of the income and time effects (such as linear versus quadratic, or
deterministic versus stochastic). This finding indicates the importance of being flexible
in the identification, avoiding functional form restrictions. Our pairwise differencing
estimations that allow for this flexibility do not support the EKC hypothesis. We do not
find clear inverted U-shaped relations, in particular not for an economically developed
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region like Western Offshoots (relative to Western Europe).17
The pairwise differencing approach identifies the income effect of a region relative
to another region, allowing consistent estimation. However, the time effects are only
calibrated. A natural next step is to construct and estimate a model for the time effects,
using these calibrated time effects. This is a topic that we investigate in the companion
paper Melenberg et al. (2014).
2.A. Appendix
2.A.1. Introduction
This Appendix contains background as well as additional material. Section 2.A.2 contains
the results of univariate unit root tests. Section 2.A.3 presents the outcomes of first
generation panel unit root tests. In Section 2.A.4 we test for the presence of cross
sectional dependence. Section 2.A.5 contains the results of the second generation panel
unit root tests (not included in the main text). Section 2.A.6 shows the outcomes of the
unit root tests relevant for the models with pairwise differencing. Section 2.B presents the
estimation results under the homogeneity assumption. Section 2.B.1 contains the results
of the cointegration tests. Section 2.B.2 presents the construction of the nonparametric
confidence intervals, presented in the main text. Finally, Section 2.B.3 contains some
estimation results of the other regions.
2.A.2. Univariate Unit Root Tests
In this section we apply the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) univariate unit root tests. Results may be useful in interpreting
the results of the panel unit root tests.
Results are presented in Table 2.8 for the logarithm of the emission per-capita and
in Table 2.9 for the logarithm of GDP per-capita. The ADF and KPSS tests mostly
give conflicting findings; however, for every series, at least one of the tests indicates a
unit root. Another crucial point for the following sections is that according to the ADF




Table 2.4: Baseline Estimations for China
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Table 2.5: Baseline Estimations for Western Offshoots
34
Appendix
Table 2.6: Pairwise Differencing Estimations for China
Table 2.7: Pairwise Differencing Estimations for Western Offshoots
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Table 2.8: Univariate Unit Root Tests for Log - Emission Per Capita
test, most of the series do not contain a deterministic trend, while for most of them the
intercept term is significant. On the other hand the KPSS test finds a significant trend
for almost all the series. Lastly, there are parallel findings for the emission and the GDP
series for the individual regions in terms of their order of integration which indicates a
potential presence of a long term relationship for each cross-sectional unit.
2.A.3. First Generation Panel Unit Root Tests
Univariate unit root tests might suffer from a lack of power due to the small sample size
of the dataset. However, since our series for different regions are expected to exhibit
some similarities (at least to some degree), both the information contained in the within
and between dimension of the panel data set can be exploited to test for unit roots. Our
general model is as follows:
yit = ρiyi,t−1 + α0i + α1it+ uit. (2.8)
Here, yit is the variable of interest, where yi0 is taken as given. The parameters α0i,
ρi, and α1i are region specific. The error term uit is assumed to be identically and
independently distributed (iid) across i and t with zero mean, a finite homoskedastic
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Table 2.9: Univariate Unit Root Tests for Log - GDP Per Capita
variance across t.18 A noteworthy point is that the common assumption of the first
generation unit root tests is cross-sectional independence.
In Table 2.10 the results of the six first generation panel unit root tests for the
emission series are presented (GDP per capita will be discussed later). Although there
are some conflicting results among the tests, they support the hypothesis that all series
have a unit root. Below, these results will be discussed more extensively by focusing on
the properties of these tests.
Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002)
Levin et al. (2002) (LLC) test the null that each individual series contains a unit root
against the alternative that each individual series is stationary. In terms of equation (1),
we test H0 : ρi = ρ = 0 against H1 : ρi = ρ < 0. Due to the inclusion of individual
intercepts and trends we can specify equation (2.8) in an ADF form as follows,
18And other regularity conditions, such as a finite fourth order moment.
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Table 2.10: p-values from the First Generation Unit Root Tests for the log - Emission
Series
Table 2.11: Hypothesis Specification - LLC Test




Model 1b : ∆yit = δyi,t−1 +
pi∑
L=1
θiL∆yi,t−L + α0i + εit,
Model 1c : ∆yit = δyi,t−1 +
pi∑
L=1
θiL∆yi,t−L + α0i + α1it+ εit.
The parameter δ is equal to ρ− 1 and assumed to be constant across the cross sectional
units. The term
∑pi
L=1 θiL∆yi,t−L, containing lagged dependent variables, is included to
make the error term asymptotically white noise. For each of these models, the corre-
sponding null and alternative hypotheses are summarized in Table 2.11.
The results of the LLC test for the levels and first differences of log-emission per-
capita series of the nine regions are presented in the first row in Table 2.10. For all
specifications, whether an individual deterministic trend and/or an intercept is included,
the LLC-test indicates stationarity in levels of the emission series.
Asymptotic normality of the LLC-test statistic requires
√
N/T to go to zero as N
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goes to infinity. A large time dimension relative to the cross-section dimension justifies
the use of the LLC-test, which is the case in our emission dataset. Indeed, Levin et al.
(2002) recommend applying this test to panels with time dimension between 25 and 250
and cross-section dimension between 10 and 250. However, there are some restrictive
aspects of the LLC-test. First, the hypothesis formulation is restrictive in the sense that
it tests the null hypothesis that all series have a unit root, and rejection indicates that all
series are stationary. Secondly, the parameters δ = ρ−1 are assumed to be homogeneous
across regions. To overcome these disadvantages Im et al. (2003) propose a test based
on averaging the individual ADF statistics, to be discussed next.
Im, Peseran, and Shin (2003)
Im et al. (2003) (IPS) test the null of all series having a unit root against the alternative
that some of the series are stationary, but possibly not all. That is, the null is the same
in use of the LLC test; however, under the alternative, the parameter ρ is allowed to be
different across units. This is formulated as follows:
H0 : ρi=0,
H1 :
ρi < 0 for i = 1, 2, .., N1,ρi = 0 for i = N1 + 1, . . . ., N.
In the ADF form we have three specifications, depending on the inclusion of individual
intercepts and deterministic trends:




Model 2b : ∆yit = δiyi,t−1 +
pi∑
L=1
θiL∆yi,t−L + α0i + εit,
Model 2c : ∆yit = δiyi,t−1 +
pi∑
L=1
θiL∆yi,t−L + α0i + α1it+ εit.
Here, the parameters δi = ρi− 1 are individual specific as opposed to the LLC test. The
corresponding null and alternative hypotheses are summarized in Table 2.12.
The required assumption for consistency of the panel unit root tests is that limN→∞N1/N =
a where 0 < α ≤ 1. That is, as the number of series grows, the fraction of stationary
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Table 2.12: Hypothesis Specification - IPS Test
series is assumed to stay constant. This is a plausible assumption for cross country
studies. Results of this test are also presented in Table 2.10. If we assume individual
deterministic trends, opposite to the LLC-test, the results of the IPS-test (Table 2.10,
row 3) implies that all series have a unit root. If a trend is excluded, the IPS-test implies
stationarity in levels of the series. It seems that including trends changes the results
dramatically. Indeed, this point is highlighted by Breitung (2000), as discussed in the
following section.
Breitung (2000)
Both the IPS and the LLC tests have the disadvantage of requiring T to be large relative
to N . Besides, they are sensitive to the specification of the deterministic trend being
individual specific or not. Breitung (2000) argues that the IPS and the LLC tests have
size distortions as N/T increases; that is, they reject the null hypothesis too often.
Furthermore, there is a substantial loss of power if individual deterministic trends are
included. The panel unit root test proposed by Breitung (2000) is free of these criticisms.
The hypothesis formulation is the same with the LLC test and it assumes a common
unit root process among the series, similar as the LLC test.
Results are presented in the second row of Table 2.10. When the individual determin-
istic trends and intercepts are excluded, the results of the Breitung-test do not conflict
with the previous results. If individual intercepts are included, the Breitung-test does
not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root, while the LLC and IPS tests do reject. If
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individual deterministic trends are included, then the test indicates the presence of a
unit root for each series. Actually, if Breitung’s criticism about the IPS and LLC tests,
namely, that they suffer from loss of power due to the inclusion of individual intercepts
and trends, is the reason why there are conflicting results, we would expect the former
tests not to reject the null of a unit root, while the Breitung test rejects. However, the
situation is just the other way around. The problem could be a size distortion caused by
large N compared to T ; however, in our case T seems to be large compared to N . So,
the conflicting results might not be based on the arguments against the LLC and IPS
tests, as presented by Breitung (2000).
ADF and Philips-Perron (PP) Fisher Chi-square test
The ADF Fisher Chi-square test assumes individual unit root processes under the null
of a unit root. It is similar to the IPS test in terms of its hypothesis formulation and
incorporating the idea to combine the information from individual unit root tests. Its
advantage over the IPS is that it allows for unbalanced panels and different lag lengths
in individual ADF regressions. For the model with individual trends, results support the
hypothesis that all series have a unit root (Table 2.10 – row 4); however, if trends are
excluded, it implies stationarity for the levels. The PP Fisher Chi-square test proposed
by Choi (2001) is suggested when N is large. This test also supports the results of the
Fisher Chi-Square test (Table 2.10 – row 5).
Hadri test
Hadri (2000) proposed a Lagrange multiplier test where the null hypothesis is the sta-
tionarity of all series against the alternative of a unit root in the panel. It is based on the
KPSS univariate unit root test. Results are presented in the last row of Table 2.10. For all
specifications, the Hadri test suggests that levels and first differences are non-stationary.
As a result, the conclusion of the Hadri-test about the first differences conflicts with the
previous tests. The reason is most likely related to the alternative hypothesis of all series
having a unit root. Even if one series is non-stationary, the Hadri-test rejects the null
that all series are stationary. This result may not be surprising; indeed, the univariate
analysis indicates that some series could be non-stationary.
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Table 2.13: p-values from the First Generation Unit Root Tests for the log - GDP Series
Table 2.14: p-values from the Cross-sectional Independence Tests
Log GDP per capita
In Table 2.13, the first generation analysis is replicated for the logarithm of GDP per-
capita series. Results are very similar except for a few cases. Like for the emission series,
the results are very sensitive to the type of the test conducted and the specification
of deterministic terms. Again, the univariate analysis indicates potential presence of
deterministic trends in most of our series. In that sense, model 1c seems to be more
reliable. For this specification, there is very few conflicting results across different tests,
both for the emission and GDP series, which are all found out to be I(1).
2.A.4. Cross-sectional Dependence
For cross-sectional dependence, two specifications are considered, depending on the as-
sumed dependence. The first one ignores common factors by assuming dependence only
through the cross correlations in the errors. We conduct the tests described in De Hoyos
and Sarafidis (2007) to investigate the presence of cross-sectional dependence in our se-
ries. The null hypothesis for all tests is cross-sectional independence. In Table 2.14,
results are presented in which all tests strongly reject the null, and hence indicate that
the error terms, εit in equation (2.8), are correlated across cross-sectional units.
19
The second specification incorporating cross-sectional dependence is a factor model,
19The references in this table are the references used by De Hoyos and Sarafidis (2007). We refer to
this paper for these references.
42
Appendix
where the cross sectional dependence is due to some unobserved common factors. Iden-
tifying the factors is problematic for our data set, due to having nine series for each
variable and a time dimension of 59. A desirable sample size/variable ratio is at least
ten. Another sample size problem arises when selecting the number of factors to be ex-
tracted. For example, the selection criteria proposed in Bai and Ng (2002) are inclined to
choose far more factors than the data generating process assumes in their Monte-Carlo
simulations. However, these problems do not make it impossible to get some valuable
insights by a factor analysis, although one should be cautious in interpreting the results.
The following analysis is mainly in line with the discussions about principle component
analysis in Anderson et al. (2006).
We start with checking whether our panel variables satisfy some conditions for a factor
analysis. Firstly, as discussed in Anderson et al. (2006), the minimum required sample
size/variable ratio is five which is satisfied in our case. However, it is also mentioned
that the desirable ratio is at least ten, which is not satisfied in our case. Secondly, a
substantial number of correlations should be higher that 0.30. This condition is satisfied
as it can be seen from the correlation matrix presented for both the emission and GDP
series in Table 2.15. Secondly, we apply the Bartlett Sphericity test to see whether
there are equal correlations which invalidate a latent structure. As presented in Table
2.16, both for the GDP and the emission series, equality of all correlations is rejected.
Lastly, we check the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy which should be
larger than 0.5 for each variable. In Table 2.17, we show that both variables satisfy this
condition. Therefore, it seems appropriate to apply a factor analysis according to these
conventional methods.
Next, in order to determine the number of common factors, we use parallel analysis
and scree-plots. When the principle component analysis is performed with the levels of
variables, for both the emission and the GDP series, the parallel analysis slightly favors
one common factor, while the scree-plot slightly favors two common factors as can be
seen in Figures 2.12 and 2.13. On the other hand, when the analysis is performed in first
differences, the parallel analysis slightly favors two common factor, while the scree-plot
slightly favors three common factors for each variable, as can be seen in Figures 2.14
and 2.15. As a result, we will continue our analysis for each case, assuming one, two, or
three common factors.
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Table 2.15: Correlation Matrix
Table 2.16: Bartlett Sphericity Test
Table 2.17: Kayser-Meyer-Olkin Sampling Adequacy
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Figure 2.12: Number of Factors in Level of Emission Series
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Figure 2.13: Number of Factors in Level of GDP Series
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Figure 2.14: Number of Factors in First Differences of Emission Series
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Figure 2.15: Number of Factors in First Differences of GDP Series
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We also present for both variables the results of the first generation unit root tests,
assuming that the cross-sectional dependence in our variables is totally due to the factors
common to the cross-sectional units. The test results are presented in Tables 2.18 to 2.21.
The analysis shows that both the common factors and the idosyncratic components are
I(1) processes for both the emission series and the GDP series. This result is robust
whether assuming one, two, or three common factors, extracting the factors by first
differencing or by using the levels of the variables.
2.A.5. Second Generation Panel Unit Root Tests
As presented in the previous section, there is a strong evidence of cross-sectional depen-
dence in our panel variables. Therefore, in this section, we apply second generation unit
root tests allowing for cross-sectional dependence. Firstly, assuming one common factor
for each variable, we apply the cross sectional augmented IPS (CIPS) test suggested by
Pesaran (2007).20 One advantage of this test is that it does not require to estimate the
factors. Secondly, we apply the tests suggested by Moon and Perron (2004), and Bai
and Ng (2004) which allow for more than one common factor, and therefore require the
factor loadings to be estimated. The results of the latter one are presented in the main
text.
Pesaran (2007)
In case of one common factor, Pesaran (2007) suggests to proxy the common factor by
the cross-section averages ȳt and lags. Without the serial correlation, ȳt and ȳt−1 are
sufficient to proxy the common factor. Therefore, by assuming one common factor, the
model given by equation (2.8) can be expressed in ADF form as follows:
∆yit = δiyi,t−1 + α0i + α1it+ biȳt−1 + ciȳt + ξit, (2.9)
where the error term εit in (2.8) is modeled as εit = biȳt−1 + ciȳt + ξit. In order to deal
with serial correlation, these regressions can be augmented with the lags of ∆yit and ∆ȳt.
The null hypothesis, presence of a unit root such that δi = 0 for all i, is tested against
the stationary alternative that δi < 0 for a fixed fraction of the cross-sectional units.
The test statistic proposed by Pesaran (2007) is the cross-sectional augmented version
of the IPS-test. The IPS-test statistic is the average of the univariate ADF tests applied
20IPS stands for the Im-Peseran-Shin test. See Im et al. (2003).
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Table 2.19: p-values from the First Generation Unit Root Tests for Idiosyncratic com-
ponents of the Log Emission-pc Series
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Table 2.21: p-values from the First Generation Unit Root Tests for idiosyncratic com-
ponents of Log GDP-pc Series
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Table 2.22: Pesaran (2007) - p values from the CIPS Test
to each individual series. Therefore, the only required modification for Pesaran’s test is a
slight modification of the standard error of the unit root coefficient estimates due to the
presence of the cross-sectional dependence. Pesaran (2007) shows that the asymptotic
distribution of the Cross sectional augmented ADF (CADF) statistic proposed is free
of nuisance parameters introduced with the factor structure, as N → ∞, followed by
T → ∞, or as N → ∞ and fixed T > 3. The Monte-Carlo simulation performed by
Pesaran (2007) shows that the test has satisfactorily small sample properties even for
very small sample sizes. More specifically, the size properties are satisfactory even for
N = T = 10, and the power of the test increases with N , when N > 30.
Results of the tests proposed in Pesaran (2007), which are presented in Table 2.22,
indicate that all series are I(1) processes. Results are robust to including a deterministic
trend.
Moon and Perron (2004)
The approach followed by Moon and Perron (2004) is similar to Pesaran (2007), in
assuming that the error terms follow a factor structure. In case of one common factor, the
data generating process is identical with the one in Pesaran (2007). Also the hypothesis
formulation is the same as Pesaran (2007). However, Moon and Perron (2004) allow for
more than one common factor. Therefore, the data generating process is given by
∆yit = δiyi,t−1 + α0i + α1it+ γ
′
ift + ξit, (2.10)
for some vector of factors ft, with corresponding vector of parameters γi. In contrast
to Pesaran (2007), the factor loadings have to be estimated. Moon and Perron (2004)
use the information criteria suggested by Bai and Ng (2004) in order to determine the
number of common factors.
In Table 2.23, we present the results of the Moon and Perron (2004) test in case of
one, two, and three common factors. For all cases, the test finds a unit root if trends
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Table 2.23: Moon and Perron (2004) Second Generation Unit Root Test
Table 2.24: Moon, Perron & Philips (2007) Point Optimal Unit Root Test Results
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are included; however, for the case where the trends are excluded, stationarity is the
result. This is valid for both the GDP and the emission data. As noticed in Table
2.23, the results differ substantially depending on the inclusion of deterministic trends.
Moon and Perron (2004) check the asymptotic power of the proposed test against some
local alternatives with a near unit root hypothesis. It is shown that when individual
deterministic trends are included, the proposed test does not possess any asymptotic
power against local alternatives. This issue is further investigated in Moon et al. (2007),
who use the same procedure in order to compare different tests proposed in the literature.
Their finding is that for almost all tests, incidental trends cause a loss of power. In the
same paper, the authors proposed a point optimal test which achieves the power envelop
even in the case of incidental trends. The results for this test are presented in Table
2.24. Test results imply first difference stationarity for all series.
Bai and Ng (2004)
One problem with the panel unit root tests that may cause a substantial bias is the
presence of cross-cointegration across panel units which should be distinguished from the
case where the errors are cross correlated. Therefore, the underlying null hypothesis in
Moon and Perron (2004) and Pesaran (2007) can be restated as all series have a unit root
and there is no cointegrating relationship among all series. Bai and Ng (2004) suggest
a multi-factor framework called “Panel Analysis of Non-stationarity in Idiosyncratic and
Common Components” (PANIC) where the factors and idiosyncratic components are
analyzed separately and hence allows for cross-unit cointegration. Furthermore, this
method allows testing for a unit root in the factors. The results of this test are presented
in the main text.
2.A.6. Pairwise Differencing and Unit Roots
Taking into acount that the pairwise differencing eliminates the cross-sectional depen-
dence (under the assumption of common time effects), we apply first generation unit
root tests for the pairwise differences of the emission and GDP series which are pre-
sented in Table 2.25 and 2.26. Results are in line with the factor analysis that our
pairwise differenced variables are all I(1).
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Table 2.25: First Generation Unit Root Tests for Pairwise Differenced Emission Series
Table 2.26: First Generation Unit Root Tests Pairwise Differenced GDP Series
2.B. Estimation Results under Homogeneity
In the main text, we only consider the heterogeneous case. In this section, we consider
the homogeneous case, i.e.,
yit = f(xit) + λ(t) + εit, (2.11)
with f and λ not region-specific. Our baseline estimations under the assumption of ho-
mogeneous income effects include DOLS estimations, differing in their specifications of
the common deterministic trends, and the CCE estimations which control for the com-
mon stochastic trends. In Figure 2.16, the within sample plots of the baseline estimations
for different polynomials of the hypothesized emission-income relation are depicted. The
number “(#)” on the bottom-right corner of each graph indicates the rank of preference
by BIC, and the curves for which the highest order term of the polynomial is not sig-
nificant is indicated with “ns”. The underlying estimation results are reported in Table
2.27. The predicted curves are in line with the EKC hypothesis for all estimations in
terms of the income effect, since the curves shows the income effects. While the best
fit functional form of all the DOLS estimations are the quadratic equations, selected on
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Figure 2.16: Baseline Estimations under Homogeneity
the basis of the BIC, for the CCE estimation, it is the fourth order polynomial. This
predicts a stabilization in the emissions, but no clear turning point. This is also the case
for the DOLS estimations with the fourth order polynomial. On the other hand, these
results are counterintuitive when interpreting the income effect as a positive scale effect.
Applying the pairwise differencing strategy does not change the results. Figure 2.17,
and the underlying estimation results in Table 2.28, show that a fixed effect estimation
indicates an inverted U-shaped income-emission relation for all polynomial specifications,
except the fifth order polynomial, which is also the best fit curve according to the BIC.
However, when the fixed effects estimation is performed in a DOLS context to increase
efficiency, the fifth order term is not significant. Therefore, the pairwise differencing esti-
mations support the baseline estimations. To sum up, the estimation strategies adopted
under the assumption of homogeneity strongly support the EKC hypothesis in terms of
income, but are counterintuitive when interpreting income as a scale effect.
In order to analyze the decomposition of the total emissions into an income and a
time effect, we use the estimation results of the DOLS pairwise differencing estimation
with fixed effects for China and Western Offshoots, presented in Figure 2.18. The pair-
wise differencing estimation does not identify the levels of these curves. Therefore, we
normalize the curves such that the level of the sample average for each curve is equal to
the average level of the observed emission in that region. The slope of the curves show
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Table 2.27: : Baseline Estimations under Homogeneity
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Figure 2.17: Pairwise Differencing Estimations under Homogeneity
Table 2.28: Pariwise Differencing Estimations Homogeneity
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the estimated change in emission per capita in a specific region for a given period, due to
the given change in income or time (the income effect and time effect, respectively). The
total effect is simply the sum of the income effect and the time effect. A first noteworthy
point in Figure 2.18 is that, for China, the time effects, which represent the technological
factors and the changes in sectoral composition, play a minor role in the total effect, and
just the opposite for Western Offshoots. Secondly, the total effect is mostly increasing
for both regions, and hence there is no evidence towards a decline in overall emissions.
Thirdly, the income effect is positive for China, but negative for Western Offshoots. The
U-shaped income-emission relation predicted by the EKC hypothesis in terms of income
is observed in only the economically developed regions, namely Western Offshoots and
Western Europe (not presented). Therefore, the income effects are responsible for the
inverted U-shaped relation under homogeneity. However, this prediction is at odds to
the interpretation of income as a scale effect. Firstly, time effects for these regions are
estimated to be positive. This means that in these regions factors related to technological
and sectoral composition changes contribute positively to the rising emissions. Secondly,
for these two regions, the total effect is positive in most of the periods. That is, the
total effect is driven by the time effect rather than the income effect. However, one
would expect that in these regions the changes in emissions should be mainly dominated
by the income related factors. This casts doubts on the supportive evidence for the
EKC hypothesis from the estimations under homogeneity which might be a too strong
assumption in our case.
2.B.1. Cointegration
The first and second generation panel unit root tests strongly suggest that our series
are I(1) processes. Therefore, unless there is cointegration for the proposed relations, we
might face a spurious regression problem when we regress emissions on income. Testing
for cointegration in macro-panels is complicated by the presence of cross-sectional de-
pendence and cross unit cointegration. For example, when modeling the cross-sectional
dependence with a common factor structure, Gengenbach et al. (2006) suggest to test
for cointegration among the idiosyncratic components of the variables, only if the com-
mon factors are stationary. Furthermore, if the common factors are also I(1) processes,
then one needs to verify a cointegrating relationship among the factors. This procedure
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Figure 2.18: Income and Time Effects of the Pairwise Differencing – DOLS Estimation
with Fixed Effects under Full Homogeneity
62
Estimation Results under Homogeneity
requires a PANIC analysis which might be appropriate in our case due to the small
time dimension. However, as discussed in Banerjee et al. (2004), these complications
can be handled with a system-based cointegration test when the cross-sectional dimen-
sion is small relative to the time dimension, which is the case in our data set. A further
complication in the EKC context is the presence of nonlinear transformations of the non-
stationary variables. As noted by Wagner (2008), this requires a different asymptotic
theory than the present panel cointegration tests.
In this section, we investigate the validity of the estimation strategies by conducting
several cointegration tests. In a panel setting, cointegrating relationships can be present
across cross-section units for the same variable or across variables measured on the same
cross-section unit. More precisely, consider an observation zijt where i = 1, · · · , N is the
cross-section unit, j = 1, · · · , K denotes K different variables, and finally t = 1, · · · , T
is the time dimension. Assume that for any i and j, the series zijt is integrated of order
one. Then a cointegrated relationship may exist for any combinations of N ×K series.
The first group of cointegration tests ignores the presence of cross-unit cointegration and
tests for the presence of cointegrating relationships among the variables for each cross-
sectional unit. These tests are residual-based tests and they can be considered as an
extension of the first generation unit root tests, applied to the residuals of a regression
among the panel variables. We will consider Kao (1999) and Pedroni (2004) as residual
based tests. A second group of tests we perform are based on a system approach which
allows for cross-unit cointegration. These are Maddala and Wu (1999) and Westerlund
(2007). We apply these tests to the full panel, including all the regions (thus, also,
India, Other Asia, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Former USSR, Africa, and Latin
America).
Residual based tests
The Kao (1999) test is residual based and ignores possible cross unit cointegration. The






εit = ∆xit − E(∆xit).
63
Chapter 2: The Environmental Kuznets Curve:
Identifying Nonlinear Nonstationary Scale Effects
The dependent variable yit is the logarithm of emission per capita. The K − 1 variable
in xit, which in our case are the logarithm of GDP per capita and its higher order terms.
These are (assumed to be) I(1) such that εit is a white noise. In addition, it is assumed
that xit is not cointegrated across i. However, we allow the error terms uit and εit to be
correlated. Finally, dit denotes the deterministic component (whether there is a constant,
trend, or none). The null of no cointegration amounts to testing the null of a unit root
in uit which is conducted in an ADF form regression like:




where ûit denotes the estimated uit. The ADF coefficient is assumed to be homogeneous
and therefore this test can be seen as an extension of the LLC panel unit root test. So,
the null hypothesis is formalized as H0 : σ = 0 against the alternative H0 : σ < 0.
In Table 2.29 the results of the Kao test are presented for the emissions and the GDP
series and for different polynomial specifications of the hypothesized relationship. For
all specifications, the results indicate the presence of a cointegrating relationship.
While Kao’s test is an extension of the LLC-test, the Pedroni (2004) tests are an
extension of the IPS panel unit root test with a heterogeneous alternative. Therefore,
the model allows for different cointegrating vectors across cross section units. That is,
the parameter σ is allowed to be individual specific. In Table 2.30 results of the four
tests proposed in Pedroni (2004) are presented. Each of them is applied to different spec-
ifications of the deterministic data generating component and different specifications of
the alternative hypothesis. The rejection of the null of no cointegration is very rare. It
seems that allowing for heterogeneous cointegrating vectors changes the results substan-
tially. These tests do not account for cross-sectional dependence. Therefore, we apply
the same tests for the demeaned variables by subtracting the cross-sectional averages.
The findings are presented in Tables 2.31 and 2.32, which are similar to the previous
results.
We also need to apply the same tests to the pairwise differences of the variables
in order to test for the validity of the pairwise differencing estimation. For the case
where we assumed heterogeneous income effects, the results are presented in Tables 2.33
and 2.34. The Kao test again indicates a cointegrating relationship for all polynomial
specifications. Also, the Pedroni test gives results towards a cointegrating relationship.
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Table 2.29: Kao (1999) Cointegration Test for logarithm of Emission and GDP series
Table 2.30: Pedroni (2004) Cointegration Test for logarithm of Emission and GDP series
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Table 2.31: Kao (1999) Cointegration Test by Demeaning the logarithm of Emission and
GDP series
Despite the presence of conflicting results, for the quadratic and cubic specifications
most of the Pedroni tests reject the null of no cointegration as long as an intercept, or a
deterministic trend, is included.
System Based Cointegration Tests
The framework suggested by Pedroni (2004) as well as Kao (1999) can be restrictive in
our case, since for both the GDP and the emission series one may expect to find some
long-term relationship across cross-sectional units. This section considers system based
approaches which allow for cross-unit cointegration.
Maddala and Wu (1999) apply the Fisher et al. (1970) technique to combine individual
unit root tests in order to create a combined Fisher-type panel unit root test. By applying
the same idea, they suggest a cointegration test for panels. It is a multivariate likelihood-
ratio analysis and it relies on the VAR representation of the variables. The null is “there
are at most r cointegrating relationships” or “there are r cointegrating relationships”
against the alternative that “there are more than r cointegrating relationships.” The test
is applied for an increasing number of r, until the null cannot be rejected. Results are
presented in Table 2.35. For all series, both the trace-test and the max-eigen value test
indicate the presence of a cointegrating relationship. Another finding is that in some
cases the cointegration matrix is found to be of full rank which implies stationarity for
the series subject to test. The results for the demeaned variables are presented in Table
2.36, which are similar.
For the pairwise differencing regression with heterogeneous income effects, there are
similar findings presented in Table 2.37. Mostly, the test finds at least one cointegrating
relationship, but sometimes indicates a full rank correlation matrix.
Westerlund (2007) provides several tests for the null of no cointegration. The dist-
inghuishing feature of these tests is that they rely on an error-correction representation
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Table 2.32: Pedroni (2004) Cointegration Test by Demeaning the logarithm of Emission
and GDP series
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Table 2.33: Kao (1999) Cointegration Test for the Pairwise Differencing Estimations
with Heterogenous Income Effects
Table 2.34: Pedroni (2004) Cointegration Test for the Pairwise Differencing Estimations
with Heterogenous Income Effects
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Table 2.35: Johansen Fisher Panel Cointegration Test for the logarithm of Emission and
GDP series
Table 2.36: Johansen Fisher Panel Cointegration Test by Demeaning Data the logarithm
of Emission and GDP series
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Table 2.37: Johansen Fisher Panel Cointegration Test for the Pairwise Differencing Es-
timations with Heterogenous Income Effects
of the data. In an error correction model, an insignificant error-correction coefficient im-
plies the null of no cointegration. Westerlund (2007) highlights the important difference
between the residual based tests and the proposed error-correction based tests. The for-
mer one relies on a restriction which the author refers to as the common factor restriction
which is possibly invalid. On the other hand, error correction based tests assume weak
exogeneity. It is mentioned that the test choice depends on a trade-off between these
restrictions.
The data generating process is assumed to be as follows,
yit = φ1i + φ2it+ zit,
xit = xi,t−1 + υit.
Here, xit is a vector of variables which are modeled as random walk processes. On
the other hand, the dependent variable yit is composed of a deterministic part and a
stochastic part, denoted by zit. The stochastic term is modeled as a conditional error
correction model as follows:




where αi(L) = 1 −
∑
j αijL
j and γi(L) =
∑
j γijL
j are polynomials in terms of the lag
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operators. The resulting conditional error-correction model is,
αi(L)∆yit = δ1i + δ2it+ αi(yi,t−1 − β
′
ixi,t−1) + γi(L)
′υit + eit. (2.12)
In order to see the common factor restriction, one subtracts αi(L)β
′




ixi,t) = δ1i + δ2it+ αi(yi,t−1 − β
′
ixi,t−1) + (γi(L)− αi(L)β
′
iυit) + eit. (2.13)
Westerlund’s residual based approach tests the null of no cointegration by testing αi = 0.
The regression on which the tests are based can be stated by rewriting equation (2.13),









There are four tests proposed by Westerlund (2007): The first two test statistics (Gt
and Ga) are group-mean statistics for which the alternative hypothesis is presence of
at least one cointegrating relationship in the panel. The second group of tests provides
panel based statistics (Pt and Pa) for which the alternative hypothesis is the presence of
cointegration for all cross-section units. The tests indicated with a t subscript are simple
t-tests and the ones with a p subscript are averaging T α̂i/α(L) over cross-sectional units.
The proposed tests assume cross-sectional independence. In order to account for the
cross-sectional dependence, we performed the tests with bootstrapping, as suggested by
Westerlund (2007).
The proposed tests also allow for testing for the presence of individual intercepts and
individual trends. The results are presented in Table 2.38 for the baseline estimations.
The null of no cointegration is rejected in only one case for which the null is that there
is at least one cointegrating relationship. The results for the demeaned data without
bootstrapping is presented in Table 2.39. Again, the null of no cointegration is not
rejected by almost all the tests.
For the pairwise differencing regression with heterogeneous income effects, the results
presented in Table 2.40 are slightly different. As long as a constant and/or trend is
included, the likeliness of a cointegrating relation increases. Besides, for the higher
order polynomials likeliness of a cointegrating relation decreases. For the quadratic
equation, most of the tests by Westerlund indicates a cointegrating relationship at the
10% significance level.
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Table 2.38: Westerlund Cointegration Test p-values with Bootstrapping (100) for loga-
rithm of Emission and GDP series
Table 2.39: Westerlund Cointegration Test p-values without / with Bootstrapping (100)
for Demeaned Data
Table 2.40: Westerlund Cointegration Test for Pairwise Differencing (Heterogeneity)
(p-values with Bootstrapping (100))
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2.B.2. Nonparametric Confidence Intervals
We use the smooth-backfitting Nadaraya-Watson estimator following Mammen et al.
(1999), and as explained in Nielsen and Sperlich (2005).
We have a regression model E(Y |X = x) = m(x), Y ∈ R, X ∈ Rd, where x stands
for a fixed point and where we can model this regression additively as :




where m0 = E(Y ). Identification requires E{(mj(Xj)} = 0 for all j > 0. Denoting the
sample size with n, and the the bandwidth with h, such that n1/5h→ ch for a constant
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where m̂j is the smooth backfitting estimate of the j’th additive term, and βj is a function
given by
(β0, ....., βd) = arg min
β0,..,βd
[∫
{β(x)− β0 − β1(x1)− ...− βd(xd)}2 p(x)dx
]
,
where p(x) is the multidimensional kernel density function of X. Our estimated in-
come effects corresponds to individual mj(xj)’s. Therefore, the confidence intervals are
calculated as:
CIj(xj) = m̂j(xj)± 1.96
√
vj(xj),
where vj(xj) = (cK/ch)σ
2
j (xj)/pj(xj). The term cK is equal to 1/(2
√
π), we take ch
equal to one, σ2j (xj) is the variance of residuals conditional upon Xj = xj, and pj(xj) =∫
p(x)dx−j is the marginal density function.
2.B.3. Some estimation results for the other regions
Figure 2.19 shows the estimations of the non-parametric non-stationary approach with
pairwise differencing of the other regions. We use the pairs according to Melenberg et al.
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(2011): Africa is coupled to Latin America, Eastern Europe is coupled to Former USSR,
Former USSR is coupled to India, India is coupled to Former USSR, Latin America is
coupled to Africa, Other Asia is coupled to Western Offshoots, and Western Europe is
coupled to Western Offshoots.
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Pairwise Differencing Forecast of
Global Carbon Dioxide Emissions:
China vs. Time Effects
3.1. Introduction
Considered as one of the most important factors leading to global warming, carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions as a result of economic activity lies at the core of the debates
on climate change. How much CO2 will be emitted in the future is important to the
international community to understand the urgency and stringency of the measures that
should be taken, and central to these discussions is the uncertainty of future emissions.
The literature on the modeling of CO2 emissions is predominated by structural models,
in which some structural parameters, (such as population growth, income growth, and
technological change) are chosen by expert judgements. This subjective uncertainty is
the main drawback of these models in forecasting future emissions. For example, in
the Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), despite the underlying “no change in policy” assumption (see
IPCC (2000) and IPCC (2008)), future forecasts of greenhouse gas emissions range from a
level that is over five times larger than the current level to a reduction by 2100, depending
on the subjective uncertainty. Therefore, probabilistic business-as-usual forecasts as a
benchmark to the structural models are crucially important (Schmalensee et al., 1998).
Although reduced form econometric modeling is a convenient tool for the purpose of
business-as-usual forecasts, and widely used in order to investigate the in-sample func-
tional relation between CO2 emissions and Gross Domestic Production (GDP) per capita
in the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) literature, attempts to make future fore-
casts depending on this relationship is scarce. The main difficulty is that the estimated
77
Chapter 3: Pairwise Differencing Forecast of Global Carbon Dioxide Emissions:
China vs. Time Effects
in-sample functional relations are generally non-linear (such as second or third order
polynomial functions) which potentially lead to implausible future forecasts such as ex-
plosive or zero emissions even in the near future. In this paper we argue that there is
a fundamental endogeneity problem in the reduced form EKC models, stemming from
the insufficiency of time trends to proxy potentially mitigating effects (time effects) such
as technology, industrial composition, preferences, policy, and so on. We deal with this
problem by incorporating the pairwise differencing approach proposed by Vollebergh
et al. (2009) for a stationary context, and further developed by Sen et al. (2014b) to a
non-stationary context. We extend this approach by modeling the time effects in order
to be able to forecast regional and global level CO2 emissions up to 2050 by extrapo-
lating the income and the modeled time effects. In Vollebergh et al. (2009) and Sen
et al. (2014b) income effects are identified independent of the identification problem of
the time effects, under a common time trend assumption between pair regions, but the
time effects are not really modeled. In this paper, we further model the time effects by
treating them as a residual data. That is, our estimation strategy identifies both pure
income related emission pathways (scale effects) and fully flexible time effects which are
expected to follow monotonic trends. While the income (scale) effects should always be
increasing in income per capita, time effects are expected to be decreasing for developed
economies and increasing for developing economies (unless there is a trend break). Ex-
trapolating these monotonic trends is easier compared to extrapolating the potentially
nonlinear total effects.
By disaggregating the total effects into its components, income and time effects, and
extrapolating these separate effects under the assumption of no trend breaks, we are able
to investigate some important questions regarding the international negotiations in an
effort to reduce CO2 emissions: Firstly, does the rapid carbon intensive industrialization,
experienced in the developing regions, like China, constitute the major future threat?
Secondly, are the pollution compensating factors, like the advancement in green tech-
nologies in the developed world, sufficient to reduce future emissions at both the regional
and the global level?
Our main findings are as follows: Firstly, according to our extrapolations, without a
trend break, global CO2 emissions will rise steadily up to 2050, where some optimistic
non-intervention IPCC scenarios indicating a U-turn in our forecast period stay outside
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our 95% confidence interval. Secondly, our extrapolations imply that the income effects
are rising for all regions, and that the time effects of the developed regions partially
offset the rising income effects. This leads to a stablilization of the total effects in
the developed regions. However, the global level extrapolations show that the negative
time effects of the developed regions are far from creating a slow-down in the global total
effects, so an inverted U-shaped relation as suggested by the EKC hypothesis is not likely
to be observed at the global level future emissions, given our business-as-usual scenario.
These results are fully in line with the theoretical arguments in the EKC literature that
environmental degradation, due to a growing scale of the economy, is mitigated as the
economy grows above a threshold level which induces technological change and sectoral
composition towards a more environmental friendly point. Thirdly, the income effect of
China is a strong contributor to the global emissions, reflecting their recent high growth
rates. Moreover, the estimated time effects of China are positive, potentially reflecting
their switch to a coal-based energy input mix, in combination with a shift to industrial
production. However, any scenarios excluding the “China effect” does not change the
global picture. That is, our results indicate that the source of both current and future
growth in global emissions is not mainly China, but the insufficient progress in the green
technologies of developed regions.
This paper is closely related to the EKC literature, initiated by Grossman and
Krueger (1991). The early literature focuses on various indicators for environmental
degradation, and analyzes many sub-samples of countries or regions, by employing para-
metric reduced form models (Shafik and Bandyopadhyay, 1992; Selden and Song, 1994;
Panayotou, 1993; Horvath, 1997; Komen et al., 1997; De Bruyn et al., 1998; Stern, 1998).
As follow up of this early literature, the attention turned towards the econometric tech-
niques employed in the early literature. First, the parametric estimation of the EKC
relation is criticized for being simply a trial and error approach by testing a pre-specified
functional form, and as a solution, non-parametric or semi-parametric econometric tech-
niques were employed (Taskin and Zaim, 2000; Millimet et al., 2003; Azomahou et al.,
2006). Second, the developments in non-stationary panel data estimation techniques
necessitated to revise the earlier findings, by also taking into account the non-linear
specification of a potentially non-stationary variable (Stern, 2004; Muller-Furstenberger
and Wagner, 2007; Wagner, 2008; Galeotti et al., 2009). Third, Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh
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(2005) showed that the homogeneous parameter assumption in panel estimations is too
strong. Allowing heterogeneity, Martinez-Zarzoso and Bengochea-Morancho (2004) used
a pooled mean estimator. Fourth, Vollebergh et al. (2009) argued that the empirical EKC
literature suffers from a fundamental problem due to the identification of the time effects.
They proposed pairwise differencing as a remedy but not allowing for non-stationarity.
In this paper, our in-sample estimations are based on the extension of the method pro-
posed in Sen et al. (2014b), controlling for all these criticisms. Moreover, we extend Sen
et al. (2014b) by updating the dataset with more recent data.
Our paper also directly contributes to the literature forecasting global emissions with
reduced form models. While Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995) use a quadratic specification,
Schmalensee et al. (1998) use a flexible estimator. Auffhammer and Carson (2008) fore-
cast the CO2 emission pathways of China, by aggregating the provincial level forecasts.
In a similar manner, Auffhammer and Steinhauser (2012) forecast US emissions, by fo-
cusing on model selection. Despite the difference that we present global level forecast,
our forecasting strategy is similar in the sense that we also use regional forecasts to con-
struct our global level forecasts. Similar to our approach of dismantling the total effects,
disaggregation across regions can also improve the forecasting performance (Giacomini
and Granger, 2004; Marcellino et al., 2003). None of the mentioned papers account for
potential non-stationarity, parameter heterogeneity, and the endogeneity problem. Our
approach allows us to figure out the driving force of the change in forecasted emissions,
whether it is time effects or income effects of specific regions.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the em-
pirical strategies. Our dataset is described in section 3. In section 4, estimation and
extrapolation results are analyzed. Finally, section 5 contains the conclusion.
3.2. Endogeneity Problem
Structural models in the natural science and engineering literature, such as the so-called
integrated assessment models (IAMs) employed by IPCC, are based on the IPAT identity
(Ehrlich et al., 1971; Commoner, 1972), where the impact (I) is decomposed into three
multiplicative determinants: Population (P ), affluence (A), and technology (T ). This
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identity is formalized as follows:
I = P × A× T
Here affluence is generally proxied by a measure of economic activity scaled by population
(GDP per capita), and A×T constitutes the total per capita impact. The IPAT equation
may support many different points of view (see the survey by ?), and although it is not
explicitly stated in the literature, the reduced form EKC model is also a very flexible
variant of the IPAT identity:
log(I/P ) = logA+ log T + ε,
where ε is a stochastic error term. The common practice is to use CO2 emission levels
as a measure of impact (I), and modeling the impact of affluence (A) as a function of
GDP per capita, rather than directly substituting GDP per capita for A.
Here, a series of problems arise due to the residual term T , which reflects not only
the effect of technology, but possibly also other factors, such as changes in industrial
composition or environmental policy (?). This term is difficult to measure at a macro
level study, and generally interpreted as a residual term (Dietz and Rosa, 1994). In order
to circumvent this problem, the EKC literature generally uses time dummies or a linear
or quadratic time trend as a proxy for this composite effect. However, such an approach
might not properly disentangle the scale effects from the effect of the composite term
T . The reason is as follows: If the time effects, constituting the effect of factors other
than income, are poorly proxied by the postulated time trends, then (If A is not tobe
changed) part of their effect will be treated as a part of the error term. Since income
and the other potentially mitigating factors are likely to be correlated, an endogeneity
problem arises. Therefore, the estimated functional relation between emissions and GDP
per-capita, not taking this endogeneity into account, might capture not only the scale
effects, but possibly also the part of other factors including technology and industrial
composition (see Auffhammer and Carson 2008; Vollebergh et al. 2009, and Sen et al.,
2013). This leads to an omitted variable bias in the model parameters.21 In line with
this argument, the estimated functions might be non-linear, like inverted U-shaped or N-
21See Wooldridge (2010) for an extensive discussion of endogeneity problem in case of imperfectly
proxied omitted variables.
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shaped, while properly identified scale effects will not be decreasing in GDP per capita.
As a result, forecasts depending on these functional forms might lead to counter-intuitive
results, like explosive growth or zero emissions even in the near future. This is elaborated
as the identification problem of the time effects by Vollebergh et al. (2009). It is argued
that the imposed structure on the time effects (like linear or quadratic time trends) is
consequential for the estimated functional form of the relation between emissions and
income. Once the income effects are properly identified, they constitute the pure scale
effects.
Such a disaggregation can also be very useful for extrapolation, since the potentially
nonlinear total effect is decomposed into its determinants, which are more likely to have
monotonic trends unless there is a structural break, and can be extrapolated easily. Fore-
casting the individual income and time effects, instead of the total effect can improve the
forecasting performance (Lütkepohl, 1984; Lükepohl, 1987; Lütkepohl, 2006). In order to
achieve this decomposition, we extend the pairwise differencing approach, first proposed
by Vollebergh et al. (2009), and modified to account for the “non-linear specification of
non-stationary covariates” in Sen et al. (2014b).
3.3. Empirical Strategy
In this section, we explain our empirical strategy. We start with a non-technical descrip-
tion of the in-sample estimations (see Sen et al. (2014b) for further details). Next, we
describe the extrapolation procedure.
3.3.1. In-sample Estimation Strategy
The correlation between per-capita emissions and GDP, documented in the EKC litera-
ture, is basically a combination of the growing scale of the economy, structural changes in
the composition of industries, and the extent to which such developments are affected by
technological change or differences in resource availability. In order to gain insight into
these structural trends, following the IPAT identity, the reduced form panel estimation
technique postulates the general decomposition:
yit = f(xit, i) + λ(i, t) + εit, (3.1)
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where the logarithm of emissions per-capita, yit = log(Iit/Pit), of region (or country) i
in year t is a combination of income effects, f(xit, i) = logAit, and time effects, λ(i, t) =
log(Tit). Here, the income effect is modeled as a fully flexible function f of GDP per-
capita, xit, the time effects as a fully flexible function λ of time, and both effects are fully
heterogeneous (i.e.., region specific). Proper identification of the scale effects requires to
disentangle the effect of xit from the (unobserved) time effects. The common approach
is to assume that the heterogeneity can be fully captured by the fixed effects that are
additively separable from f and λ, which leads to yit = αi +f(xit) +λ(t) + εit, where the
income and time effects are assumed to be homogeneous across regions. Furthermore,
the commonly applied parametric estimation methods postulate functional forms for f
and λ, such as using some degree of polynomials or time dummies. However, as argued
by Vollebergh et al. (2009), the choice of such functional forms are arbitrary to some
degree, and raises a fundamental problem in the identification of the income effects. More
specifically, the choice for λ is consequential for the estimated shape of f . This is a more
crucial problem, if the goal is not just to test a postulated functional relation, but to
identify the functional relation to make future forecasts. Indeed, the results in the EKC
literature illustrate how problematic it is to obtain robust estimations of the long-term
relationship between income and the environmental quality, even with comparable data
sets. Therefore, it is important to be as flexible as possible, when specifying the time
effects.
We start with the general form in equation (3.1), and do not impose any functional
form for the time effects. Instead, by applying pairwise regional time differencing such
that the time series data of the paired regions are substracted from eachother, we elimi-
nate the common time effects of paired regions. Formally, consider the following reduced
form relations for a pair of regions i and k:
yit = fc(xi,t, i) + λc(t) + εc,it
ykt = fc(xk,t, k) + λc(t) + εc,kt
where c = {i, k} indicates the pair. Here λc(t) represents the common time effect, and
fc(xi,t, i) and fc(xk,t, k) are the resulting region-specific income effects. Applying a pair-
wise differencing eliminates the common time effects leading to the following equation:
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(yit − ykt) = fc(xi,t, i)− fc(xk,t, k) + (εc,it − εc,kt) (3.2)
where we assume E(εc,it − εc,kt|xit, xkt) = 0. Therefore, this equation allows estimation
of both fc(xi,t, i) and fc(xk,t, i) without imposing any functional restrictions on the time
effects. Independent of the degree of the similarity of the time effects of the pair regions,
the pairwise differencing is a more flexible approach in controlling for the common time
effects compared to standard panel estimations which impose the assumption of equal
time effects across all cross-sectional units. Moreover, its advantage in eliminating time
effects increases, when the time effects of pair regions are more similar.
Different sets of pairs c correspond to different time effects and generate different
income effects. The income effect in this set-up captures the change in the emissions not
yet captured by the common time effect. In the sequel, we proceed under the assumption
that for each region i there exists a set of pairs ci = (i, ki) such that λci(t) is the time
effect of region i. Choosing the pair regions is key to the identification of the income
effect in our approach. Our prior is that, combining two regions with similar time trends
will result in a good fit, while combining two regions with different time trends will result
in a bad fit. Based on this prior and on the basis of the in-sample fit of equation (3.2), for
each region, we select a corresponding region with a similar time trend. This selection
procedure is referred to as the “Goodness-of-Fit (GoF) prior”. Any specification of the
time effect, such as one being fixed and homogeneous across cross-sections, is also based
on some prior. Our approach simply makes explicit, from the very beginning, that the
empirical evidence on the the EKC relationship cannot be inferred automatically, but
always depends upon one’s prior (Heckman, 2000).
One can impose further restrictions on equation (3.2), depending on the employed
estimation strategy. In Sen et al. (2014b), a wide range of estimations accounting for
several problems are conducted. Firstly, it is shown that homogeneity of income ef-
fects across regions is a very strong assumption, driving the inverted U-shaped results in
the literature. Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh (2005), by employing a formal test, reach the
same conclusion. So, here, we assume full heterogeneity across regions, as well as pairs.
Secondly, equation (3.2) can be estimated both parametrically and non-parametrically.
Non-parametric techniques are superior by allowing a fully flexible estimation of func-
tional forms. However, they might suffer from over-fitting and end-of sample biases,
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which deteriorates their usefulness in forecasting. Therefore, in this paper, we perform
semi-parametric estimations of equation (3.2), by using polynomials up to the fifth or-
der. In contrast to Vollebergh et al. (2009), we control for nonlinearity of non-stationary
variables, by adopting the estimation strategy “efficient nonstationary nonlinear least
squares” (ENNLS) suggested by Chang et al. (2001). Thus, we also take into account
both the non-linearity and non-stationary properties of the variables. Indeed, Sen et al.
(2014b) show that per capita emission and GDP series are potentially integrated of order
one. 22
Following the estimation of the income effects, the residual time effects can be ob-
tained from:
λ(t, i) + εit = yit − f̂(xit, i)
λ(t, k) + εkt = ykt − f̂(xkt, k),
where f̂(.) is the estimated income effects. Under the assumption that λ(t) = λ(t, i) =
λ(t, k), the difference between the two expressions is idiosyncratic. Vollebergh et al.
(2009) suggest to callibrate λ(t) as average of yit − f̂(xit, i) and ykt − f̂(xkt, k). Finally,
the total effect is estimated as the sum of the estimated income and time effects.
This procedure reveals the time effects as residuals (i.e., observed minus estimated
income effects). Therefore, we consider these revealed time effects as a series to be
modeled econometrically. In this paper, we extend Vollebergh et al. (2009) and Sen et al.
(2014b) by modeling the revealed time effects as univariate autoregressive integrated
moving average (ARIMA) processes, possibly with deterministic trends.
In the EKC literature, an estimate of the function f(.) is interpreted as a combined
effect of scale, technological, compositional, and other possible effects, since technological
change potentially depends on income and emissions. However, pairwise differencing
identifies the pure effect of income growth on emissions. Therefore, the estimated income
effects are interpreted as scale effects, and time effects reflect a composite effect, which
is argued to be dominated by technological change and compositional effects in the
theoretical EKC literature (see, for example, Taylor and Copeland (2004)). In theory,
properly identified scale effects must be increasing in GDP per capita, which puts a check
22See Wagner (2008) for a discussion of these problems. Pairwise differencing is a possibilty to account
for these problems.
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on our results. An inverted U-shaped relation in total emissions can only arise, if the
time effects are negative and strong enough to offset the scale effects.
Non-parametric estimations may suffer from end-of-sample biases, which may drive
out-of-sample predictions. Therefore, we prefer a parametric approach in making in-
sample estimations of equation (3.2) to estimate the income effects prior to the projec-
tions. However, compared to parametric estimation strategies, non-parametric ones have
the advantage of imposing far less structure on the income effects. For this reason, we
base our pair selection procedure, the GoF prior, on non-parametric estimations. As
the non-parametric estimation strategy, we follow Schienle (2011) where the proposed
non-parametric estimator applies to the cases with multiple nonstationary covariates.23
The chosen pairs are intuitive, such as Western Offshoots with Western Europe, East-
ern Europe with Former USSR, India with Latin America. For these six regions, every
individual best pair is also the best pair of the other pair. However, this should not
necessarily be the case for every region. Indeed, Latin America stands as the best pair
also for China and Africa, and India is the best pair also for Other Asia.
3.3.2. Out-of-sample Extrapolation
In this section we briefly describe our extrapolation procedure. We start with extrapo-
lating the income and time effects of each region. Next, the total effects of each region
is obtained as the sum of the forecasted income and time effects. Finally, the extrapola-
tions of the global income and total effects are the sum of the regional effects weighted
by population. Global time effects are obtained as residuals. Before describing the ex-
trapolation method of the individual series, we first formalize the aggregation process.
In order to save on notation, in formulizing the aggregation process, we denote the levels
of the series with the same notation which we used for the logarithm of the series in
the previous subsection. Firstly, in line with the IPAT identity, the total effect for each
region is given by
23The generalized smooth backfitting (G-SBF) estimator suggested by Schienle (2011), which applies
to the cases with multiple nonstationary covariates, reduces to classical smooth backfitting (C-SBF)
estimator (Mammen et al., 1999), under the assumption that the two dimensional nonstationarity of the
paired GDP pc. series is as nonstationary as in the univariate GDP pc. series. Following this result, we
implement classical SBF as explained inNielsen and Sperlich (2005).
86
Empirical Strategy
ŷi,T+h|T = f̂i,T+h|T λ̂i,T+h|T,
where f̂i,T+h|T is the predicted levels of income effects for region i, h year ahead of the
final sample year T , based on the information available at time T . Forecasts of regional
time effects are denoted with λ̂i,T+h. The forecasts of total effects, ŷi,T+h|T , reflects the
regional per capita impact. Forecasted levels of global total effects can be calculated as







where the subscript w indicates the series at the global level, p stands for population,
and N is number of regions. In the same manner, global income effects can be calculated







where f̂w,T+h|T is the predicted levels of income effects for the whole world (w). Now,





Next, we describe how the individual series are extrapolated.
In order to perform the above procedure, first we need to extrapolate all the rele-
vant series to the future. We make out-of-sample extrapolations with simple univariate
ARIMA techniques, possibly augmented with linear trends. The forecasting model for
each individual series is chosen from a pool of models. Candidate models are combina-
tions of autoregressive and moving average terms up to order two, a linear or a quadratic
time trend, and we also allow the series to be I(1). That is, candidate models are in the
class of ARIMA models with deterministic trends. In choosing the forecasting model,
we do not impose the order of integration a priori based on unit root tests. Instead, we
allow the model selection criteria to choose the order of integration for each series as
suggested by Chatfield (2002).
24Alternatively, one can work with series in logarithms, and the total effects can be derived by summing
the logarithms of income and time effects.
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In the main text, we present the results using BIC as the model selection criterion.
This model selection criterion penalizes for increasing number of parameters, hence miti-
gates the over-fitting problem. In the main text, we present our results based on forecasts
derived from models which are chosen according to their in-sample fit. Alternatively, one
can divide the sample into an estimation period and a test period, and choose the model
which predicts the test period better. This method also accounts for the over-fitting
problem. In the Appendix, we present our results from model selection based on out-
of-sample-fit evaluated with forecast mean squared errors (MSE). Our main results are
robust to these considerations. Selected models for each individual series, their extrap-
olations, and some diagnostic tests are presented at the Appendix.
Taking logarithms of GDP and population series is a common application in econo-
metric modeling for various purposes. In the context of forecasting, the goal of a loga-
rithmic transformation might be to obtain a series with a relatively stationary variance.
In their simulation, Lütkepohl and Xu (2012) show that a logarithmic transformation
improves forecasts, only if the variance of the level variable is stationarized. On the other
hand, forecasting in logarithms may result in dramatic distortions in forecast accuracy,
if the level variable has already a stationary variance. Based on this finding, we allow
the model selection process to choose whether a logarithmic transformation is required.
Another issue in case of modeling the log-transformed variable is about transforming
forecasts back into levels. Simply exponentiating the log-forecasts in order to obtain
level-forecasts might not be optimal. Instead, following Granger and Newbold (1976),
we apply the following transformation:




where σ̂2ln(y) is the mean squared error of log-forecasts.
3.4. Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our dataset is a balanced panel for all countries, covering the period between 1950 and
2010. CO2 emission data consist of the sum of emissions from gas, liquid and solid
fuels (based on consumption figures), and from gas flaring and cement production (see
88
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Boden et al., 1995; Marland et al., 2009; Boden and Andres., 2013). For each type
of fuel, data on annual CO2 emissions result from three aspects: the amount of fuel
consumed, the fraction of the fuel that becomes oxidized, and a factor for the carbon
content of the fuel. The fuel types incorporated in the calculations are coal, other solid
fuels, crude oil, petroleum products, and natural gas. Total energy use and emissions
per country are corrected for exports and imports of fuels, as well as for stock changes,
international marine bunkers, and non-energy use of fuels, such as chemical feedstock.
The estimation of the amounts of CO2 released through gas flaring are based on the
UNSTAT database, supplemented by estimations from DOE/EIA. The estimations of the
amounts of CO2 released from cement manufacturing are based on figures indicating the
quantity of manufactured cement, the average calcium oxide content per unit of cement
and a factor to convert the calcium oxide content into CO2 equivalents. Data on GDP
and population are taken from Bolt and van Zanden (2013). All figures are expressed
in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars, using purchasing power parities. Following
Maddison (2009), we aggregate data on a country by country basis into nine regions:
India, China, “Other Asia”, western Europe, Eastern Europe, former USSR, “Western
Offshoots”, Africa, and Latin America. In contrast to the division into regions by the
IPCC, we distinguish explicitly between Eastern Europe and Former USSR, divide the
“old” OECD in Western Europe (old EU) and what we indicate as “Western Offshoots”
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States), while Japan, together with
the countries of the Middle East are grouped under the name “Other Asia”. Finally, we
split the IPCC region ALM into Africa and Latin America. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 present
our basic data.
Looking at our data on the distribution of GDP per capita (see Figure 3.1), West-
ern Offshoots have by far the highest income per capita, whereas, in particular, India
and Africa are on the lowest end of the scale. Clearly, the distribution has changed
remarkably over time. At the beginning of our sample period, there were three clubs
with Russia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America forming a rather stable middle-income
group. Because of instability in these middle income regions as well as the remarkable
growth for Other Asia and China since the 1990s, the set of middle-income countries
currently contains five out of our nine regions.
Interestingly, both the distribution and development over time, the region-specific
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per-capita CO2 emissions are remarkably different (see Figure 3.2). The carbon inten-
sity in the Western Offshoots has always been much higher than in any other region,
followed by Former USSR, Western and Eastern Europe. Since these emissions reached
a peak in Western Europe in the 1970s, carbon intensity there has remained more or
less constant, whereas Former USSR and Eastern Europe have experienced a strong de-
cline in emissions since the beginning of the 1990s. Most remarkable, however, is the
recent, very high growth rate in China. China’s growth in carbon intensity since 2001
is almost unprecedented. The only precursor in growth in per-capita carbon intensity
since World War II, is the development in Western Offshoots during the 1960s. Indeed,
China’s per-capita carbon emissions have already reached the level of Eastern Europe of
2010.
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Units Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max.
Emission Tons(mln) 534.976 336.746 477.245 18.171 2259.856
GDP 1990dollar(bln) 3293.401 1673.159 4503.200 183.017 29058.937
Population mln 689.883 372.464 794.709 87.637 4138.919
Emission pc. kg. 1483.931 699.753 1559.259 30.604 5806.490
GDP pc. 1990dollar 6118.600 4277.080 6369.410 448.022 30547.928
Emission pc. (log) 6.591 6.551 1.325 3.421 8.667
GDP pc. (log) 8.234 8.361 1.016 6.105 10.327
Note: Descriptive statistics are for the period 1950 - 2006. Total number of observation is 513.
Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics of the data. Our data-set, aggregated over the
regions, contains 9 regions and 61 years, resulting in 549 observations for all variables in
our panel of CO2 emissions.
3.5. Results
In this section, we present our regional and global emission projections. There are two
patterns in the regional forecasts depending on the slope of the time effects. For the
developed regions, Western Offshoots and Western Europe, the time effects are negatively
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sloped, possibly indicating that contribution of technological and compositional effects
to CO2 emissions are decreasing. For the other regions, the time effects are positively
sloped. Here, we only present the results for China, representing the developing regions,
and Western Offshoots, representing the developed regions. Interpretations of the results
extends to other regions in these two groups.
In line with theoretical arguments in the EKC literature, in the analysis below, we
interpret the time effects as a composite effect, reflecting not only the effect of technology
but also industrial composition.
3.5.1. Is the developments in green technologies sufficient to reduce
emissions at the regional and global level?
Figure 3.3 illustrates the in-sample estimates and the projections for China. Since the
levels of the curves are not identified in the semi-parametric specifications, we normalize
the curves per region in such a way that the average log-levels equals the corresponding
sample average of the logarithm of CO2 emissions per capita. In case of the income
effect, we plot the f(xit, i) for the given region, i, as a function of time t, so that we
actually plot the income effect using the income level at time t. Thus, moving from 1990
to 1991, the figures show the effect of the change in per-capita income between 1990 and
1991. Similarly, the time effect in the figure represents the estimated technological plus
compositional effects for an additional year. Finally, the total effect just consists of the
income effect plus the time effect at time t.
The results in Figure 3.3 illustrate that both income and time effects are increasing
for China. That is, both the effect of the growing scale of the economy, and the combined
effects of technological change and change in industrial composition are strong contrib-
utors to the emissions of China. In the corresponding future projections, this pattern is
not likely to change for the period up to 2050, unless there is a structural change. This
pattern is qualitatively the same for other developing regions.
The results for Western Offshoots are presented in Figure 3.4. Being in line with the
theoretical arguments in the EKC literature, the income effect is increasing, while the
time effect is decreasing. Therefore, the technological and compositional effect mitigates
the increase in emissions due to a growing scale of the economy. Furthermore, it seems
that there is a stabilization in emission per capita, which is likely to create a slow-down
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in emissions.
Our regional in-sample estimates and forecasts illustrate how pairwise differencing
leads to results in-line with theory, by allowing for full-flexibility in the specification of the
time effects. Thus, properly identified income effects seem to reflect pure scale effects, as
is illustrated by the estimated income effects that are increasing.25 The common inverted
U-shaped and N-shaped findings in the EKC literature likely have to be interpreted as
the combined effects of scale, technology, and industrial composition.
The pairwise differencing approach has some important advantages in forecasting.
Firstly, the potentially nonlinear total effect is decomposed into its determinants, which
are more likely to exhibit monotonic trends. Clearly, the estimated inverted U-shaped or
N-shaped total effects in the EKC literature are not appropriate for forecasting purposes,
since they often lead to forecasts with explosively increasing emissions, or zero emissions
in the long-run. On the other hand, as illustrated in Figure 3.3 and 3.4, our findings
indicate that the individual income and time effects are likely to have monotonic trends.
25Indeed, for all regions, our estimated income effects are increasing reflecting the emissions as a result
of growing scale of the economy. These results are given in the appendix.
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Under the assumption of no trend break, extrapolating these monotonic individual trends
are more convenient which prevents the counter intuitive results stemming from the use
of the non-linear total effects. Moreover, Giacomini and Granger (2004) show that
forecasting individual effects, instead of aggregate effects, can improve the forecasting
performance. We achieve such a decomposition by decomposing the global effects into
regional income and time effects.
We make simple future extrapolations for the global emissions based on population-
weighted averages for each region’s best-fit estimates. To compute these global averages,
we weight each of our region specific GoF estimates (after transforming our log estimates
into levels) of the income and time effects with the region specific population levels.
Similarly, we weight the future projections with projections of the population levels.
The results in Figure 3.5 presents the development of our region specific findings. The
pattern in the time effects are dominated by the developing world. That is, they are
increasing and expected to increase in the future. However, this trend in time effects is
not sufficient to compensate the increasing income effects. As a result, our projection
indicates a sharp rise in global emissions.
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In theory, the effect of industrial composition should constitute a less important
role in the time effects at a global level, compared to its role at the regional level.
The reason is that the change in sectoral composition, affecting the emission level, is
hypothesized to be mostly driven by a shift of dirty industries from regions with strict
environmental regulations to the regions with less strict regulations (Pollution Haven
Hypothesis). Clearly, such an effect should cancel out at the global level, since it is a mere
replacement of dirty industries. Another reason for the change in sectoral composition
can be the directed technological change towards cleaner technologies, which can be
considered as a technological effect rather than a compositional effect. Therefore, in
theory, global time effects should constitute technological effects. Given this explanation,
we can answer the question whether technological progress will be sufficient to create a
slow-down in future emissions. Our global level forecasts illustrate that such a slow-down
is not likely, indicating a pessimistic picture. Although, there is some mitigating effect
of technological change in the developed regions, these are far from being sufficient to
compensate the effect of a growing scale of the global economy.
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3.5.2. Is China the main threat in combating with global warming?
Our finding of a positive time effect for China reflects their recent switch to a coal-
based energy input mix, as well as their strong industrial expansion, both of which have
contributed to the recent upsurge in global carbon emissions. However, this trend has
not co-evolved with a strong enough negative time effect in developed regions, such as
Western Europe and Western Offshoots, in order to induce an overall reduction in global
per-capita carbon emissions. In fact, the underlying regional trends in emission patterns
make a reversal of the overall global trend quite unlikely, for the next decades at least.
These findings strengthen the concerns that high growth rates by China, which are
expected to continue for the following decades, may constitute the main problem for the
struggle against environmental degradation. In order to analyze if this is the case, we
forecast global emissions by excluding China. Figure 3.6 illustrates the results. Although
the recent strong growth in per-capita emissions in China certainly have contributed to
the renewed upward overall trend (Figure 3.5), the same result is obtained when we
exclude China from the sample. This suggests that the underlying current developments
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in the other regions have been such that the downward sloping time effect cannot com-
pensate for the strong positive income effect. This remarkable result is at odds with the
popular view that particularly China would be the most important threat to the policies
that aim at stabilizing global carbon emissions.
3.5.3. Comparison with IPCC Scenarios
In this section we compare our extrapolations with some representative IPCC scenarios.
In Figure 3.7, four different IPCC scenarios are presented. These projections are called
“Representative Concentration Pathways”(RCP) which are selected to represent the wide
range of scenarios published in the literature at 2007 (see Moss et al. 2010 for a detailed
discussion about the selection process). In Figure 3.7, each individual RCP is labeled
by the name of its modelling team. The most optimist one among the four, IMAGE
(RCP 2.6) (van Vuuren et al., 2007), represents the 10th percentile of the mitigation
scenarios. MESSAGE (RCP 8.5) (Riahi et al., 2007), being a pessimist one, represents
the 90th percentile of the range spanned by emission scenarios by IPCC. MiniCAM
(RCP 4.5) (Clarke et al., 2007; Smith and Wigley, 2006; Wise et al., 2009) and AIM
(RCP 6.0) (Fujino et al., 2006; Hijioka and Kainuma, 2008) stands between these two
extreme scenarios.
In Figure 3.7, we also present the 95 percent confidence intervals based on our ex-
trapolations. The confidence intervals includes the uncertainity of all the parameters in
our model. Our baseline extrapolations supports the range spanned by IPCC scenarios
between the 90th and 60th percentile. Except MESSAGE, other three scenarios predicts
a peak until 2050, which seems unlikely according to our 95 percent confidence intervals
constructed from our baseline extrapolations. Our confidence intervals also exclude the
most pessimistic scenario, MESSAGE, at its earliar stage.
An important point is that the presented IPCC projections are based on no-policy
scenarios. Our results indicate that a peak in the emissions up to 2050 is not likely
unless there is a trend break such as strong policy interventions implemented in the
future. That is, the current pace of the changes in income-related emissions and in
potentially mitigating factors are not likely to create a slow-down in our forecast period.
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The pairwise differencing approach is a flexible way to disentangle the scale effects from
other factors. Our results show that such a decomposition can reveal some powerful
insights about the underlying trends driving the global CO2 emissions, and provides a
convenient tool to make future extrapolations. Our results reveal a pattern consistent
with the role of scale effects in the growth and environment literature that the income
effects are positive for any region. That is, GDP per capita and the corresponding amount
of emissions are always positively linked. This shows that the pairwise differencing
approach is able to identify the scale effects properly.
While we find a strong income effect leading to a sharp rise in global emissions, the
global time effects, dominated by the trends in the developed regions, play a mitigating
role, but far from compensating the strong income effects. As a result, our extrapolations
do not even imply a slow down in global CO2 emissions up to 2050. We further present
an analysis regarding the recent role of China in the global emission pathways. We find
that the pessimistic patterns revealed by our forecasts is not driven by China alone, but
another important problem is the weakness of the time effects in the developed regions
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to create a global U-turn.
As a final note, there are some points in our analysis that are open to be improved
by future research. Firstly, our analysis fully relies on historical data, including the
projections of GDP and poulation series, by which we aim to avoid subjective uncertainty.
However, expert judgements about the future evolution of these series can easily be
incorporated in our analysis in order to produce more scenario-based forecasts. For
example, our future forecasts of population for China implies a downturn around 2030,
which can be a reasonable forecast due to the one-child policy of China. However, if one
believes only a slow-down, but not a downturn as a possible scenario, this can be easily
incorporated as a constraint in the forecasting model. Furthermore, since we are able to
decompose the income and time effects, such scenarios can also include expert views on
these series.
A second point is that our pairwise differencing estimations rely on the GoF prior in
order to match regions which have similar time effects. In our view, a matching strategy
based on an expert judgment can also be legitimate. Indeed, the matching by GoF prior
produce intuitive results, such as matching Western Europe with Western Offshoots, or
Eastern Europe with Former USSR. Any estimation in the EKC literature applies such
prior beliefs, like imposing homogeneous income and time effects in the panel estimations.
However, using expert judgment can be infeasible when there are many cross-sectional
units, and the GoF prior becomes a necessity. Using another matching process, possibly
relying on observed data relevant to the time effects, can be a possible future research
avenue.
3.A. Appendix
3.A.1. Model selection based on out-of-sample performance
In this section, we present our results from using the alternative model selection process
where we decompose our data into an estimation and a test sample. We estimate the
candidate models with the sample up to 1995. We make the model selection based on
their performance in predicting the observed data from 1996 to 2010. We assess the fit
with forecast mean squared errors of the candidate models.
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Figure 3.8 and 3.9 present the extrapolation results from using the out-of-sample fit
method for model selection. The results are qualitatively similar. The only remarkable
difference with our baseline extrapolations is that the increase in income effects of China
is now weaker. Similarly, the extrapolations of global effects are again similar to our
baseline extrapolations as presented in Figure 3.10.
A comparison with the IPCC scenarios is presented in Figure 3.11. The general trend
is similar to our baseline estimations, only with the difference that AIM slightly stays in
our confidence intervals until it peaks around 2040.
3.A.2. Estimation Tables
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Table 3.2: Pairwise Diffirenced ENNLS Estimations Africa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP pc. 0.330∗ -18.601 593.753
(0.183) (11.801) (374.078)
GDP pc.2 1.296 -82.888 40.236
(0.808) (51.408) (26.035)
GDP pc.3 3.857 -7.486 3.630
(2.355) (4.766) (2.423)




Pair-GDP pc. 887.479∗∗∗ 868.708∗∗∗ 1834.764∗∗∗ 1808.438∗∗∗ 1781.608∗∗∗
(321.327) (316.992) (664.891) (647.254) (631.060)
Pair-GDP pc.2 -58.732∗∗∗ -58.238∗∗∗ -121.014∗∗∗ -119.290∗∗∗ -117.533∗∗∗
(21.055) (20.763) (43.280) (42.129) (41.072)
Pair-GDP pc.3 1.296∗∗∗ 1.300∗∗∗ 2.660∗∗∗ 2.622∗∗∗ 2.584∗∗∗
(0.460) (0.454) (0.939) (0.914) (0.891)
Adjusted R2 0.329 0.347 0.368 0.368 0.369
AIC -155.6 -156.4 -157.3 -157.3 -157.3
BIC -147.3 -146.0 -144.8 -144.9 -144.9
Observations 59 59 59 59 59
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Table 3.3: Pairwise Diffirenced ENNLS Estimations China
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP pc. 0.580∗∗∗ 2.727∗ 10.205 -342.021∗
(0.096) (1.461) (16.912) (179.381)
GDP pc.2 -0.146 -1.135 69.209∗ -21.674∗
(0.098) (2.224) (35.795) (12.387)
GDP pc.3 0.044 -6.174∗ 5.855∗
(0.097) (3.165) (3.275)




Pair-GDP pc. -3411.581∗∗∗ -4661.428∗∗∗ -4451.421∗∗∗ -4937.352∗∗∗ -4856.458∗∗∗
(810.560) (1141.808) (1226.812) (1209.169) (1206.476)
Pair-GDP pc.2 221.896∗∗∗ 304.755∗∗∗ 290.903∗∗∗ 322.350∗∗∗ 317.077∗∗∗
(53.185) (75.267) (80.824) (79.610) (79.445)
Pair-GDP pc.3 -4.810∗∗∗ -6.641∗∗∗ -6.336∗∗∗ -7.014∗∗∗ -6.900∗∗∗
(1.163) (1.654) (1.775) (1.747) (1.744)
Pair-GDP pc.4
Pair-GDP pc.5
Adjusted R2 0.908 0.909 0.907 0.912 0.912
AIC -32.1 -31.8 -29.7 -32.1 -31.8
BIC -23.8 -21.4 -17.2 -17.6 -17.3
Observations 59 59 59 59 59
Standard errors in parentheses
Note:
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.4: Pairwise Diffirenced ENNLS Estimations Eastern Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP pc. 0.193∗∗∗ -0.103 -23.622 -101.314
(0.037) (0.910) (29.692) (257.954)
GDP pc.2 0.018 2.823 -1.393
(0.054) (3.541) (1.784)
GDP pc.3 -0.111 0.223 2.784
(0.141) (0.283) (7.367)




Pair-GDP pc. 0.256∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗





Adjusted R2 0.322 0.311 0.303 0.303 0.293
AIC -169.3 -167.4 -166.0 -166.0 -166.1
BIC -163.1 -159.1 -155.7 -155.6 -155.8
Observations 59 59 59 59 59
Standard errors in parentheses
Note:
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.5: Pairwise Diffirenced ENNLS Estimations Former USSR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP pc. 0.256∗∗∗ 0.924 106.317
(0.049) (1.855) (83.290)
GDP pc.2 -0.039 -12.513 6.379
(0.109) (9.852) (4.937)
GDP pc.3 0.492 -0.999 0.514
(0.388) (0.778) (0.390)




Pair-GDP pc. 0.193∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗





Adjusted R2 0.322 0.311 0.327 0.327 0.328
AIC -169.3 -167.5 -169.0 -167.0 -167.0
BIC -163.1 -159.1 -160.7 -156.6 -156.6
Observations 59 59 59 59 59
Standard errors in parentheses
Note:
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.6: Pairwise Diffirenced ENNLS Estimations India
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP pc. 1.348∗∗∗ 10.433∗∗∗ 72.286∗∗∗ -1139.634∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.992) (21.299) (323.338)
GDP pc.2 -0.642∗∗∗ -9.097∗∗∗ 243.308∗∗∗ -74.074∗∗∗
(0.067) (2.911) (67.340) (22.835)
GDP pc.3 0.385∗∗∗ -22.938∗∗∗ 21.183∗∗∗
(0.133) (6.225) (6.323)












Adjusted R2 0.955 0.970 0.974 0.979 0.979
AIC -129.7 -152.5 -159.0 -172.3 -172.2
BIC -121.4 -144.1 -148.6 -161.9 -161.8
Observations 59 59 59 59 59
Standard errors in parentheses
Note:
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.7: Pairwise Diffirenced ENNLS Estimations Latin America
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP pc. 0.973∗∗∗ 9.449∗∗ 60.282
(0.110) (4.551) (123.162)
GDP pc.2 -0.507∗ -6.680 4.133
(0.272) (14.888) (7.308)
GDP pc.3 0.250 -0.612 0.376
(0.600) (1.176) (0.578)







Pair-GDP pc.3 -0.911∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ 0.744∗∗∗ 0.744∗∗∗ 0.744∗∗∗
(0.269) (0.177) (0.186) (0.186) (0.186)
Pair-GDP pc.4 0.023∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Pair-GDP pc.5 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Adjusted R2 0.974 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.975
AIC -161.7 -163.6 -161.9 -161.8 -161.8
BIC -153.4 -153.2 -149.4 -149.4 -149.4
Observations 59 59 59 59 59
Standard errors in parentheses
Note:
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.8: Pairwise Diffirenced ENNLS Estimations Other Asia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP pc. 1.469∗∗∗ 17.111∗∗∗ 16.943 -508.560∗∗∗
(0.104) (1.413) (37.468) (165.146)
GDP pc.2 -1.003∗∗∗ -0.979 2.685
(0.090) (4.832) (2.341)
GDP pc.3 -0.001 -0.349 16.872∗∗∗
(0.208) (0.402) (5.368)








Pair-GDP pc.3 1.178∗∗∗ 1.172∗∗∗ 1.181∗∗∗ 1.030∗∗∗
(0.192) (0.200) (0.198) (0.190)
Pair-GDP pc.4 -0.122∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020)
Pair-GDP pc.5 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Adjusted R2 0.854 0.952 0.950 0.951 0.957
AIC -92.6 -159.1 -156.8 -157.1 -164.4
BIC -84.2 -148.7 -144.3 -144.6 -149.9
Observations 59 59 59 59 59
Standard errors in parentheses
Note:
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.9: Pairwise Diffirenced ENNLS Estimations Western Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP pc. 0.831∗∗∗ 7.741∗∗∗ 50.799∗∗∗ 169.069
(0.058) (1.800) (13.809) (103.354)
GDP pc.2 -0.396∗∗∗ -5.302∗∗∗ 2.920∗∗∗
(0.103) (1.480) (0.768)
GDP pc.3 0.186∗∗∗ -0.405∗∗∗ -3.739
(0.053) (0.110) (2.424)




Pair-GDP pc. 0.958∗∗∗ 13.233∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗






Adjusted R2 0.799 0.831 0.832 0.831 0.835
AIC -243.5 -253.0 -253.8 -253.4 -255.8
BIC -237.2 -242.6 -243.4 -243.0 -245.4
Observations 59 59 59 59 59
Standard errors in parentheses
Note:
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.10: Pairwise Diffirenced ENNLS Estimations Western Offshoots
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP pc. 0.500∗∗∗ 7.913∗∗∗ 29.122
(0.181) (2.079) (50.940)
GDP pc.2 -0.385∗∗∗ -2.518 1.944
(0.110) (5.116) (2.668)
GDP pc.3 0.071 -0.232 0.430∗
(0.171) (0.357) (0.246)




Pair-GDP pc. 150.103∗∗∗ 13.214∗∗∗ 14.218∗∗∗ 14.186∗∗∗
(41.799) (3.229) (4.112) (4.056)
Pair-GDP pc.2 -9.118∗∗∗ -0.396∗∗∗ -0.428∗∗∗ -0.427∗∗∗
(2.572) (0.104) (0.131) (0.129)






Adjusted R2 0.832 0.831 0.829 0.829 0.833
AIC -255.7 -253.0 -253.2 -253.2 -254.5
BIC -247.4 -242.6 -242.9 -242.8 -242.0
Observations 59 59 59 59 59
Standard errors in parentheses
Note:
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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The conventional view is that enhancing environmental quality via regulations hampers
productivity growth by imposing extra costs on firms, such as reducing incentives to
innovate. Mitigating this concern, there is a growing literature which provides empiri-
cal and theoretical evidence that more stringent environmental regulations direct R&D
towards environment-friendly technologies (see surveys by Jaffe et al., 2003; Ricci, 2007;
Popp et al., 2010). While ameliorating the negative effect on productivity, in an economy
with profit maximizing firms, induced innovation may not totally offset the productivity
loss, since it may crowd out some of the existing R&D activity (Popp and Newell, 2012).
Indeed, if a given regulation could achieve to enhance overall productivity, it is expected
that the profit maximizing firms would undertake it even in the absence of regulations.
A limited number of empirical studies present opposing evidence that environmental reg-
ulations increase, not only R&D on clean technologies but “overall” R&D activity. For
example, Jaffe and Palmer (1997) find that within industries there is a positive relation-
ship between total R&D expenditure and stringency of environmental regulation proxied
by pollution abatement costs. More recently, Hamamoto (2006) supports this finding
by providing evidence from Japanese industries. In the current paper, we address these
conflicting findings by departing from the profit maximizing manager assumption.
In the corporate governance literature, following Jensen and Meckling (1976), it is
argued that, due to the agency problems associated with the separation of ownership
and managership, firms may not be profit maximizer. As argued by Nelson and Winter
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(1982) and Hart (1983), while maximization of profits is in line with the interests of the
owners, firm behavior may also be determined by so called satisficing managers whose
concerns are their private benefits. In Hart (1983), it is assumed that the managers
get a fixed utility when their income satisfies a minimum level, and a utility of −∞
otherwise. Under this condition, it is shown that owners may choose to pay a fixed wage
as long as the firm achieves a threshold profit level, and zero otherwise. Another way to
explain this situation is that managers obtain private benefits of control as long as they
avoid bankcruptcy; however, they have a negative utility, if the firm is out of business
(see Aghion and Griffith, 2005). We incorporate this approach in order to illustrate the
implications of ownership-managership separation on the relationship between aggregate
productivity growth and environmental regulation. We assume that a fraction of firms
are governed by satisficing managers. The usefulness of this framework is that we are
able to model corporate governance structure as a combination of two extreme cases,
where owner controlled firms, maximizing their profits, are on the one extreme, and the
mangerial firms, avoiding bankcruptcy, on the other. Therefore, we are able to present a
general model leading to testable implications given the properties of existing ownership
structure data.
Our model indicates that environmental regulation reduces the incentives of firms
to innovate by eroding the monopoly rents for owner-controlled firms. However, for
managerial firms where ownership and managership are separated, this conclusion is no
longer valid. Since any effort beyond avoiding bankruptcy provides no extra utility for a
satisficing manager, environmental regulations act as a disciplinary device, forcing them
to innovate more. Depending on the prevalence of managerial firms in the economy,
this distinction between owner-controlled and managerial firms makes it possible for
environmental regulations to spur overall innovation, while ameliorating environmental
pollution.
We conduct a country level empirical analysis in order to test our theoretical pre-
diction that in countries where managerial firms with satisficing managers are more
common, more stringent environmental regulations lead to higher innovation. Our main
proxy for environmental stringency is tax-inclusive fuel prices across countries. As sug-
gested by Aghion et al. (2010), fuel prices can be considered as the price of carbon, which
may have an impact on innovative behavior in automobile firms. By using patent counts
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of countries as an indicator of innovative activity, we test whether fuel prices have a
differential effect on innovation across countries depending on the relative prevalence of
managerial firms. In order to construct a measure of ownership structure, we rely on firm
level data. Since we use fuel prices as a proxy for environmental stringency, following
Aghion et al. (2010), we restrict our sample to one industry category, “Manufacturing
of motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers” (hereafter, auto industry) as defined by the
statistical classification in the European Union (NACE Rev 1.1 or NACE Rev 2). For
this industry category, we classify firms as managerial or owner-controlled depending on
their ownership concentration. Our panel data estimations show that in countries where
the fraction of managerial firms is higher, increasing fuel prices have a higher innovation
encouraging effect. This result suggests that by imposing more stringent environmental
regulations, countries may achieve higher growth rates by encouraging innovation, as
firms evolve to an ownership structure where separation of management from ownership
is higher (Berle and Means, 1932).
This paper is related to the literature on the Porter Hypothesis. According to Porter
and Van der Linde (1995), a properly designed environmental policy can lead to more
innovation which reduces the net cost of regulation. They provide anecdotal evidence for
how environmental regulations lead particular firms to innovate and adapt new technolo-
gies, which, in turn, results in a net benefit. In the literature, explanations of the Porter
Hypothesis are centered around some type of market failure (see, among others, Simpson
et al., 1996; Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw, 1999; Mohr, 2002; Greaker, 2003; Popp, 2005;
Mohr and Saha, 2008; André et al., 2009). On the other hand, as in our paper, there are
a small number of papers questioning the profit maximizing manager assumption (for
example Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné, 1997; Ambec and Barla, 2002). Among these,
indicating a future research area, only the survey by Jaffe et al. (2003) discuss how the
satisficing manager assumption can lead to outcomes in line with the Porter Hypothesis.
Secondly, our paper is related to the corporate governance literature investigating the
effect of managership-ownership separation on the performance of firms, mostly mea-
sured by accounting profit rates or Tobin’s Q (for example Demsetz and Lehn, 1985;
Cho, 1998; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Holderness et al.,
1998). Our paper differs from this literature by taking outcome of innovation, patents,
as a measure of performance. The only paper taking this approach is ?, which shows
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that there is a positive effect of institutional ownership on innovation. We also provide
supportive evidence towards this hypothesis that fewer agency problems associated with
ownership structure leads to more innovation. However, none of these papers investigate
the differential effect of a given regulation depending on the ownership structure, which
constitutes our main hypothesis in this paper. Our paper presents the only country
level study on this relationship, which enables us to exploit directly the cross-country
variations in environmental stringency.
There are only a limited number of papers investigating the relationship between
patent counts and environmental regulations in a cross-country framework, such as Vries
and Withagen (2005), Popp (2006), and Johnstone et al. (2010). All these papers focus
on patenting activity in clean technologies in response to a specific type of environmental
regulation. This is a weak form of the Porter Hypothesis, and there is also supportive
empirical evidences at the firm level (for example Lanjouw and Mody, 1996; Brunner-
meier and Cohen, 2003). On the other hand, our focus is the strong form of the Porter
Hypothesis, predicting an increase in overall innovation in response to more stringent
environmental regulations. Our goal is to identify the specific channel through the own-
ership structure, which may lead to outcomes in line with this hypothesis.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present our model.
Section 3 describes our empirical strategy. We present the empirical results in Section
4. Section 5 concludes.
4.2. Model
In this section, in order to illustrate how environmental regulations can affect techno-
logical change depending on ownership structure, we present a static model of aggregate
innovation. We choose the simplest framework in terms of the agent taxed for pollution
(for example households or producers) and the stage of economic activity where pollu-
tion occurs (for example production or consumption), while maintaining that the model
illustrates all our proposed channels through which environmental regulations affect in-
novation. However, our main theoretical results hold under different configurations.
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4.2.1. Environmental Regulation and Innovation
There is a unique final output, Y , with price normalized to one. It is produced from








where xi is the intermediate input used, and Ai is its productivity in final good produc-
tion. The final good is used in consumption, intermediate goods production, and R&D
activity. Therefore, our economy-wide resource constraint is given by
Y = C +X + Z,
where C is consumption, X is aggregate spending on intermediate goods production,
and Z is total R&D spending. Assuming perfect competition in the final good market,






where pi is the price of variety i.
Market structure is assumed to be same for each intermediate good. The leading
edge version of each variety is produced by a monopolist, and its production requires
1/ψM units of final good and 1/z units of pollution, which are constant and equal across
i.26 Therefore, the unit cost of each monopolist is
cM = ψM + τz,
where τ is the economy-wide pollution tax levied per unit of pollution.27 We assume that
the monopolist is forced to charge a limit price in response to a competitive fringe of
26By taking emission intensity as a constant we exclude the possibility of induced innovation. We
can also endogenize pollution intensity; however, we will see that our framework is sufficient to reach
our main empirical hypothesis. On the other hand, endogenizing environmental innovations may lead
to new and richer insights.
27Our model can be modified to allow for unit costs increasing with technology level, Ai. Thus, it can
be extended to a case where unit cost changes across sectors.
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imitators, producing the same variety with a higher marginal cost ψF > ψM .28 Therefore,
the monopolist sets the price of its variety equal to cF = ψF + τz, which prevents a
possible entry by the fringe firms. Substituting the limit price in equation (4.2) gives the

















Any intermediate good producer can freely engage in R&D activity. Each R&D
activity in sector i raises the productivity of variety (Ai) by a factor γ > 1, and grants
a monopoly power to the innovator to produce the leading edge version of that variety.
Following Aghion and Griffith (2005), we assume that R&D spending raises the size of
innovation in a deterministic manner.
Producing a blueprint of a variety, which raises its productivity by size γ, requires
to incur a variable cost of γ2Ai/2 . Innovating firms differ in their degree of separation
between ownership and managership. While owners benefit more from higher profits,
the managers’ main concern is their private benefit. We consider two extreme cases. On
the one hand we have no separation, where the firm is a pure profit maximizer. On the
other hand we have full separation, where there is a “conservative” firm in the sense that
for the satisficing manager any effort beyond avoiding bankruptcy provides no further
utility. We assume that innovation requires also to incur a fixed cost of κjAi, where
κj > 0. Here, j ∈ {pm, sm} indicates the ownership structure, where pm stands for
profit maximizer, and sm is for satisficing manager. The fixed cost of managerial firms
is assumed to be higher compared to the profit maximizer firms, since managerial firms
might have to incur extra costs in case of innovation such as training the manager. That
is, κsm ≥ κpm.
A profit maximizing manager chooses γ, which maximizes net benefit from R&D:
28Our main result is independent of the limit pricing assumption. However, it may be more intuitive
in the context of the satisficing manager assumption. All results remain valid, if would assume a very



















The monopoly profits can be rewritten in terms of γPMi as (γ
PM
i )
2Ai. In order to have
that an incumbent gains a non-negative benefit from innovation, (γpmi )
2Ai−(γpmi )2Ai/2−
κpmAi ≥ 0 must hold. Rearranging this expression, we impose the following assumption:
Assumption 1: γpmi ≥
√
2κpm.
Otherwise, there would be no incentive for the intermediate good producers to innovate.
The effect of pollution tax on a profit maximizing manager’s innovation decision is
given by following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. More stringent environmental regulation discourages innovation by












Here, pollution tax increases the limit price, reducing the rents which the monopolist
appropriates. In response, the monopolist reduces the innovation size, which, in turn,
reduces the demand for intermediate goods. As a result, the monopolist’s output de-
creases as well as the emission level. So, an improvement in the environmental condition
comes at the cost of a lower output.
However, the innovation reducing effect of environmental regulation is not granted,
once we take satisficing behavior of managers into consideration. A satisficing manager’s
objective is to avoid bankruptcy, and further effort reduces his utility. Therefore, the
optimum R&D decision leads to zero profit net of the fixed costs:
πi(γAi) = κ
smAi.
This gives the optimal size of innovation for the satisficing manager as
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The following proposition states the effect of pollution tax on a satisficing manager’s
innovation decision.
Proposition 4.2. More stringent environmental regulation encourages innovation by











As in the profit-maximizing case, pollution tax reduces the monopoly rents, which,
in turn, reduces the demand for intermediate goods. If the satisficing manager responds
by reducing innovation, bankruptcy is unavoidable, since a satisficing manager always
chooses innovation size at a level just preventing bankruptcy. Therefore, a satisficing
manager increases innovation size in order to maintain the same level of demand before
the increase in pollution tax. That is, environmental regulations reduce slack behavior
in satisficing managers in the sense that they are forced to have higher innovation size
in order to avoid bankruptcy.
A peripheral point in this model, which does not have any consequences on the main
results is that the relative innovation size of two types of firms depends on the difference
between their fixed costs. When κsm = κpm, profit maximizer has a higher innovation
size. When κsm is higher, the difference in the innovation size of two types of firms
reduces. When κsm is sufficiently high, the innovation size of a satisficing manager is
suboptimally higher than that of a profit maximizer. Such a case may seem unrealistic in
our model, where κ reflects the fixed costs of innovation to the firms. However, avoiding
bankruptcy is an extreme type of satisficing behaviour. In a more detailed model, one
can model satisficing behaviour by specifying the utility function of a manager, and
excluding fixed costs of R&D. In this case, κ can be related to the manager’s ability of
adopting to a new technology. Or it might be related to some career concerns. Therefore,
the innovation size of a satisficng manager can be separated from the cost structure of
the firm given that satisficing behaviour always avoids bankruptcy. In such a model, a
suboptimally high innovation by a satisficing manager is not unrealistic. Note that the
relative innovation size of two types of firms does not effect our main results which are
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regarded with the response of firms to a pollution tax. Therefore, in the current model,
we avoid such complications.
4.2.2. Aggregation
The pollution level resulting from production of a variety is given by Et = zxi. Substi-








Obviously, there are two channels through which raising τ affects Ei. The direct effect
is a decline in monopoly rents which reduces equilibrium pollution. The indirect effect
is through its influence on productivity. For the profit maximizer, this indirect effect
is also negative. Therefore, pollution decreases when environmental regulation is more
stringent. However, for the satisficing manager, the indirect effect is positive. It can
be shown that these two opposing effects are neutralized. Hence, satisficing managers
keep the equilibrium amount of intermediate good unchanged. Therefore, the pollution
level does not change. In order to clarify this point, it is convenient to work with the
pollution-output ratio. Substituting equation (4.3) in (4.1), the final good produced by








Note that the effect of τ on Yi is similar to its effect on Ei. The emission-output ratio
can be calculated as zα/(ψF + τz). Now it is clear that the emission-output ratio is
independent of the degree of separation between ownership and managership, and more
stringent environmental regulation always reduces this ratio. The distinction is that
in response to a higher pollution tax, in order to reduce this ratio, profit maximizing
firms decrease both output and emission, while satisficing managers increase output
to meet this ratio. In other words, the satisficing manager’s optimal response is only
to increase productivity of their variety, so that the negative direct effect of taxation
through depressing monopoly rents is balanced with an increase in demand. The result
is an unchanged level of pollution, but a higher output level through productivity gains.
The equilibrium final good production can be calculated by integrating both sides of
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where the fraction of firms with satisficing managers is denoted by s ∈ [0, 1]. The average
technology levels are denoted by Ā for the whole economy, Asm for the type sm firms,
and Apm for the type pm firms. Therefore the average innovation size, γA, is given by
γAĀ = (1− s)γpmApm + sγsmAsm.29 Substituting γpm and γsm yields



















where aj = Aj/Ā. Here, the first term represents the direct effect of τ on innovation
size, γA, which is negative. This direct channel is about decreasing monopoly rents,
and independent of ownership structure. The second term represents the indirect effect
through the ownership structure, s, which is positive. The total effect of τ on γA is equal
to (1−s)(∂γpm/∂τ)apm+s(∂γsm/∂τ)asm, which has an ambiguous sign. We can directly
substitute the partial derivatives in this expression from equation (4.5) and (4.7) which




















where α̃ = α1/(1−α)/(1 − α). Taking the derivative of equation (4.10) with respect to s
leads to our main result:
















29We measure the degree of separation in an economy as a linear combination of full separation and
no separation. Here, the satisficing manager assumption is very useful, in the sense that it illustrates
an extreme case where the agency costs are most severe, in contrast to the profit maximizing firm
assumption. As indicated by Aghion et al. (1997), in practice, the objective function of each individual
manager is likely to be a convex combination of these two extreme cases. Therefore, our assumption,
which allows the construction of an indicator for a country level study, can be seen as an approximation.
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which is always positive. Therefore, more stringent environmental regulations marginally
lead to relatively higher innovation in economies where the degree of separation between
ownership and managership is relatively high.
These results suggest that, everything else constant, for the countries where manage-
rial firms are more prevalant, higher pollution taxes have a higher innovation encouraging
effect, although their performance in terms of innovative outcome can be lower. The to-
tal effect of an increase in pollution tax depends on the magnitude of two countervailing
effects. The direct effect is negative; however, this is mitigated by its effect through
ownership structure.
According to equation (4.11), compensation of the direct negative effect of fuel prices
is stronger when emission intensity is higher.30 If the indirect positive effect of fuel prices
in relation to ownership structure is sufficiently strong, a positive net effect of pollution
tax on innovation is also possible. Such an outcome is more likely when fraction of
managerial firms, fixed costs of R&D to satisficing managers, competitive pressure from
the fringe firms, emission intensity, and relative knowledge stock of satisficing firms
compared to owner-controlled firms are all higher.
It is important for our empirical strategy that this result of our model is independent
of the type of agent taxed for environmental pollution. If the tax is levied on households
or final good producers instead of intermediate good producers, demand for intermediate
goods falls. The monopolists’ response depends on the type of ownership. That is, the
indirect channel works in the same manner with the case where the monopolists are
taxed. Therefore, in all cases, there is a differential effect of pollution tax depending on
the ownership structure. However, taxing households or final good producers does not
trigger the direct channel which works through reducing monopoly rents.
Our goal in this section is to illustrate the proposed mechanism, and derive consistent
testable predictions. Therefore, our model is kept simple, at the cost of leaving some in-
teresting questions unanswered. Importantly, we do not analyze under which conditions,
regulations might not create this differential effect on innovation. More specifically, in
our model, any regulation that triggers a change in the demand for the polluting good
will result in the same differential innovative response depending on ownership structure.
30A sufficient condition for this result is (2 − α)/(1 − α) > τ + ψF /z. That is, emission intensity
should not be too small.
131
Chapter 4: Corporate Governance, Environmental Regulations, and Technological
Change
Indeed, this is not realistic, and the question of why some regulations may create this
outcome, while some may not, is an interesting question for future research. One possible
avenue relates to the assumptions on the substitution possibilities. When there exists
a substitute for the input which is taxed, both the satisficing managers and the profit
maximizing owners may switch between the substitutes. The net effect on innovation
will depend on the structure imposed on the variable and fixed costs. Therefore, the
mechanism proposed may not work in every circumstance. Our underlying assumption
is that either the elasticity of substitution is low, or the tax rates are not sufficiently
high, preventing a switch. These assumptions make sense in the current context. First
of all, although there have been substantial improvements in clean technologies such as
non-renewable energy production, it is still in its infancy compared to dirty technolo-
gies, leading to a low substitution possibility. Secondly, there are well-known political
frictions (for example international coordination failures) such that environmental reg-
ulations cannot be as stringent as required in order to trigger a switch towards clean
technologies. However, these assumptions may not be argued to be valid in every con-
text.
Another possible improvement is to model the behavioral consequences of managership-
ownership separation more precisely. Satisficing and profit maximizing managers as-
sumptions are very useful in the same framework, in the sense that they illustrate ex-
treme cases in terms of agency costs. However, one can go further by endogenizing
ownership structure. This may have interesting implications, since in response to a given
regulation, firms may re-evaluate their ownership structure.
4.3. Empirical Strategy
The main predictions of our theoretical model are
1. Direct effect of environmental stringency on innovation is negative.
2. Indirect effect of environmental stringency through ownership structure stimulates
greater innovation when ownership and managership are more separated.
In order to test these predictions, we follow the common approach of using patent counts
as a proxy for innovation size. For count variables, the outcome is non-negative, mostly
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zero for a substantial number of observations, and unbounded from above. This requires
us to use appropriate estimation techniques accounting for these properties. We will
show that our patent count data is also characterized by these properties. Therefore, we
estimate the hypothesized relationship using non-linear count data estimation techniques
in a maximum likelihood framework. Consider the following non-linear specification:
E(INNit|Zi,t−1) = exp(α1STRi,t−1 + +βOWNi,t−1STRi,t−1 + δXi,t−1), (4.12)
where INN is the innovation size of country i in year t, and Zi,t−1 stands for all right
hand side variables. In equation (4.12), STR is a measure of environmental stringency;
therefore, our first prediction indicates that α1 should be negative. OWN is the fraction
of firms with satisficing managers in country i. Therefore, β measures the indirect effect
of STR through OWN . Our second prediction indicates that it should be positive.
Finally, X is a set of control variables including ownership indicator, country-fixed effects,
and a full set of time dummies.
For environmental stringency, the ideal measure is the shadow price of pollution,
which is difficult to observe. The common approach is to use proxies such as polluting-
input prices, abatement expenditures, or characteristics of environmental regulations
(Jaffe et al., 2003). Since the policy variable in our model, measuring environmental
stringency, is a pollution tax, using polluting-input prices is preferable as a proxy for
environmental stringency. Following Aghion et al. (2010), we use tax-inclusive fuel prices
as our main proxy for environmental stringency.31 Fuel prices can be considered as a
proxy for the shadow price of pollution (Aghion et al., 2010), which refers to the pollution
tax, τ , in our theoretical model. Of course, not all industries are sensitive to tax-inclusive
fuel prices in terms of innovative behavior. However, it is expected that, when fuel prices
increase, automobile manufacturers will respond by making carbon saving innovations
31In our theoretical model, tax is levied on the innovating sector; however, note that fuel prices
and taxes are end-use prices and taxes, and paid by households or enterprises. Hence, these cannot
be directly considered as polluting-input prices for the intermediate sector. However, as we discussed
previously, our main theoretical predictions remain robust, if τ is levied on households or final good
producers instead of intermediate good producers. Furthermore, we make no assumptions about the
stage of economic activity at which pollution occurs. Our only assumption is that pollution is directly
linked to the equilibrium amount of intermediate goods.
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(Aghion et al., 2010). Therefore, we restrict our sample to the auto industry. We also
check the robustness of our results by using R&D subsidies proxied by government R&D
budget appropriation and expenditure on environmental protection.
In order to construct the ownership indicator, implied by our theoretical model as
a fraction of ownership-managership separated firms, we rely on firm level data. We
follow the general approach of using ownership concentration as a proxy for ownership-
managership separation, since a higher level of concentration reduces agency problems.
Adopting this approach, one strand of literature investigates the determinants of own-
ership structure and its effect on firm performance, following Demsetz and Lehn (1985),
where ownership structure is proxied by the share of dominant shareholders such as the
top five or top twenty shareholders. However, such a measure can be criticized for not
taking into account the fact that managers of many firms hold some shares, which mit-
igates agency problems. For this reason, a number of studies prefer to use managerial
shareholdings instead of ownership concentration (Cho, 1998; Hermalin and Weisbach,
1988; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Holderness et al., 1998; Loderer and Martin, 1997; Mc-
Connell and Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988). However, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001)
argue that this measure also has limitations. The most important problem is that domi-
nant shareholders generally have representatives as board members, and they cannot be
considered as satisficing managers. Revealing the severity of such a problem, Demsetz
and Villalonga (2001) report that in their sample there is a correlation of 0.67 between the
fraction of shares held by families and the fraction of managers’ shares. Clearly, both
proxies are imperfect; however, using dominant shareholder data has some additional
advantages in our case, which we will discuss later.
4.3.1. Data and Descriptive Statistics
Patent Data
The World Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) by the European Patent Office
(EPO) provides data on firm level patent counts which are categorized according to the
international patent classification (IPC). The statistical office of the European Union
(EUROSTAT) documents the applications to the EPO at national level by priority year
and NACE industry classification.32 It covers an unbalanced panel of patent counts for
32NACE classes are derived in line with IPC categories.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of Patent Counts
Note: Graph excludes the range where patent counts are higher than 600 for which there
are very few observations.
48 countries from 1977 to 2009. We extract all available Eurostat data for the automobile
industry.
The number of patents is a count variable, including only non-negative values with
no natural upper bound. A common property of count variables is that they are highly
skewed to the right. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, these properties also hold for our
patent count variable. About 60% of the observational values are close to zero, more
specifically below 20. This is crucial for our estimation strategy, which we will discuss
in detail in following sections.
Count of patents is a preferred measure of innovative outcome and activity of a firm
or country for several reasons, which are all well documented in the literature (see ? for a
detailed discussion). However, it is not a perfect measure, and there are some important
points that should be taken into account in an econometric analysis employing patent
counts. First of all, the propensity of an inventor to apply for a patent to EPO may vary
across countries depending on the market conditions, quality of institutions in protecting
the patent rights, and variation in patent law. In order to deal with these country specific
differences, we simply employ country fixed effects in our regressions.
Another problem is that patent counts weight all patents equally, ignoring their rela-
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tive importance. The common practice in the literature, dealing with this problem, is to
make robustness checks by using a measure of patent quality in order to obtain quality
adjusted patent counts. For this purpose, future citations to a patent is a frequently used
measure of its quality. Obviously, this requires a dataset with a sufficiently long time
dimension in order to allow sufficient time for the patents observed in the final period
to receive citations. For this reason, such an approach is not feasible in our case, since
our ownership data restricts our sample between 2003 and 2009. Still, there are several
reasons why unweighted patent counts can be sufficient in our case. Firstly, this problem
is partially mitigated in our study by only using patent applications to the EPO. Since an
application to the EPO is more expensive compared to an application to national patent
offices, this strategy eliminates low quality patents (Johnstone et al., 2010). Secondly, in
a cross-country setting, using citations in order to weight patents may not be so crucial
compared to a firm level study, since the change in mean quality at country level is not
expected to be as high as the change within the firms. The reason is that a firm can
change its innovation quality easily, for example by hiring more qualified researchers.
However, at the country level, such an attempt requires long term investments, such
as education. Therefore, using patent counts may suffice, considering our short time
dimension of our dataset.
Our estimation strategy can still account for some source of variation in the quality
distribution of patents. Firstly, if the quality differences among countries are due only to
country specific time-invariant characteristics, then fixed effects estimation can control
for this concern. Moreover, if the change in quality is a worldwide trend, then time dum-
mies eliminate this effect. Therefore, the assumption required is that, in our time period,
relative quality differences among countries does not change over time. More specifically,
we assume that, between 2003 and 2009, the relative differences in the citations received
by the representative patents of countries remain constant. This can be argued to be
valid due to our short time period.
This assumption is also consistent with recent theoretical and emprical evidence. In
theory, there are two reasons to expect a systematic variation in the quality of inno-
vative activity. Firstly, a variation in quality may be observed over time, such that as
knowledge stock increases, it may be more difficult to create new inventions. Note that,
in theory, this suggests that we have to control for initial levels of technology. Fixed
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effects estimation controls for such a concern. However, in practice, such diminishing
returns may exhibit heterogenous time patterns across countries. However, Popp (2012)
finds no emprical evidence for this. Secondly, it may be argued that the highest quality
projects are those first undertaken by entrepreneurs, and additional investment goes to
lower quality projects. Therefore, one might expect to see diminishing returns to R&D
spending in a given year. Indeed, Popp (2012) finds that an increase in the number of
patents in a given year decreases the probability that these patents will receive future
citations. As a consequence, higher patent counts are associated with lower quality.
Therefore, ignoring citation weights requires us to assume that the rate of diminishing
returns in terms of innovation quality does not exhibit heterogenous time patterns across
countries, which seems realistic due to our short time period. In this case, again, such a
concern can be accounted for by fixed effects estimation with time dummies. Note that
it is realistic even to assume that this rate does not change over short time periods, since,
as we argued, a shift in the quality distribution of innovative outcome at country level
requires long-term investments such as education. This may also explain the fact that
most results in the literature do not change by weighting patent counts with citations.
Tax Inclusive Fuel Prices
Fuel price data are from the International Energy Agency (IEA) which are available for
35 countries from 1978 to 2011. Our preferred variable is tax-inclusive diesel-fuel prices,
since it reflects the full price of using carbon.33 The IEA provides this data for different
sectors and types of fuels. Among these, we use household data, since it is the largest.
We present robustness checks with the alternative measures.
Figure 4.2 presents the tax inclusive fuel prices for some auto producer countries from
distinct locations around the world. There seems to be a worldwide general upward trend
with a peak around 2008. However, there is also heterogeneity in the patterns exhibited,
in which the different tax regimes of these countries may play a role.
33Market may respond to tax exclusive fuel prices and taxes differently. However, using tax data
reduces our sample size substantially.
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Figure 4.2: Tax Inclusive Fuel Prices (US$/unit, PPP adjusted)
Ownership Data
As a measure of separation between ownership and managership, we use the Bureau van
Dijk’s (BvD) independence indicator which is available in the ORBIS database. BvD’s
indicator classifies firms into four categories: A company is classified as A when no
recorded shareholder has more than 25% of the shares. If a company is not in category
A, and there is no recorded shareholder with an ownership percentage over 50%, then
it is classified as B. Companies in categories C and D have at least one owner with an
ownership percentage over 50%. The final category is U, indicating unknown situation.
We consider category A and B firms as managerial, and category C and D firms as
owner-controlled. We also control for sensitivity of our results by taking only category
A firms as managerial.
We filter the data of automobile firms from 48 countries for which patent counts are
available in the EUROSTAT database. This produces a list of 86,015 firms, which is
close to the total population size. As can be seen in Figure 4.3, among these firms, we
have around 13,000 active firms per year with a known ownership situation for 2005 and
onwards, and around 8,000 from 2003 to 2005. Since the number of firms with a known
ownership situation remains very small until 2003, we exclude the years before this date.
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Figure 4.3: Total Number of Firms by Ownership Category
Figure 4.4: Percentages of Firms by Ownership Category
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Although there are a substantial number of observations, this number increases signif-
icantly over time, which may constitute a problem if the selection of observational units
for an individual country changes over time depending on firm characteristics affecting
the composition of the ownership structure. Figure 4.4 illustrates that the relative num-
ber of firms across categories (for all countries in our sample) changes little over time.
Interestingly, this pattern is also valid for 2001 and 2002 where the number of firms is
relatively small compared to the following years. Here, it seems unlikely that the problem
we described and the pattern depicted in Figure 4.4 coexist. In Section 4, we extensively
investigate whether sample selection raise a problem in our analysis.
The firms with no ownership information at a specific year are denoted with “U”
by the BvD indicator. Although the BvD dataset lists nearly all firms for most of the
countries in our sample, for some countries, the firms in category U constitute a high
fraction of the listed firms. As long as the firms with a known situation do not differ
across countries in those characteristics, which are correlated with ownership structure,
this will not constitute a problem. However, it is possible that in some countries only
the large firms have a known situation, while in some other countries, the unknown
situation is more heterogeneous in terms of firm size. At the same time, firm size may
be related with ownership structure as argued in the corporate governance literature,
following Demsetz and Lehn (1985). In order to control for such a situation, we employ
the size data, which is available in the ORBIS database for all the listed firms, including
those with unknown ownership status. BvD categorizes firms as “very large”, “large”,
“medium”, and “small”. This categorization depends on pre-determined thresholds for
four variables: operating revenue, number of employees, total assets, and being publicly
listed or not. For example, a firm is categorized as very large, even if only one of these
variables exceeds the relevant threshold. Therefore, prevalence of one of these variables
is sufficient to determine the size of a firm, which explains why it is available for all listed
firms.
There are several advantages of using the BvD independence indicator. Firstly, it can
be constructed for a substantially larger number of firms compared to the measures that
depend on the top five or twenty shareholder ownership percentage. Basically, there are
two reasons for this. Firstly, what we need is not the shares of the top five shareholders,
but only information about owners who hold 50% of the shares. That is, when two
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shareholders have 50% ownership, then other unknown shareholders will not have a
share higher than 50%. Secondly, for many firms, not all shareholders are recorded,
and those recorded are more likely to be dominant ones. That is, it is very likely that
other unknown owners’ shares are less than the shares of the recorded ones. Indeed,
BvD indicates the reliability of the indicator with a “+” or “−” sign. For example, if a
firm is classified as A−, this means that there is only one recorded shareholder whose
ownership percentage is less than 25%. As a result, our sample size is substantially
larger than the previous studies, which mostly focus on publicly listed or very large
companies. As Aghion and Griffith (2005) argue, when the focus is on the differential
behavior between owner-controlled and managerial firms, restricting the sample with
large or publicly listed firms may not be appropriate, since these firms are likely to be
managerial. This may have a substantial effect in our case, since our goal is to construct
a country level indicator which is the fraction of managerial firms. For example, although
large firms from developed countries are more likely to be managerial firms compared to
their counterparts in developing countries, it is also more likely that the fraction of small
size firms which are likely to be owner-controlled is also higher in developed countries.
Therefore, having a representative sample is crucial.
Another advantage of using BvD’s indicator is that it accounts for an indirect own-
ership structure. Consider a case where firm A owns 80% of firm X and 80% of firm Y,
and both firms X and Y have 40% of shares of firm B. Here, if we only consider direct
ownership linkages of B, it is classified as a managerial firm, since neither X nor Y has
more than 50% of shares. However, A indirectly owns 64% of B. So, it is classified as
owner-controlled when we consider the indirect ownership structure. As Demsetz and
Villalonga (2001) argue, such external owners mostly have representatives in firm boards,
who cannot be considered as “pure manager personnel”.
Other Data
In order to check the robustness of our results, we also use proxies for R&D subsidies on
environmental issues which is expected to relax the environmental constraints on firms,
as opposed to the tax-inclusive fuel prices. Our first measure of R&D subsidy is the
percentage of government R&D expenditure in overall government expenditures, which
is extracted from the EUROSTAT database. However, using this data shrinks our already
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small sample size (country level) substantially. For this reason, as our preferred measure,
we employ the percentage of government R&D budget appropriations on environmental
issues in overall government expenditure, which is also extracted from the EUROSTAT
database. Using budget appropriations leads to a number of observations about two
times higher than that obtained by using expenditure data.
4.3.2. Estimation Strategy
As we illustrated in Figure 4.1, our dependent variable, the number of patents, exhibits
the typical count data properties, a highly right-skewed distribution with no natural
upper bound, and with majority of observations close to zero. A common approach ap-
plied in such a situation is to perform a Poisson maximum likelihood (PML) estimation,
which assumes that the dependent variable has a Poisson distribution. On the other
hand, the drawback of the PML estimation is the assumption of equal conditional mean
and variance, which is rejected in most cases, since count data are generally overdis-
persed. All our estimations will employ individual specific fixed effects, which mitigates
the concern about overdispersion. In case this is not sufficient, we fully account for a po-
tential overdispersion problem by using the Poisson quasi maximum likelihood (PQML)
estimator with cluster robust standard errors, which is free of the conditional variance
specification. This approach is fully efficient among the estimators which only use the
conditional mean assumption (see ?). As a result, our estimations are robust to a po-
tential misspecification of the conditional variance.
Another method directly accounting for overdispersion is the negative binomial maxi-
mum likelihood (NBML) estimation, which assumes that conditional variance is a quadratic
function of the conditional mean. If this specification is correct, then the NBML is more
efficient than the PQML estimation. Therefore, we also employ the NBML estimation
strategy.34 These three estimation strategies account for most of the problems raised for
count data applications, and are sufficient in most applications (?).
34In the Appendix, we also present robustness checks for the negative binomial estimations by calcu-





Our baseline Poisson estimations are presented in Table 4.1, where all regressions in-
corporate the logarithm of GDP per capita, a set of time dummies, and country fixed
effects. We start with PML estimations. Column (1) indicates that the effect of lagged
prices on patent counts is significant with a negative sign. The sign and significance of
this coefficient is robust to include other variables of interest in the following columns.
This finding confirms our first prediction, that an increase in the shadow price of pollu-
tion discourages innovation by reducing the monopoly rents of firms. This channel works
independently of the ownership structure.
Table 4.1: Baseline Poisson Regressions
Dependent variable: Patent counts
Poisson ML Poisson QML
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fuel price -2.210*** -2.017*** -2.333*** -2.210*** -2.017*** -2.333***
ln(1 + Pi,t−1) (0.295) (0.328) (0.339) (0.493) (0.523) (0.375)
Ownership structure 0.079 -0.616*** 0.079 -0.616***
Ownstri,t−1 (0.065) (0.196) (0.086) (0.199)
Interaction 1.080*** 1.080***
ln(1 + Pi,t−1) ∗Ownstri,t−1 (0.288) (0.382)
ln(GDP per capita) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Years 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09
AIC 1117 1075 1062 1117 1075 1062
BIC 1140 1100 1091 1140 1100 1091
Ave. obs. per group 5.7 5.5 5.5 5.7 5.5 5.5
Num. of countries 34 34 34 34 34 34
Observations 194 186 186 194 186 186
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance is indicated as: * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
143
Chapter 4: Corporate Governance, Environmental Regulations, and Technological
Change
In column (2), we also include the lagged ownership variable. The estimated coeffi-
cient is insignificant. Finally, in column (3), we add the interaction term into the regres-
sion. Its effect on patent counts is highly significant. This confirms our third prediction,
that imposing higher environmental costs on firms has a differential impact depending
on the ownership structure. The sign of this coefficient is positive, which suggests that
when managerial firms are more prevalent, environmental regulation encourages innova-
tion more. In this full specification, the direct effect of ownership structure turns out
to be highly significant with a negative sign. This supports the theoretical arguments
in the corporate governance literature claiming that owner controlled firms may perform
better in the absence of regulation.
The estimated coefficients in Table 4.1 are interpreted as the elasticities. In column
(3), the estimated direct effect of fuel prices on innovation is -2.333. However, the size of
this negative effect substantially reduces in absolute terms due to the indirect effect in
relation to the ownership structure, which leads to a net effect of -1.253. We also calculate
the marginal effect of fuel prices at OWN = 1 and for the maximum value of fuel price,
leading to a net marginal effect of fuel price as low as -0.18. Therefore, according to our
estimation, the compensating effect of the ownership channel is substantial. However,
there is no evidence for the theoretical possibility that the fuel prices might increase
innovation.
We replicate these regressions by using the PQML estimation strategy with cluster-
robust standard errors. Results are presented in columns (4) to (6). In terms of sign,
size, and significance of the coefficients, these results confirm the findings from the PML
estimations. The increase in the standard errors is not large, which indicates that the
overdispersion problem may not be very severe.
Alternatively, negative binomial estimation can directly account for overdispersion.
Therefore, we replicate these regressions by using negative binomial estimations with
fixed effects. The results, presented in Table 4.2, confirm the findings from the Poisson
estimations in terms of sign, size, and significance of the coefficients. The Akaike and
Bayesian information criteria indicate that negative binomial estimations have a slightly
better fit than the Poisson estimations. This also indicates that the overdispersion prob-
lem is not likely to be severe.
Table 4.1 also reports the number of observations subject to the baseline regressions.
144
Empirical Results
Table 4.2: Baseline Negative Binomial Regressions
Dependent variable: Patent counts
Independent variables (1) (2) (3)
Fuel price -2.175∗∗∗ -1.974∗∗∗ -2.344∗∗∗
ln(1 + Pi,t−1) (0.406) (0.453) (0.429)
Ownership structure 0.076 -0.606∗∗
Ownstri,t−1 (0.095) (0.267)
Interaction 1.011∗∗∗
ln(1 + Pi,t−1) ∗Ownstri,t−1 (0.371)
log(GDP per capita) yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes
Years 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09
AIC 1097 1055 1050
BIC 1123 1084 1082
Ave. obs. per group 5.7 5.5 5.5
Num. of countries 34 34 34
Observations 194 186 186
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance is indicated as
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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It is noteworthy that, despite our small number of observations, we have highly significant
results. Following, we perform various robustness checks on these results. Hereafter, we
will not report the results from the PML estimations, by noting that all our results from
the PQML estimations does not change with the PML, since the PQML only adjust the
standard errors of the PML in the upward direction.
4.4.2. Robustness Checks
Setting a Minimum Number of Observations to Calculate Ownership Indica-
tor
Table 4.3: Setting a Minimum Number of Observations
Dependent variable: Patent counts
Poisson QML Negative Binomial
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fuel price -2.385∗∗∗ -2.373∗∗∗ -2.378∗∗∗ -2.456∗∗∗ -2.493∗∗∗ -2.500∗∗∗
ln(1 + Pi,t−1) (0.391) (0.411) (0.405) (0.431) (0.434) (0.436)
Ownership structure -0.671∗∗∗ -0.740∗∗∗ -0.726∗∗∗ -0.667∗∗ -0.682∗∗ -0.659∗∗
Ownstri,t−1 (0.191) (0.194) (0.191) (0.280) (0.278) (0.279)
Interaction 1.194∗∗∗ 1.422∗∗∗ 1.400∗∗∗ 1.152∗∗∗ 1.377∗∗∗ 1.343∗∗∗
ln(1 + Pi,t−1) ∗Ownstri,t−1 (0.395) (0.373) (0.371) (0.395) (0.396) (0.398)
ln(GDP per capita) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm num. per data point >20 >40 >60 >20 >40 >60
Years 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09
AIC 932 808 775 920 797 764
BIC 960 834 800 951 826 793
Ave. obs. per group 5.3 5.0 5.4 5.3 5.0 5.4
Num. of countries 30 27 23 30 27 23
Observations 158 136 124 158 136 124
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Siginificance is indicated as ∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
While calculating the country level indicator for the ownership structure, the number
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of firms at a country-year data point can be very low. More precisely, if there are just
two firms in different ownership categories, having one missing observation for a data
point changes the evaluation totally. Therefore, we replicate our baseline regressions
by setting a minimum number of observations to calculate ownership structure at each
country-year data point equal to 20, 40, and 60. Table 4.3 presents the results. From this
table, it can be seen that these restrictions substantially decrease the already low number
of observations subject to our country level analysis. Despite this, the results confirm
our findings in the baseline regressions, providing a strong support for our hypothesis.
Sensitivity Analysis on the Categorization of Firms
In our baseline estimations, we take category A and B firms as managerial in order
to calculate the country level ownership indicator. Another possibility is to take only
category A firms as managerial. However, the number of observations in category A is
substantially smaller compared to the other categories, and this makes it more likely
to have the problem of insufficient sample size in constructing the ownership indicator,
which we described in the previous subsection. Therefore, in our sensitivity analysis, we
also control for the minimum number of firms to calculate the ownership indicator. Our
results are presented in Table 4.4.
The upper panel presents the results from the PQML estimations. In the first column,
we replicate our full specification. Although the coefficients of the ownership structure
and the interaction term are insignificant, the signs of the coefficients are fully in line
with the baseline estimations. However, in the next columns, as we increase the mini-
mum number of firms for each country-year data point, the insignificance of these terms
dissappears, confirming our baseline results. Again, we see the importance of controlling
for the minimum required number of firms in calculating the ownership indicator. In the
lower panel, we present the results of using the negative binomial strategy. The results
exhibit a similar pattern to the PQML estimations, such that the p-values (not reported)
decrease substantially as we increase the minimum number of firms for each data-point.
However, this time, the interaction term never becomes significant.
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Table 4.4: Taking Only Category-A Firms as Managerial
Dependent variable: Patent counts
Poisson QML
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fuel price -2.280∗∗∗ -2.433∗∗∗ -2.558∗∗∗ -2.556∗∗∗
ln(1 + Pi,t−1) (0.521) (0.507) (0.476) (0.476)
Ownership structure -0.239 -0.341 -0.502∗ -0.474∗
Ownstri,t−1 (0.276) (0.273) (0.285) (0.273)
Interaction 0.372 0.511 0.893∗ 0.847∗
ln(1 + Pi,t−1) ∗Ownstri,t−1 (0.488) (0.494) (0.529) (0.508)
Firm num. per data point Full >20 >40 >60
Years 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09
AIC 1077 948 828 795
BIC 1106 975 854 821
Ave. obs. per group 5.5 5.3 5.0 5.4
Num. of countries 34 30 27 23
Observations 186 158 136 124
Negative Binomial
Fuel price -2.124∗∗∗ -2.393∗∗∗ -2.651∗∗∗ -2.665∗∗∗
ln(1 + Pi,t−1) (0.477) (0.473) (0.477) (0.482)
Ownership structure -0.023 -0.199 -0.496 -0.452
Ownstri,t−1 (0.404) (0.420) (0.420) (0.425)
Interaction -0.014 0.224 0.932 0.855
ln(1 + Pi,t−1) ∗Ownstri,t−1 (0.623) (0.654) (0.694) (0.704)
Firm num. per data point Full >20 >40 >60
Years 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09
AIC 1058 929 811 777
BIC 1090 960 840 806
Ave. obs. per group 5.5 5.3 5.0 5.4
Num. of countries 34 30 27 23
Observations 186 158 136 124
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Table 4.5: R&D Subsidies
Dependent variable: Patent counts
PQML NBML PQML NBML
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
R&D bud. appropriations 0.190 0.245∗∗
RDappi,t−1 (0.160) (0.106)
R&D expenditure -0.001 -0.001
ln(RDexp)i,t−1 (0.001) (0.001)
Ownership structure 0.970∗∗∗ 1.001∗∗ 0.239 0.109
Ownstri,t−1 (0.373) (0.439) (0.254) (0.230)
Interaction -0.380∗∗ -0.405∗ 0.001 0.001
Ownstri,t−1 ∗ ln(RD)i,t−1 (0.184) (0.219) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(GDP per capita) yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Years 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09
AIC 935 909 400 394
BIC 963 941 422 419
Ave. obs. per group 5.5 5.5 4.6 4.6
Num. of countries 33 33 19 19
Observations 181 181 88 88
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 ,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01 . Our choice of functional transformation for a variable
is based on the Akaike and Bayesian Information Criterion (AIC and BIC).
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R&D Subsidies
In Table 4.5, instead of using tax-inclusive fuel prices and taxes which indicate stricter
environmental constraints on firms, we use proxies for R&D subsidies for environmental
concerns which relax the environmental constraints on firms. More specifically, we use
the fraction of government R&D budget appropriation and expenditure in total gov-
ernment expenditure on environmental issues. In columns (1) and (2), we present the
results of the estimations with budget appropriations. In column (1), we present the
PQML estimations. The direct effect of subsidy is insignificant, but with a positive sign,
confirming the negative effect of tax-inclusive fuel prices. The interaction of subsidy
with ownership structure is significant, indicating that relaxing the environmental con-
straints leads to a differential behavior depending on the ownership structure. The sign
of this coefficient is negative, in line with the positive sign of the interaction term in
our baseline regressions, where we use tax-inclusive fuel prices. This result is robust to
using the negative binomial regression which is presented in column (2). Moreover, the
direct effect of budget appropriation is now significant with a positive sign. Akaike and
Bayesian information criteria favor the NBML estimations, which is fully in line with
our predictions.
In columns (3) and (4), we use the expenditure data. As one can see in Table 4.5,
the number of observations is only 88 in these regressions, due to the limited size of the
expenditure data. Clearly, it is hard to expect significant results. Columns (3) and (4)
confirm this expected result. All the coefficients are highly insignificant.
In these regressions, the only result conflicting with the baseline regressions is the
highly significant and positive sign of the ownership structure in columns (1) and (2).
According to our model, this is possible only if the fixed costs of R&D is sufficiently higher
for the managerial firms compared to the owner-controlled firms. Note, our theoretical
predictions are independent of the relative innovation size of these two types of firms.
Sample Selection Problem in Constructing the Country-level Ownership In-
dicator
Our country level ownership indicator, the fraction of managerial firms, is calculated by
using a sample of firms with a known ownership status. The source of the “unknown”
ownership status is potentially related to the size of firms, since small firms are not
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Table 4.6: Known Ownership Status and Size
Dependent variable:
Ownership status (= 1, if known; 0, otherwise)
Size category of firms (1) (2) (3)
Very large 1.745∗∗∗ 1.187∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗







Note:Below the coefficients, standard errors are presented in
parenthesis.All estimations employ firm specific fixed effects and
a full set of time dummies.
generally obliged to report their ownership information. If this is the case, there is a
potential sample selection problem in the construction of the ownership indicator, which
arises, if size of firms is also a determinant of ownership structure. In this section, we
control for this potential problem.
In order to reveal this correlation more clearly, by using all the listed active firms35,
we conduct a fixed effect logit estimation where ownership status, which is a dummy
variable indicating known ownership status with 1, regressed on a set of dummies indi-
cating the size category of firms. Results in Table 4.6 indicate that the probability of
having a known ownership status is significantly higher for larger firms. These results
confirm our expectation that larger firms are more likely to have a known ownership
status. As a result, our sample of firms with a known ownership status is not fully
representative in terms of size. If firm size and ownership concentration are also corre-
lated, this may constitute a sample selection problem in constructing the country level
35We use the term “listed” in order to indicate that a firm is listed at least one of the updates of
ORBIS databes. For a detailed explanation see appendix A.4, where we also extensively explain the
source of the missing observations in our ownership data.
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Table 4.7: Ownership Category and Size
Dependent variable:
Ownership status (= 1, if A&B; 0 if C&D)
(1) (2) (3)
Very large firms -0.393 0.384 -0.022
(β1) (0.436) (0.395) (0.302)
Large firms -0.371 0.406
(β2) (0.329) (0.275)
Medium sized firms -0.777∗∗∗ -0.406
(β3) (0.194) (0.275)
Small firms 0.777∗∗∗ 0.371
(β4) (0.194) (0.329)
Note:Below the coefficients, standard errors are presented in
parenthesis. All estimations employ firm specific fixed effects
and a full set of time dummies.
ownership indicator.36
In order to see if there is a correlation between ownership and size category, we use
our observations with a known ownership status. In Table 4.7, the results from a fixed ef-
fect logit model are presented. In contrast to the arguments in the corporate governance
literature, our results do not indicate a systematic relationship between ownership struc-
ture and size of firms. The only problematic situation arises between the medium and
small sized firms. This anomalous finding may be due to a situation where small firms
are more inclined to report their ownership information when the number of dominant
owners is higher.
Irrespective of the reason for the problem revealed by Table 4.7, we can simply control
for it by excluding small firms from our baseline regressions. Table 4.8 presents the results
from replication of our baseline regressions excluding the small firms. The results are
fully in line with the baseline estimations. Therefore, our results are not likely to be
driven by a sample selection problem.
36However, the problem arises only if the sample selection pattern is not similar across countries.
Otherwise, our calculated ownership indicator will still capture the variation across countries.
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Table 4.8: Regressions by Excluding Small Firms
Dependent variable: Patent counts
Poisson QML Negative Binomial
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fuel price -2.210*** -2.051*** -2.461*** -2.175*** -2.002*** -2.443***
ln(1 + Pi,t−1) (0.493) (0.514) (0.360) (0.406) (0.444) (0.426)
Ownership structure 0.073 -0.625*** 0.073 -0.621**
Ownstri,t−1 (0.086) (0.204) (0.094) (0.266)
Interaction 1.096*** 1.044***
ln(1 + Pi,t−1) ∗Ownstri,t−1 (0.389) (0.375)
ln(GDP per capita) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Years 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09
Number of countries 34 34 34 34 34 34
Number of observations 194 186 186 194 186 186
Ave. num.of obs. per group 5.7 5.5 5.5 5.7 5.5 5.5
AIC 1119 1075 1063 1099 1056 1051
BIC 1142 1101 1093 1125 1085 1083
Note: Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. Significance is indicated with *** at 1% , ** at 5%, and
* at 10% level.
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As argued by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), ownership structure as a possible factor
determining firm performance is possibly endogenous. Our analysis in this section also
controls for such a concern. Although we control for firm size, there are other factors
of relevance to ownership structure which could profitably be included in our ownership
determination regression. However, data is not available or relevant for these factors
for most of our observations, since these factors are mostly related to and reported by
publicly listed firms, which constitutes a small portion of our sample of firms.
4.5. Conclusion
In this paper, we provide both theoretical and empirical evidence in support of our
hypothesis that, when ownership structure in a country evolves towards a phase of
ownership-managership separation, more stringent environmental regulations become
more innovation friendly. Our empirical results show that the negative direct effect
of fuel prices on innovation is substantially mitigated through its indirect effect in rela-
tion to the ownership structure. However, we find no evidence for a full compensation.
The results are robust to many considerations, such as a sample selection problem in
constructing the ownership indicator.
We approach the problem from a macro perspective. This is a natural choice from
several points of view. Firstly, our policy variable reflects a country level variation.
Secondly, we are interested in the effect of our policy variable on overall innovation.
Thirdly, country level data is easily accessible through several databases. The price of
using country level data is that we have a small number of observations. Despite this
disadvantage, our empirical evidence provides significant support to our hypothesis.
On the other hand, it is also necessary to complement our study with a firm level
study. Obviously, this approach can also account for the problems that may arise during
the aggregation processes. However, a firm level study should account for the fact that
the policy variables are country specific. Secondly, merging the firm level patent and
the ownership data from different databases is a substantially time consuming process.
In order to deal with this problem, future research can concentrate on publicly traded
firms, for which such a dataset is more accessible. This strategy will also allow to use
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citations to weight patent counts, since ownership data for publicly traded firms can be
found for a longer time horizon.
4.A. Appendix
4.A.1. Jackknife Method to Calculate Standard Errors
Table 4.9: Negative Binomial Estimations with Jackknife Standard Errors
Dependent variable: Patent counts
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fuel price -2.344∗∗∗ -2.456∗∗∗ -2.493∗∗∗ -2.500∗∗∗
ln(1 + Pi,t−1) (0.672) (0.683) (0.709) (0.688)
Ownership structure -0.606 -0.667 -0.682∗∗ -0.659∗∗
Ownstri,t−1 (0.532) (0.522) (0.274) (0.269)
Interaction 1.011 1.152 1.377∗∗ 1.343∗∗
ln(1 + Pi,t−1) ∗Ownstri,t−1 (0.699) (0.728) (0.556) (0.538)
ln(GDP per capita) yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Firm num. per data point Full >20 >40 >60
Years 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09
AIC 1050 920 797 764
BIC 1082 951 826 793
Ave. obs. per group 5.5 5.3 5.0 5.4
Num. of countries 34 30 27 23
Observations 186 158 136 124
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance is indicated with ∗ p < 0.10 ,
∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 .
Although all our baseline regressions control for overdispersion, standard errors of the
negative binomial estimations are still sensitive to a misspecification of the conditional
variance. In order to account for this potential problem, we replicate our regressions
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Table 4.10: Using Industry Diesel Fuel Prices
Dependent variable: Patent counts
Poisson QML Negative Binomial
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fuel price -2.276*** -2.048*** -2.070*** -2.339*** -2.069*** -2.158***
ln(1 + Pi,t−1) (0.411) (0.419) (0.340) (0.375) (0.420) (0.402)
Ownership structure 0.078 -0.504** 0.096 -0.501*
Ownstri,t−1 (0.083) (0.196) (0.097) (0.256)
Interaction 1.098** 1.061**
ln(1 + Pi,t−1) ∗Ownstri,t−1 (0.475) (0.422)
ln(GDP per capita) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Years 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09
AIC 1029 1009 1000 1011 991 987
BIC 1052 1034 1028 1036 1020 1019
Ave. obs. per group 5.9 5.7 5.7 5.9 5.7 5.7
Num. of countries 31 31 31 31 31 31
Observations 182 178 178 182 178 178
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance is indicated as: * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
by using the Jackknife method to calculate the standard errors. Table 4.9 presents
the outcomes of applying this. In the first column, we see that there is a substantial
deterioration in the significance of the coefficient of the interaction term compared to the
baseline estimations. However, when we increase the minimum number of observations
to calculate the ownership indicator in the following columns, the effect of the interaction
term becomes highly significant, confirming the baseline estimations. We note in Table
4.9 that these restrictions decrease the number of observations substantially, which is
expected to yield higher standard errors. The opposite situation reveals the importance
of controlling for the problem we described in the previous section.
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Table 4.11: Excluding 2009 Data
Dependent variable: Patent counts
Poisson QML Negative Binomial
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fuel price -1.986*** -1.964*** -2.188*** -2.012*** -1.941*** -2.203***
ln(1 + Pi,t−1) (0.378) (0.342) (0.346) (0.406) (0.456) (0.455)
Ownership structure 0.003 -0.536*** 0.029 -0.527*
Ownstri,t−1 (0.065) (0.151) (0.089) (0.272)
Interaction 0.849*** 0.843**
ln(1 + Pi,t−1) ∗Ownstri,t−1 (0.233) (0.392)
ln(GDP per capita) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Years 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09 2003-09
AIC 839 803 799 835 799 796
BIC 857 824 823 856 823 823
Ave. obs. per group 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.7
Num. of countries 33 32 32 33 32 32
Observations 159 151 151 159 151 151
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance is indicated as: * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
4.A.2. Using Industry Fuel Price Data
Our preferred fuel price series is “Household diesel fuel prices”, since it is the largest
among all alternatives. IEA also provides data for industry prices. We present the
replication of our baseline regression by using this alternative measure in Table 4.10.
The number of observations is now smaller. However, the results are fully in line with
the baseline regressions.
4.A.3. Excluding 2009 Data
For our patent data from EUROSTAT, the last year of the dataset is indicated as pro-
visional, since these values may be subject to change in the future, due to lags in the
patenting procedure. For this reason, we replicate our baseline regressions by exclud-
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Table 4.12: Frequency and Percentage of Firms with (Un)Known Ownership Indicator
by Size in 2009
Size Ownership Indicator
Unknown Known Not Listed Total
Unknown 0 0 41926 41926
0% 0% 100% 100%
Very large 320 1819 0 2286
15% 85% 0% 100%
Large 2895 3976 0 7031
42% 58% 0% 100%
Medium 9696 5233 0 15465
65% 35% 0% 100%
Small 15038 5112 0 20929
75% 25% 0% 100%
Total 27949 16140 41926 86015
32% 19% 49% 100%
ing 2009 data. The results, presented in Table 4.11, are fully in line with our baseline
regressions.
4.A.4. Source of Missing Ownership Data and Sample Selection Problem
Firstly, we start with some descriptive statistics in order to reveal the source of a potential
sample selection problem. Table 4.4 presents the number of firms and their percentages
with known/unknown ownership status by size in 2009. The missing ownership indicator
can be due to two factors. Firstly, a firm may be listed in 2009 in the ORBIS database
with an unknown ownership indicator. We label these observations as “unknown”. Sec-
ondly, the firm may not be listed for 2009 in any updates of the ORBIS database. In
merging the updates of this database, these observations are labeled as “not listed”. In
total, we have 86,015 firms observed throughout our sample period. These are all legally
registered firms in their countries. Firstly, for 2009, 49% of these firms are not listed in
any updates, therefore we have no 2009 data for them.37 Secondly, the percentage of
37However, we note that each of these 86,015 firms is listed in at least one year from 2003 to 2009.
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firms indicated with an unknown ownership status is 32. In performing our regressions,
we also exclude observations where the firms are not active in a given year. Therefore,
our ownership indicator for 2009 is calculated by using 16% of the whole population of
firms (This is not reported in Table 4.4). This constitutes 13,867 observed firms out of
86,015, which is a reasonable sample size.
The distinction between the data points labeled as “not listed” and “unknown” is
crucial to our analysis. Note that all the firms in our sample are listed for at least one
year. However, BvD does not collect the data for a specific firm every year, so this firm
may have missing observations, which are labeled as “not listed”. Also considering that
ownership structure is argued to be a persistent variable at the firm level, these missing
observations are not expected to cause a sample selection problem. Another source of
missing observation is that a listed firm may not be reporting the ownership information
for some reason. These are the missing observations labeled as “unknown”. The source
of “unknown” ownership status is likely to be related to size of firms, since smaller firms
are not generally obliged to report their ownership information. In Table 4.12, a known
ownership status seems to be positively correlated with increasing size.
Table 4.12 also reveals an important opportunity to control for the possible sample
selection problem depending on size. It is seen that we have the size category of all
the listed firms in 2009.38 Therefore, following the literature on the determinants of
ownership structure, we can use the size data to estimate the ownership indicator of
all the listed firms. Moreover, this can increase our sample size to 43% of the whole
population.




Intra Elite Conflict, Collective
Action Problem of the Masses,
and Political Transitions
5.1. Introduction
A substantial part of the political economy literature argue that democratic transitions
are conscious political choices of the elites for their own benefit; however, there are
broadly two perspectives depending on the highlighted force which leads the elite to
transfer substantial political power to the masses. Firstly, according to the elite-poor
conflict view, democratic transitions are the result of a revolutionary threat originating
from the masses. As an example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) consider an autocratic
society with an elite and a poor class, where income allocation is determined by redis-
tributive policies. It is argued that the revolutionary threat by the poor due to high
income inequality is the main driving force of the elite-led democratic transition, which,
in the end, guarantees future redistribution for the poor. The other approach, seeks
the answer in elite structure, following the tradition initiated mainly by Mosca et al.
(1939) and Pareto (1991). According to the elitist view, the elites are unchecked and
lose their privilege only through infighting. Not surprisingly, these two perspectives put
forward different preconditions for a democracy to consolidate. According to Acemoglu
and Robinson (2001), democracy consolidates only if the society is sufficiently equal, al-
leviating the class conflict over the redistributive policy. On the other hand, Higley and
Burton (1989) argue that disunity in the elite structure, originating from nation-state
formation, is the factor leading to unstable regimes.
Despite the substantial literature from these two perspectives, the relation between
the intra-elite and the elite-poor conflict is a relatively uninvestigated area. Are they
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two competing perspectives, do they emerge in different circumstances, or is there a
degree of complementarity between these factors leading to democratic transitions? In
this paper, we put forward a potential link between the roles of intra-elite and elite-poor
conflict in democratic transitions, and draw conclusions about the possible consequences
for regime stability. At the center of our analysis, there is the collective action problem
of the masses and intra-elite conflict, forcing some elite factions to employ potential de
facto power of the masses.
There are two main difficulties in incorporating the elite structure (unity vs. disunity)
as a possible determinant of political regimes. Firstly, elite structure varies substantially
across societies and over time (Mosca et al., 1939). Naturally, the focus of the early
studies was to identify some major forms of elite structure, depending on the character
and the degree of the contest within the elite, which lead to distinctive political regimes.
Although there is a loose agreement on this issue in the political science literature,
one widely accepted idea is that a unified elite structure is a precondition for a stable
regime. However, the problem of formalizing the dispute within the elite and explaining
how a consensus arises, paving the way to a stable regime, remains very dependent
on the country and time period under consideration. Secondly, a further complication
arises, if one tries to establish a casual link between the elite structure and democratic
transitions. If we define democratic transition as a significant transfer of political power
to the masses (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000), it seems more appropriate to handle the
problem as an elite-poor conflict. The question is: why do the elites need democracy
as a solution to their internal conflict, while the main beneficiary is a third party, the
poor? Ghosal and Proto (2009) argue that democracy is a result of intra-elite conflict
as a solution to uncertainty in future political power allocation. An earlier approach
argues that the elites extend franchise as a strategic choice by expecting the support of
newly enfranchised (Collier, 1999). Both approaches assume that the non-elite have no
political power in non-democracy, due to the high costs of collective action imposed by
the elite. Therefore, democracy is seen as an institution to regulate disputes within the
elite. Giving no role to the masses in the democratization process, the elitist view can be
criticized for being unable to explain elite unification and democratic transitions within
the same framework. The reason is that once we have a unified elite, we would not observe
a democratic transition according to the above explanations. So, elite unification remains
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as a precondition for a stable regime, but has no consequences for regime transitions. In
order to identify the role of the elite structure in democratic transitions, our strategy in
this paper is to relate the intra-elite conflict to the elite-poor conflict.
Rather than identifying the sources of the contest and the strategies which the elites
adopt against each other, which is problematic due to the variability of elite structures, we
identify when the intra-elite conflict arises as a threat to regime in non-democracies. We
argue that in any non-democracy, there is an inherent conflict over income and political
power distribution within the elite. The disunity of the elite is persistent; however, only
if an elite faction, discontented with the existing regime, is willing and able to mobilize
the masses against the authority, an intra-elite conflict arises as a threat to the regime.
Therefore, in our model, a unified elite is characterized by the inability of the discontent
elite factions to mobilize the masses against the regime.
The critical element in our analysis is the collective action problem of the poor,
which establishes the link between the intra-elite and the elite-poor conflict. In our
model, democratic transition can take place due to a revolutionary threat by the poor,
even if the poor are not capable of overcoming collective action problems with their own
resources. The underlying idea is that maintaining a collective movement is a costly
activity, and when the poor alone cannot finance the pre-revolutionary activity, intra-
elite conflict may force an elite faction, which is discontent with the existing regime,
to bear the costs of the collective action in order to employ de facto political power of
the poor. In such an environment, the revolutionary threat cannot be credible unless
there is an appropriate level of conflict among the elite, which is assumed to depend on
intra-elite income inequality. Therefore, our model distinguishes between two types of
democratization. One is due to a revolutionary threat posed by the unconstrained poor
in solving the collective action problem, which we call the “poor-elite conflict transition”.
The second type is due to a revolutionary threat posed by a revolutionary coalition
between the resource-constrained poor in maintaining collective action and a discontent
elite faction, which we call “intra-elite conflict transition”. Such a setting allows us to
investigate when the elite-poor conflict or the intra-elite conflict becomes the major factor
in democratic transitions, and why.
Our results indicate that intra-elite conflict transition does not arise in relatively equal
societies, which is argued to be a factor leading to consolidated democracies (Acemoglu
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and Robinson, 2000). Thus, elite unification arises when the income distribution is
sufficiently equal. Therefore, it is shown that elite unification and low income inequality
are not separate, but consistent preconditions for a consolidated democracy. That is, the
elitist and the elite-poor conflict perspectives are not conflicting views.
Secondly, our model explains why some mass movements create post revolutionary
non-democracies, such as in Russia and China in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, while some revolutions lead to democracies, such as in 19th century France. Our
answer is related to ability of discontented elite factions, leading the poor for a revo-
lution, in compensating collective action cost of the masses by making pre-revolution
transfers, while keeping post-revolutionary income share of the poor sufficiently low,
which, in the end, prevents the masses to act collectively after a revolution. As a result,
a post-revolutionary non-democracy arises. We show that such an outcome requires a
sufficiently low intra-elite inequality. This can also be interpreted as a second kind of
elite unification, which is consistent with the view that elite unification can also lead to
consolidated non-democracies (Higley and Burton, 1989).
Relevance of our intra-elite conflict model for revolutions is based on two observa-
tions. Firstly, in history, revolutions replaced monarchies with state organizations in
line with the interests of emerging elites who pursue an industrial development path.
Secondly, every revolution witnessed a substantial mass mobilization organized around
the elites who are discontented with the existing institutions. Therefore, the intra-elite
and the elite-poor conflicts play interrelated roles in revolutions, as well as in democratic
transitions.
5.2. The Model
Our model is an infinitely repeated discounted dynamic game, following the approach by
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), where democracies are argued to be more redistributive
compared to non-democracies. We extend their model by introducing elite heterogeneity
and allowing for coalition formation between some elite factions and the poor. Initially
we are in a non-democracy. Political power is in the hands of the elite class, but its
within class distribution is not necessarily symmetric. We call the politically more pow-
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erful elite group, the strong elite. They can change future income distribution through
redistributive policies. Income levels of any elite group are assumed to be higher than
the average income level. Therefore, there is no intra-elite conflict over redistributive
policies. The unequal intra-elite income distribution is the only source of the discontent
among the elite.39
5.2.1. The Environment
Consider a society with three classes of homogenous agents: the strong elite (s), the
weak elite (w), and the poor (p). The strong elite and the weak elite constitute a
fraction, respectively, λs and λw of the total population. The population is normalized
to one. Thus, 1 − λs − λw of the society is poor and they are the majority, such that
1−λs−λw = λp > 1/2. Initially, each agent is endowed with an income which is denoted
with yi, where i = s, w, p indicates the individual’s class. That is, for each class, income
is uniform across agents. Denoting the average income with ȳ, income-share parameters










, where γs + γw + γp = 1.








(1− γs − γw)ȳ
1− λs − λw
.
The income-share parameters are convenient for formalizing and interpreting our
model. However, analyzing the comparative statics with inequality parameters makes
more sense. Firstly, the elite-poor inequality is defined as the fraction of the total income
owned by the elite. Secondly, the intra-elite inequality is defined as the fraction of elite
income owned by the strong elite. Elite-poor inequality (κ1) and intra-elite inequality
(κ2) are parametrized as follows:
39In order to explain the gradual expansion of enfranchisement, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) model
the intra-elite conflict as an occurrence between the rich and the middle class whose income is less than
the average. So the middle class has conflicting interests to the rich over the redistributive policy.
However, in our model we do not consider a middle class, which may have substantial political power
in a democracy.
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.
Some regularity conditions follow. Firstly, since it is assumed that 1−λs−λw > 1/2,
we have λs + λw < 1/2. Secondly, imposing the assumption that yp < ȳ, yw > ȳ and
ys > ȳ leads to the following conditions:
1− γs − γw
1− λs − λw







Or in terms of the inequality parameters, we have
1− κ1
1− λs − λw







Cost of Taxation, Government Budget Constraint, and Most Preferred Tax
Rates
Income allocation is determined by the class with dominant political power. Any class
which holds de jure political power can impose a tax rate, 0 < τ < 1, on income. In
terms of de facto political power, the poor can impose a revolutionary threat either by
itself, or by forming a coalition with the weak elite against the strong elite in order to
change the income distribution.
We assume that taxation is costly. The cost of taxation, C : [0, 1] → R+, is a
fraction lost of total income. It is assumed to be a function of the tax rate. In order
to ensure that the second order conditions of the agents’ utility maximization problem
will be satisfied, we assume C ′(τ) > 0 and C ′′(τ) > 0. Moreover, in order ensure an
interior solution, we assume C
′
(0) = 0 and C
′
(1) = 1. The government collects income
taxes, and redistributes it uniformly to all citizens. Denoting the transfer with T, the
government budget constraint can be written as T =
∑n
j=1 τy
j−C(τ)nȳ. Here, n stands
for the population size and agents are indexed with i. Normalizing the population to
one leads to T = (τ − C(τ))ȳ.
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In every period, each agent earns the income described previously. The intertemporal
expected utility of every agent at time t = 0 is the discounted sum of post-tax incomes
which can be stated as follows:




where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, and ŷit stands for the post-tax income which is
totally channeled to consumption. So, the indirect utility of an agent from class i, in
case of no regime transitions, can be formulated as:
V (yi | τ) = (1− τ)y
i + (τ − C(τ))ȳ
1− β
.
Maximization of the indirect utility with respect to the tax rate gives the following first
order condition:
−yi + (1− C ′(τ))ȳ = 0 and τ i > 0 or
−yi + (1− C ′(τ))ȳ < 0 and τ i = 0. (5.3)
Under the assumptions on the cost function, if individual’s income is higher than aver-
age income, we are in the second line of condition (5.3). That is, under the assumed
redistributive policy, any agent above the average income is worse off with a positive tax
rate. Therefore, for any elite, the ideal tax rate is zero. On the other hand, for the poor,
the first line of condition (5.3) applies, and they prefer a positive tax rate. Applying the
implicit function theorem to the first order condition of the poor, we obtain the effect of
income on the ideal tax rate of the poor:
τ
′
(yp) = − 1
C ′′(τ(yp))
< 0. (5.4)
Therefore, the poor prefer higher tax rates as they are further away from the average
income. The most preferred tax rate for each class is given as follows:
τ s = τw = 0 (5.5)
C
′




Equation (5.6) follows from the first order condition of the poor and the definition of
income-share parameters. Both sides of the equation (5.6) are positive from the regularity
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conditions given by equation (5.1) and the assumptions imposed on the cost function.
Equation (5.6) can be written in terms of the inequality parameters as follows:
C
′
(τ p) = 1− 1− κ1
λp
. (5.7)
Here, the term on the right hand side is positive by the regularity condition given by
equation (5.2).
From equation (5.6), it can be verified that, as the per capita income share of the
poor increases, they demand less redistribution. In the same way, we can derive the
effect of the inequality parameters from equation (5.7). Taking derivatives of both sides
of (5.7) with respect to κ1 gives ∂τ p/∂κ1 = 1/(λpC
′′
(τ p)), which is positive due to the
assumptions made on the cost function. Therefore, higher elite-poor inequality leads the
poor to demand higher redistribution.
Revolution
Due to an unequal income distribution, the poor can initiate a revolution which is as-
sumed to be always successful. However, a revolution is attempted only if the poor can
afford the cost of collective action, denoted with ε, which is assumed to be a fraction of
total income. If the poor is resource-constrained in solving the collective action problem,
another possibility is that the weak elite and the poor can form a revolutionary coali-
tion. More precisely, the weak elite finances the uprising by transferring Ω fraction of
their income to the poor, and benefits from the post-revolution income allocation. If the
revolution takes place, all post-revolutionary income is allocated to agents of the revolt-
ing classes, and the strong elite ends up with zero indirect utility. The post-revolution
income share for coalition members is determined prior to the revolution. In order to
ease interpretation, we maintain a simple structure for pre-revolution agreements on
post-revolution income allocation. We assume that the weak elite offers a fraction θ of
post-revolution income to the poor, and the poor decides whether to revolt by observing
the offered combination of Ω and θ.40
40One might expect a commitment problem relating to post-revolutionary income allocation. How-
ever, note that a potential commitment problem in post-revolutionary income allocation and future
redistribution in non-democracy are very different. Firstly, post-revolutionary income allocation, which
takes place in the same period with pre-revolutionary agreements, is a one period event, as opposed to
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The cost of collective action, at the date when a revolution takes place, is denoted
by εs, where s = {L,H}. We assume that it fluctuates between the values εH and εL.
It is assumed that εL = 1, which stands for a state where the cost of collective action
does not allow a revolution. This is simply a normalization. On the other hand, εH = ε,
which is smaller than one. It is assumed that εt = ε
H with probability q, independent of
εt−1. Therefore, the threat of revolution fluctuates over time, indicating the transitory
nature of de facto political power held by the potential revolters. Hence, the strong elite
may change the policy to prevent revolution in every period, in response to the level of
de facto power held by the poor.
Revolution also leads to post-revolutionary costs. Some fraction µ of total income is
destroyed forever during the revolution. It is assumed that µ < 1, otherwise revolutionary
threat would never be credible. This makes sense by considering that there should exist
some assets that would never be totally destroyed in a revolution, such as human capital.
Firstly, we start by formalizing the instantaneous payoffs when the poor can revolt
alone, and expropriate the income of both the weak and the strong elite, which leads to
zero indirect utility for both elites. The poor contributes εȳ to overcome the collective
action problem. Once the revolution occurs, the income of the strong and the weak elites
is allocated uniformly to the poor agents, which is (γs + γw)ȳ/λp. However, during the
revolution 1 − µ of the total income is destroyed forever. Therefore, each poor agent
gets (1− µ)[ȳ/λp − εȳ] following a revolution. Also, the poor face the cost of collective
action only once, so in each following period the poor get (1−µ)ȳ/λp. Rearranging these
payoffs, the intertemporal indirect utilities of each agent following a revolt by the poor
alone is given by:
redistribution, which are taken into consideration for an infinite horizon. Secondly, we assume that what
is allocated between the parties is the productive resources of the economy. Therefore, one expects the
coalition members to foresee sufficiently accurately how much of the productive resources they can own
following a revolution. A final point is that once the productive resources are allocated, it is also more
binding for future income allocation compared to a promise for future redistribution. Indeed, redistri-
butions inherently lead to commitment problems, since the ownership of productive resources remains
unchanged. For these reasons, we assume that coalition members know the fraction of post-revolutionary
income which they will be able to expropriate, if they undertake a revolution.
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V spe(R, µ) = V
w
pe(R, µ) = 0




where the subscript “pe” indicates the case where the poor-elite conflict arises. Secondly,
the payoffs are different if the poor revolt by forming a coalition with the weak elite. In
this case each agent of the weak elite contributes a fraction Ω of their income to solve
the collective action problem of the poor, and, in turn, gets the 1 − θ fraction of the
remaining income following the revolution. Therefore, the payoffs are given as follows:
V sie(R, µ) = 0




V pie(R, µ) = (1− µ)[
θȳ
λp(1− β)




where the subscript “ie” indicates the intra-elite conflict case.
Expected Payoffs of Not Revolting
In non-democracy, the strong elite can prevent the revolution via redistribution. How-
ever, it is not certain that the redistribution will take place in the future. Therefore, all
agents discount their indirect utility in case of no revolution with a probability reflecting
the uncertainty of future implementation of the promised policy.
In state εt = ε
L, there is no threat of revolution, therefore the strong elite will set
their most preferred tax rate, which is zero. Then the indirect utility to each agent in
state εL can be written as follows:
V i(N, εL) = yi + β[qV i(N, εH) + (1− q)V i(N, εL)], (5.8)
where, in the current period, agents get no redistribution, but in the future the threat
state will be εH with probability q, and there may be a redistribution.
When the threat of revolution is realized in state εt = ε
H , the strong elite can set
a tax rate τN to prevent the revolution. However, this cannot be credible for future
redistributions due to the transitory nature of de facto power held by the poor. That
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is, when the state is εt = ε
L in the future, the strong elite will set their most preferred
tax rate, τN = 0. Assuming that a redistribution prevents revolution, the intertemporal
indirect utility of each agent in state εt = ε
H can be written as follows:
V i(N, εH , τN) = [yi + τN(ȳ − yi)− C(τN)ȳ] (5.9)
+β[qV i(N, εH , τN) + (1− q)V i(N, εL)]
Equations (5.8) and (5.9) are two equations with two unknowns. We can solve for
V i(N, εH , τN), which gives:
V i(N, εH , τN) =
yi + (1− β(1− q))(τN(ȳ − yi)− C(τN)ȳ)
1− β
. (5.10)
Due to the commitment problem relating to future redistributions, current redistri-
butions may not suffice to prevent a revolution. Democratization is the instrument for
the strong elite to make a credible commitment for future redistributions. Therefore,
whenever a redistribution is not sufficient to prevent revolution, the strong elite may
democratize to create a higher incentive for the poor not to revolt. In a democracy all
political power is in the hands of the poor, since it is assumed that the median voter is
poor. Therefore, the tax rate is set by the poor as τ p. Hence, the payoffs in democracy
for an agent of class i is
V i(D) = (yi + τ p(ȳ − yi)− C(τ p)ȳ))/(1− β). (5.11)
Timing of Events
Initially we are in a non-democracy where the strong elite holds de jure political power.
The timing of events at an arbitrary period t is as follows:
1. The state εt ∈ {εL, εH} is revealed.
2. The strong elite decides whether to democratize, φ ∈ {0, 1}.
3. If φ = 1, the tax rate is determined by the median voter. If φ = 0, the strong elite
sets a tax rate.
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4. Realizing the tax rate set by the strong elite, the weak elite decides whether to
make a transfer to the poor, Ω ∈ [0, 1]. If Ω > 0, they propose a post-revolution
income share, θ ∈ [0, 1], to the poor.
5. The poor decides whether to form a revolutionary coalition with the weak elite.
6. The poor decides whether to revolt, ρ ∈ {0, 1}.
7. Incomes are realized and consumption takes place.
Class Structure
Our model imposes some structure on the instruments available to the agents. At this
point, it is worthwhile to discuss these assumptions briefly. Firstly, our model imposes
elite disunity exogenously as an inherent character of societies. Such an assumption is
realistic, only if there is a persistency in the elite structure. Higley and Burton (1989)
argue that the more common elite structure is characterized by disunity, and once an
elite structure emerges, it persists. Indeed, our model adopts the same approach, and we
introduce elite disunity to our model exogenously. However, our model explains when it
does not play a decisive role in regime transitions. We interpret such a case as elite unity.
In this case, only elite-poor conflict is relevant for regime transitions. In other words, our
goal is not to explain how such a class structure has evolved in the pre-transition era.
This implies that the unit of analysis for our model is a regime transition, whether it
is successful or not. For example, the 17th-18th century Britain is characterized by elite
disunity, whereas 19th century Britain is characterized by elite unity (Lachmann, 1990).
Therefore, these periods are different units to be analyzed.
Secondly, we restrict the intruments available to the strong elite with income redis-
tribution and democratization. It can be assumed that the strong elite also has control
of the military, which provides the means to preserve their preferred income allocation.
Such an assumption does not change our main results. One can refer to Acemoglu and
Robinson (2006) to see the implications of such an assumption.
Thirdly, we allow a coalition only between the weak elite and the poor, since it is the
only historically relevant case for most of the regime transitions where the within elite
struggle is between a resource owner elite class (such as aristocracy), and an emerging
elite class pursuing industrialization. The most important element leading to a coalition
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with the emerging elites and the poor instead of other possibilities is that emerging elites
can commit to post-revolutionary allocation of a productive resource which is land, while
aristocracy cannot. This is also the reason why we exclude any commitment problem
about the post-revolutionary income allocation within the coalition. However, if we
would forcefully allow a coalition also between the strong elite and the poor, the poor
would always prefer a coalition with the weak elite, since the poor would always get
higher payoff by expropriating the strong elite rather than the weak elite. Note that,
although the direct transfers from the strong elite to the poor would be possibly higher,
we would always have a parameter space where it cannot compensate the forgone gains of
the poor from expropriating the strong elite. Finally, there is no way for the strong and
the weak elites to compromise with side-payments, since they always have an incentive
to expropriate eachother, as long as they hold some assets. In our setting, this is only
possible by getting support of non-elites.
5.2.2. Equilibrium
In order to have a simple recursive structure, we restrict attention to Markow perfect
equilibria. That is, we assume that strategies of players at an arbitrary date only depend
on the current state of the game. Firstly, our main state variable is the cost of collective
action, ε = {εL, εH}. Secondly, the political state is denoted by P = {N,D,R}, where
N is non-democracy, D is democracy, and R is revolution. Let σi be the strategy space
for an agent of class i = {s, w, p}. The strong elite decides whether to democratize,
φ : {εL, εH} → {0, 1}, when P = N , and sets a tax rate τN : {εL, εH} → [0, 1], if φ = 0. If
φ = 1, the state switches to P = D. So the strategy space for the strong elite is σs(ε, P ) =
{φ, τN}. The weak elite decides on the transfer rate Ω : {εL, εH}×{0, 1}×[0, 1]→ {0, 1},
and proposes a post-revolutionary income share θ : {εL, εH} × {0, 1} × [0, 1] → [0, 1].
That is, their strategy space is σw(ε, P | φ, τN) = {Ω, θ}. When P = N , the poor decide
whether to revolt, ρ : {εL, εH} × {0, 1} × [0, 1]3 → {0, 1}. Secondly, if P = D, the poor
set a tax rate τD : {εL, εH} × {0, 1} × [0, 1]3 → [0, 1]. Therefore, the strategy space of
the poor is given by σp(ε, P | φ, τN ,Ω, θ) = {ρ, τD}. Having the strategy spaces, we can
define the equilibrium as follows: A Markov perfect equilibrium is a combination of
{
σs(ε, P ), σw(ε, P | φ, τN), σp(ε, P | φ, τN ,Ω, θ)
}
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such that σi is a best response to σ−i for all states.
Collective Action Problem
The poor can afford the cost of collective action, if yp − εȳ > 0. In terms of the income





Therefore, condition (5.12) defines a critical ε level for the no coalition case, which is
εpe1 ≡ γp/λp. If condition (5.12) does not hold, the weak elite may finance the poor for a
revolution. Thus, the resource constraint of the poor becomes yp − εȳ + Ωywλw/λp > 0.
This leads to a lower bound for the transfer rate as Ω > (ελp − γp)/γp. We denote the
lower bound by Ω. However, the transfer is also limited by the budget constraint of the
weak elite such that yw −Ωyw>0, which defines an upper bound for the transfer rate as





This defines another critical level for ε as εie1 ≡ (γp + γw)/λp, where the superscript
“ie” indicates an intra-elite conflict case. These critical levels defines the feasibility of a
revolutionary threat by the poor, whether alone, or by in coalition with the weak elite.
The situation is described by the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1. If the cost of collective action to the poor is lower than the criti-
cal level defined by inequality (5.12), that is when ε < εpe1 , the poor are able to solve
the collective action problem with their own resources.41 If ε ≥ εpe1 , then the poor are
resource-constrained, and cannot overcome the collective action problem. In this case,
if condition (5.13) holds such that εie1 > ε ≥ ε
pe
1 , then the poor may prefer to form a
coalition with the weak elite. If condition (5.13) is not satisfied, then the collective action
problem of the poor cannot be solved, and there can be no revolutionary threat.
Therefore, the level of cost of collective action with respect to the critical levels is the
main factor determining the nature of a potential uprising, whether it is by the poor, or
41It will be shown that when the poor are able to solve the collective action problem without a coalition
with the weak elite, they always prefer to act alone.
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a coalition between the poor and the weak elite. From equations (5.12) and (5.13), the
poor’s income share should be sufficiently high for a revolution to be feasible. If it is not
sufficient for the poor to revolt, then the weak elite’s income should be sufficiently high
to finance the resource constraint of the poor.
Elite-Poor Conflict Transitions
We start with the case where the poor are able to solve the collective action problem
with their own resources. The poor will not be willing to undertake a revolution if the
expected utility from the revolution is lower than the expected utility when there is no
redistribution forever. Therefore, the revolutionary threat from the poor alone can only
be credible, if:




Otherwise, the strong elite anticipates that the poor will never revolt, and set their ideal
tax rate accordingly. By using the income share parameters, the revolution constraint




[1− µ− γp]. (5.14)
We denote this critical level by εpe2 . In next sections we will show that if ε < ε
pe
2 , our
model reduces to Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) model. Following, we restate their
results.
In a non-democracy the best concession that the strong elite can offer to prevent
revolution is to promise the ideal tax rate of the poor, τ p, given by equation (5.6). If
even this concession cannot prevent the poor from initiating the revolution, then the
revolution cannot be prevented by redistribution. We denote the payoff to the poor,
when the strong elite sets τ p, by V p(N, εH , τ p). Substituting τN = τ p in equation (5.10),
we can find V p(N, εH , τ p). The poor are willing to revolt if V ppe(R, µ) > V
p(N, εH , τ p).




[(1− µ− γp)− (1− β(1− q))A], (5.15)
where A = (τ p(λp − γp) − C(τ p)λp), which is equal to the fraction of total income
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transferred to the poor when the tax rate is τ p. We denote the critical level defined by
equation (5.15) by εpe3 .
If a redistribution cannot prevent revolution, another choice for the strong elite is
to democratize the regime, guaranteeing future redistribution for the poor. However,
the poor may not find democratization beneficial, if V ppe(R, µ) > V
p(D), where V p(D) is




[(1− µ− γp)− A], (5.16)
which defines the critical level εpe4 .
Now, we summarize the equilibrium for the case where the poor are able to solve the
collective action problem with their own resources with the following proposition.
Proposition 5.2. Assume that the poor are able to overcome the realized cost of collective
action. If the revolution constraint given by equation (5.14) is not binding such that
ε ≥ εpe2 , the strong elite does not have a reason to democratize. Since there is no credible
threat of revolution, they set their most preferred tax rate, which is zero. If the revolution
constraint is binding for the strong elite such that ε < εpe2 , so that the revolutionary threat
is credible, then the strong elite tries to prevent revolution by making redistribution or
democratizing the regime.
The strong elite can redistribute wealth to prevent revolution, only if εpe2 > ε ≥ ε
pe
3 ,
that is when (5.14) holds but inequality (5.15) does not hold. If inequality (5.15) holds,
the strong elite cannot prevent revolution through redistribution. In this case, they can
democratize. If inequality (5.16) holds, while inequality (5.15) does not hold, that is when
εpe3 > ε ≥ ε
pe
4 , the strong elite can use democratization as a means to prevent revolution.
If inequality (5.16) does not hold, that is when ε ≥ εpe4 , even democratization cannot
prevent revolution, and a revolution occurs.
From equation (5.12), it can be shown that the elite-poor inequality, κ1, should be
sufficiently low for an uprising by the poor alone to be feasible. That is to say, the poor
should have sufficient resources. However, condition (5.14) puts an upward pressure on
the elite-poor inequality in contrast to the condition describing the resource limitation
of the poor. That is, κ1 should be sufficiently high for the revolutionary threat to be







which shrinks the space to prevent the revolution by redistribution or democratization.
Intra-Elite Conflict Transitions
When εie1 > ε ≥ ε
pe
1 , the poor cannot solve the collective action problem, and may
form a coalition with the weak elite. If ε ≥ εie1 , solving the collective action problem
of the poor is never feasible, and there is no revolutionary threat. Now assume that
εie1 > ε ≥ ε
pe
1 holds. The poor or the weak elite will not be willing to undertake a
revolution if the payoff from the revolution is lower than their income when the strong
elite sets its ideal tax rate, which is zero. Therefore, one condition for the revolutionary
threat from the coalition to be credible is that V pie(R, µ) > y
p/(1 − β). Otherwise, the
strong elite anticipates that the poor will never revolt. This constraint can be written as
Ω >
γp − θ(1− µ) + ελp(1− µ)(1− β)
γw(1− µ)(1− β)
,
which defines the relevant lower bound Ω. Another condition is V wie (R, µ) > y
w/(1− β),






which defines an upper bound Ω for the transfer rate. The transfer to pose a revolutionary




[γs − µ]. (5.17)
We denote this critical level by εie2 .
In a non-democracy, the best concession that the strong elite can offer is to promise
the ideal tax rate to one of the member classes of the revolutionary coalition. If even these
concessions cannot prevent at least one of the members from initiating the revolution,
then the revolution is unpreventable. Note that the most preferred tax rate of the weak
elite is zero, which leads to the revolution constraint where no redistribution takes place.
When the strong elite makes a redistribution at a positive rate, the poor are better
off, and they demand a larger post-revolutionary share from the strong elite’s income
which increases the lower bound. On the other hand, any positive rate of tax worsens
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the weak elite’s situation. They demand less from the post-revolution allocation, which
decreases the upper bound. Therefore, the best strategy that the strong elite can follow,
to prevent revolution through redistribution, is to set the tax rate τ p.42 Then, the poor
are willing to revolt, if V pie(R, µ) > V
p(N, εH , τ p). By using the income share parameters,
this constraint can be written as:
Ω >
γp − θ(1− µ) + ελp(1− µ)(1− β)
γw(1− µ)(1− β)
+
(1− β(1− q))(τ p(λw − γw)− C(τ p)λw)
γw(1− µ)(1− β)
,
defining a relevant lower bound Ω. Another condition is V wie (R, µ) > V
w(N, τ p), that is
the weak elite should be able solve the collective action problem of the poor. This leads
to:
Ω <
(1− θ)(1− µ)− γw − (1− β(1− q))(τ p(λp − γp)− C(τ p)λp)
γw(1− µ)(1− β)
which defines an upper bound Ω for the transfer rate. The transfer can pose a revolu-




[γs − µ− (1− β(1− q))B] , (5.18)
where B = τ p(γs − λs)− C(τ p)(1− λs), which is the fraction of total income of the net
transfer from the strong elite to the rest. We denote this critical level by εie3 .
If a redistribution is not sufficient to prevent a revolution, the strong elite may de-
mocratize, which guarantees future redistributions. Applying the same method, we find




[γs − µ−B]. (5.19)
We denote this critical level by εie4 .
42Note that we exclude a case in which the strong elite and the weak elite compromise on the basis of
wealth transfers. The idea is that the strong elite obtains their wealth through rent seeking activities.
This is the incentive for the weak elite to employ de facto power of the poor against the strong elite. As
long as the weak elite leads a revolution, they will be better off by expropriating the strong elite.
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We summarize the equilibrium for the case where the poor solve the collective action
problem, only if the weak elite makes a transfer compensating the resource constraint of
the poor:
Proposition 5.3. Assume that the poor are not able to solve the collective action prob-
lem. If the revolution constraint given by equation (5.17) is not binding such that ε ≥ εie2 ,
the strong elite does not have a reason to democratize. Since there is no credible threat
of revolution, they set their most preferred tax rate which is zero. If the revolution con-
straint is binding for the strong elite such that ε < εie2 , the strong elite tries to prevent
revolution by making a redistribution or democratizing the regime.
The strong elite can redistribute to prevent revolution, only if εie2 > ε ≥ εie3 , that
is when (5.17) holds but inequality (5.18) does not hold. If inequality (5.18) holds, the
strong elite cannot prevent revolution through a redistribution. In this case, they can
democratize or repress. If inequality (5.19) holds, while inequality (5.18) does not hold,
that is when εie3 > ε ≥ εie4 , the strong elite can democratize in order to prevent revolution.
If inequality (5.19) does not hold, that is when ε ≥ εie4 , even democratization cannot
prevent revolution, and a revolution occurs.
Only if the elite-poor inequality is sufficiently high, so that the poor do not have
sufficient resources to solve the collective action problem, they can form a coalition with
the weak elite. In this case the weak elite finances the uprising by the poor, and have
a share of the post-revolutionary income allocation. In contrast to the no coalition
case, now the primary role in determining the equilibrium outcome belongs to the intra-
elite inequality. The comparative statics with respect to the intra-elite inequality in
the revolutionary coalition case are the same as the comparative statics with respect to
the elite-poor inequality in the no coalition case. That is, a sufficiently low intra-elite
inequality is required for the weak elite to be able to finance the uprising. However,
it should also be high enough such that the weak elite is dissatisfied with the existing
income allocation. In contrast to the elite-poor conflict case, the elite-poor inequality
have two opposing effects on the critical levels. The additional effect is due to the reason
that, in the revolutionary coalition case, the income of a poor agent is also important
for the ability of the weak elite to be able to create an incentive for collective action.
However, it can be shown that the net effect of κ1 on the critical levels is in the same
direction with its effect in the elite-poor conflict case.
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The poor’s trade off between acting alone and forming a coalition with the
weak elite
When ε < εpe1 , the poor can revolt alone. Still, it is still possible that the poor may
prefer to form a coalition with the weak elite. Now we will show that this is not the case.
The net benefit of revolting alone instead of forming a coalition with the weak elite is
V p1 (R, µ)− V
p
2 (R, µ) =
(1− µ)ȳ(1− θ − Ωγw(1− β)
λp(1− β)
.
This defines a critical level, Ω̂, such that when Ω < Ω̂, the poor prefers to revolt alone.
Remember that a revolutionary threat by the coalition is feasible only if V wie (R, µ) >
yw/(1 − β), that is the weak elite should be able solve the collective action problem of
the poor. This leads to Ω < (1− θ)(1−µ)γw/(γw(1−µ)(1−β)), which defines an upper
bound Ω for the transfer rate. It can be shown that Ω̄ < Ω̂. This means, in a parameter
space where the poor is able to solve the collective action problem and the revolutionary
threat by the coalition is credible, the poor always prefer to revolt alone. This leads to
the following proposition:
Proposition 5.4. When the poor are able to solve the collective action problem, the
revolutionary threat, if it exists, is always posed by the poor alone. When the poor are
not able to solve the collective action problem, the revolutionary threat, if it exists, can
only be posed by the coalition between the poor and the weak elites.
Proposition (5.4) also leads to some relational issues among our critical levels, which
allows us to identify some interesting situations. Before explaining these situations, we




4 always holds in the
poor-elite conflict, consistent with the idea that the strong elite prefers no distribution
at all, to preventing revolution via redistribution, and prefers these two strategies to
democracy. However, the position of εpe1 , which describes the critical level for the collec-
tive action problem, with respect to other critical levels, is ambiguous. For example, we
may have εpe1 < ε
pe
2 . This means, whenever the poor is able to solve the collective action
problem, there must exist a revolutionary threat by the poor alone. The same situation




4 always holds, the position of
εie1 is ambiguous. Therefore, our parameter space may lead to a situation where some
cases described by proposition (5.1) and (5.2) never appear.
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Secondly, εpe2 > ε
ie
2 always holds. That is, if the revolution constraint is binding
for the coalition, then it must also be binding for an uprising by the poor alone. In
such a case, the only thing that may drive the poor to form a coalition is their inability







The first inequality indicates that if the revolution is prevented by redistribution in the
poor-elite conflict, then a revolutionary threat by the coalition must always be met by a
redistribution. The second inequality implies that if democratization prevents revolution
in the poor-elite conflict, then democratization must prevent revolution in the intra-elite
conflict case. In such a setting, we are able to identify the conditions when intra-elite
conflict is never a threat to non-democracy.
5.3. Elite Unification, Income Inequality, and Consolidation of
Democracy
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) explain the reason for the consolidation of democracy
in Britain with relatively low levels of inequality between the unified elite class and
the poor capable of acting collectively. When inequality is low, following a democratic
transition, the poor demand less redistribution. Thus, the burden of democracy on the
elites is lower, making coups less attractive for the elites. On the other hand, Burton and
Higley (1987) argue that the elite unification occurred between the Tories and the Whigs
in Britain, around the 1840s, in response to civil wars “unleashing the leveling social
revolutionary tendencies”. This is considered as the main reason for the consolidation of
British democracy. However, they do not relate the conflicting interests of elites with the
occurrence of social movements. By proposing the inability of elite factions to mobilize
the poor, as a precondition for elite unification, our model relates elite unification to
democratic transitions through income distribution.
In our model, an intra-elite conflict arises from the presence of discontented elite fac-
tions which are able to mobilize the masses and create a revolutionary threat. However,
the threat by the weak elite is never credible, if our parameter space is such that εpe1 is
higher than εie2 , which means that whenever intra-elite conflict leads to a revolutionary
threat, the poor are able to act collectively, and they do so by proposition (5.4). In
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such a society, intra-elite conflict never threatens the non-democratic regime. In terms




κ1κ2 − (1− κ1)(1− β)
1− (1− κ1)(1− β)
. (5.20)
We denote the critical level of µ defined by condition (5.20) by µ∗. A simple comparative
static analysis reveals the following result:




κ2 + (1− β)(1− κ2)






[1− (1− κ1)(1− β)]2
> 0.
Therefore, condition (5.20) is more likely to hold, when both intra-elite and poor-elite
inequality is lower. That is, a society with a unified elite structure must have a more
equal income distribution compared to a society where a threat of intra-elite conflict does
exist.
In our model, a unified elite structure, rather than being a result of strategic move-
ments of contending elites, arises from the elimination of the ability of discontented
elite factions to mobilize the masses. Proposition (5.5) indicates that this is possible
if the income distribution is sufficiently equal. Therefore, the proposed preconditions
for a democratic transition to create a consolidated one are consistent: A unified elite
structure will only exist in sufficiently equal societies.
5.4. Revolutions
In this section, our main goal is to analyze equilibrium revolutions, arising at where
democratization is not sufficient to meet revolutionary threat. Specifically, we make
a comparative analysis of the events of 1848 and 1875 in France, 1917 in Russia, and
1911-1949 in China. While doing this, we restrict our attention to intra-elite conflict
case, since all of these revolutions replaced the monarchial elites of old-regimes with
emerging elites.43 Therefore, throughout this section, we assume that εie1 > ε ≥ ε
pe
1
holds. That is, the cost of collective action prevents the poor to collectively act, but
43We ignore the emprically irrelevant case where the poor-elite conflict leads to revelution.
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allows a coalition with the weak elite in order to pose a revolutionary threat. The post-
revolution outcomes in these societies are not the same. Revolution in France resulted
in some political reforms towards democracy, whereas, in China and Russia, revolutions
created new non-democracies. Following, we will analyze these distinct revolutionary
paths.
Why do some revolutionary mass movements result in consolidated non-democracies,
such as in Russia and China in the first half of the twentieth century? In these cases, the
revolutions created new non-democracies with new elites even stronger than the elites of
the previous regimes. Based on this observation, we assume that these revolutions are
undertaken by the coalition of discontent elite factions and the masses. Furthermore,
we assume the revolutionary threat cannot be met by the strong elite. That is, εie4 > ε
holds. Now, assume that when a revolution takes place, we are in a non-democracy
where the weak elite has all the political power. Moore (1966) argues that totalitarian
regimes arise from the domination of an elite class. However, do the weak elite has the
chance to maintain the post-revolutionary non-democracy? Our answer is yes. In intra-
elite conflict revolutions, if the weak elite can offer to the poor a combination of current
transfer to solve the collective action problem (Ω), and a post-revolution income share, θ,
such that the offer is sufficient to lead the poor to a revolution, but the post-revolution
income share of the poor is not sufficient to act collectively in a post-revolution non-
democracy, then the post-revolutionary regime is a non-democracy where all political
power is concentrated in the hands of the weak elite. To derive the condition where such
an outcome is possible, first note that, if the weak elite is able to offer a post-revolution
income share (θ), which is smaller than the actual income share of the poor (γp), so
that the poor are not able to solve the collective action problem in the post-revolution
period, then existence of such an equilibrium is guarenteed. Now assume that the weak
elite makes the highest possible transfer, namely Ω = 1. If, in this case, the weak elite
can offer a θ < γp, just making the poor indifferent between revolution and democracy,
then consolidation of post-revolution non-democracy can always be achieved. Now, we
can state the proposition.
Proposition 5.6. If the following condition holds
Bp
(1− β)
< (γw − ελp)(1− µ)2, (5.21)
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then the weak elite always offers a combination of Ω and θ, such that the poor revolt, but
are not able to solve the collective action problem in the post-revolution non-democracy.
Proof. See Appendix Q.E.D.
In inequality (5.21), Bp = τ p(λp − γp)−C(τ p)λp is the net per period redistribution
that the poor would get if democratization takes place. On the other hand, the expression
on the right hand side measures the ability of the weak elite to mobilize the masses, or
equivalently, it is what the poor require in order to take action. Both sides of inequality
(5.21) is increasing in elite-poor inequality, κ1, and the net effect is ambigious. However,
higher intra-elite inequality, κ2, decreases the likeliness of inequality (5.21) to hold, since
it means that the weak elite is economically less powerful to make direct transfers. In
such a case, in order to mobilize the masses, they have to offer a higher post-revolutionary
share, which makes the poor more likely to be able to collectively act in the post-
revolutionary period. Hence, establishment of non-democracy is more difficult when
κ2 is higher.
5.5. Historical Evidence
5.5.1. Democratic Transitions in Britain and Denmark
In the first half of the 19th century, a series of political reforms took place in both Britain
and Denmark. In Britain, the franchise was first extended with the Reform Act of 1832,
and gradually expanded to 64% of adult males by the Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884. In
Denmark, universal male suffrage was introduced in 1949. In line with our theoretical
model, we analyze the form of the conflict leading to these two cases in two dimensions:
The elite structure and the collective action problem of the masses.
Elite unification as a result of the Glorious Revolution (Burton et al., 1992) placed
Britain on a rapid industrialization path. This prepared the conditions for the emergence
of a collectively active working class at the end of the 18th century. For example, from
1800 to 1850 the population of the ten largest cities in Britain are doubled. The social
unrest in this era showed itself in the Luddite Riots, the Spa Fields Riots, the Peterloo
Massacre, and the Swing Riots. The Chartist movement of the working class between
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1838 and 1848 made the necessity of further political reform obvious for the elites. Thus
the political reforms in Britain are an example of poor-elite conflict transitions, where
the collectively active poor is a threat to the unified elites.
The introduction of universal male suffrage in Denmark in 1849 can be explained
by a series of events mainly initiated by discontented elites. Industrialization started
in Denmark after 1850. Hence, as opposed to the British case, it is hard to identify a
collectively active industrial working class until that time. The upheavals were partly
due to the bourgeoisie-led peasant movement (Collier, 1999), in addition to the strong
nationalist movements in the Schleswig and Holstein Duchies. In both cases conflict arose
within the elite, and the masses was mobilized by discontented elites. These upheavals
resulted in extension of franchise which was not actually the intention of the discontented
elites. Indeed, soon thereafter Schleswig and Holstein joined the German Confederation.
The case of Denmark illustrates intra-elite conflict transitions where the masses are
mobilized by the discontented elites.
5.5.2. Democratic Consolidation
Following, we analyze the implications of proposition (5.5) on the political reforms in the
19th century Britain. However, initially, it is important to highlight the historical process
preparing the conditions which leads to these reforms. Compared to the long history of
autocratic states, democratic transitions, emerging in the 19th century, are very recent
events. So, what are the underlying reasons behind this fact? Why, for example, was
the British democracy not established before the 19th century?
Our model places the ability of the masses to act collectively at the center of the
analysis, which can change in the pre-transition period independent of the income dis-
tribution. Field and Higley (1980) highlight the passive role of the non-elites in the
seventeenth and eighteenth century politics of Britain, and how this situation changed
in the nineteenth century as the working class evolved from peasantry to an industrial
working class. At this point, we underline the implications of this situation for the collec-
tive action problem. While the peasantry class has mostly private property orientations,
the industrial working class has the potential to realize their common interests as in
nineteenth-century Britain. Specifically, according to our model, what have changed in
the pre-transition period is a decline in the cost of collective action. Such a decline
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can be a result of structural changes associated with industrialization such as higher
urbanization, more specialized labor requirements, and the poor in a more impersonal-
ized production process, which all leads the poor to realize the conflict over the income
redistribution, and ease collective action.
According to our model, another element of change in the period preceding 19th
century Britain was a structural change within the elite class. Before the industrial
revolution, any conflict within the elite class was mostly due to the rents over land. The
equilibrium between elites was a result of balanced military forces. However, following
the decades of the discovery of the new world and the industrial revolution, there had
been a crucial change within the elite class. Most importantly, saving and investing
were not a privilege of a dense elite class. Capital ownership had broadened to a larger
group. These new capital owners, the so-called bourgeoisie, had different interests to
those of the existing elites. In order to protect their savings and investments, they
needed different political institutions to the existing traditional institutions. Lachmann
(1990) gives priority to the intra-elite conflict in British transition from feudalism to
capitalism experienced from the 16th to the 18th century. He argues that, although the
interests of the elites are determined by inter-class relations, their capacity to pursue their
interests is primarily restricted by intra-elite relations. According to Lachmann (1990),
only when a unified elite rules, can the situation be analyzed as a struggle between the
ruling and the producing classes. As Lachmann (1990), our model describes 19th century
Britain with the case where the main determinant of the regime is the elite-poor conflict.
Burton et al. (1992) argues that elite unification in Britain was a result of the Glorious
Revolution. In proposition (5.5), we show that the conditions leading to a unified elite
structure in Britain are those which are argued to consolidate democracy.
In our model, we analyze the role of both the collective action problems and the
elite structure on democratic transitions, although we do not explain how they evolve
over time. Moreover, we argue that these two possible explanations are interrelated.
Democratic transition in Britain can be explained by such an analysis. Our model puts
forward two characteristics of the pre-transition period. Firstly, elite unification was
achieved by elimination of potential mass mobilization by the discontented elite factions.
Secondly, rapid industrialization reduced the costs of collective action, possibly through
higher urbanization, more education, and impersonalized production processes, paving
186
Historical Evidence
the way for the poor to act collectively with greater ease. According to proposition (5),
such an elite-poor conflict transition, where elite unification has been achieved and the
poor are able to solve the collective action problem, is more likely in relatively equal
societies. Therefore, the two explanations for the consolidation of democracy in Britain,
a low income inequality and a unified elite structure, are consistent preconditions.
In contrast, when condition (5.20) does not hold, intra-elite conflict transitions are
possible. Proposition (5.5) indicates that higher inequality makes this situation more
likely. Indeed, while in Britain the income share of the richest 14% was 0.44 in 1688
(Maddison, 2007), in Denmark the top decile’s share of income was 0.50 in 1870 (Mor-
risson, 1999). This is consistent with our view that the 1849 reform in Denmark is an
example of intra-elite conflict transition. Moreover, these reforms in Denmark were not
long-lasting, in line with the arguments of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006).
5.5.3. Revolutionary Transition to Democracy
In the previous sections, we argued that the 1849 Reform in Denmark took place in
response to an intra-elite conflict. Why did Denmark succeed meeting the revolutionary
threat by political reforms, while monarchial elites were overthrown in France, Russia,
and China? According to our model, meeting the revolutionary threat by democratiza-
tion is not possible, if εie4 > ε holds. Simple comparative statics on ε
ie
4 reveals that higher
intra-elite inequality and elite-poor inequality make revolutions more likely. Indeed, ac-
cording to Morrisson (1999), the top decile income share in France from 1788 to 1864
was ranging between 0.50 and 0.55, indicating a very high level of inequality.
When the condition in proposition (5.6) does not hold, the weak elite may not be able
to seize power without satisfying the demands of the masses, if a non-democracy were es-
tablished following the revolution.44 In this case, the weak elite may establish democracy
following the revolution. Such a case is well exemplified by the reforms in 19th century
France. Following the French Revolution, elites were divided along the monarchist and
the republican camp. The democratic reforms of 1848 was a result of the republican chal-
lenge to the monarchists. The republican movement was a bourgeoisie-led movement in
a coalition with the working class (Ghosal and Proto, 2009). However, the republicans
44Note that, in this case, the post-revolutionary game is exactly same with case of elite-poor conflict.
For this reason, we do not go into analytical details.
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were socially conservative (Collier, 1999) in the sense that they were against the universal
male suffrage. However, as they seized power, universal male suffrage was introduced,
not because they favored it, but because the working class was a class-conscious actor
in the pre-reform movements. Indeed, in the July revolution of 1830, the working class
was an active participant. While the peasantry has a private property orientation which
can be met by land reforms, an industrial working class has the potential to realize
their common interests in future redistributions. That is, as opposed to the Russian and
Chinese cases, the elite-led mass movement was motivated by the future gains (which
is represented by the left hand side of inequality (5.21)). The new elites seizing power
were constrained by pressure from below following the revolution. As Aminzade (1993)
argues, working class were the revolutionary force that put the republicans in power in
1848, and working class pressure forced republicans accept universal male suffrage.
The same nature of inter and intra class conflicts are valid for the reforms following
1870. Collier (1999) argues that “the democratic constitution of 1875 and the resolution
of the deadlock in 1877 can be understood in terms of both divisions within the governing
monarchial elites and rapid political recovery of the republican movement”. The political
reform was again in response to working class pressure, particularly the Paris Commune
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).
5.5.4. Post-revolutionary Non-democracy
In the pre-revolutionary period, both Russian and Chinese societies were predominantly
agrarian, and peasant revolts played a crucial role in these revolutions (Skocpol, 1979).45
According to Moore (1966), peasants were the“dynamite”bringing the old-regimes down.
However, neither Skocpol nor Moore do not focus on the obvious answer to the ques-
tion that why the peasant revolts did not appear in the post-revolution period. As
Skocpol (1979) argues, main motivation of peasant movements is land allocation. While
land reforms were contradictory with the monarchial character of the old-regimes46, it
was a possible concession for the post-revolutionary regimes, since the main concern of
45According to Skocpol (1979), Russian working-class movement played a role only in shaping the
outcome of the revolution, however, major factor breaking the old-regime down was peasant movements.
46Skocpol (1979) states “Together the extensiveness and anti-landlord focus of the revolutionary peas-
ant revolts created decisive constraints at the societal level on the range of sociopolitical options available
to elites contending for national power.”
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revolutionary leaders were creating industrialized states. Indeed, both Russian and Chi-
nese post-revolutionary regimes engaged in highly extensive land reforms, and took a
industrialized development path. This is what we refer as the pre-revolution agreements
on the post-revolution income allocation in our model. Land reforms were reachable
outcomes for the peasantry. This is the opportunity arised with industrial revolution,
which opened the way for the revolutionary leaders to make a credible promise about the
post-revolution income allocation via land reforms. This also explains why the previous
peasant uprisings never led to revolutions. In other words, it was possible for the weak
elites to mobilize the masses by keeping their post-revolution income share at a minimum
level, which, in turn, prevents collective action following the revolution. Therefore, in
our point of view, preponderence of peasantry’s role in these revolutions is the reason
which made a non-democratic regime possible in the post-revolution era.
5.6. Conclusion
In this paper, the intra-elite conflict is explained as an inherent character of any non-
democratic society. We show that it does not appear as a threat in societies with rel-
atively equal income distribution. Hence, in these societies the only determinant of a
regime transition is the conflict between the masses and a unified elite. This result de-
pends on the idea that when the masses is resource-constrained in solving the collective
action problem, an elite faction which is discontented with the existing regime, can em-
ploy de facto power of the poor. Hence, intra-elite conflict and mass movements are
considered as related issues effecting regime transitions.
Furthermore, we incorporate our intra-elite conflict model to explain the differential
outcomes of revolutions. We show that the outcome of revolutions depends on the com-
bination of current transfers to solve the collective action problem of the masses, and
the post-revolution income allocation. When intra-elite inequality is high, this combina-
tion either cannot mobilize the mass or cannot keep the poor in post-revolutionary era
collectively inactive. In this case, emerging elites have to make concessions.
As a future research, the role of collective action in our model can be incorporated
into models of regime transitions which aim to explain the expected decline in the cost
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of collective action with the industrialization in the pre-transition periods. Such a model
can construct the link between growth via industrialization and political transitions.
5.A. Appendix
5.A.1. Proof of proposition (5.6)
In order to provide a better intuition, we start with analyzing proposition 5.3. All cases
in intra-elite conflict, summarized in proposition 5.3, are outcomes of the possibility of
a cooperation between the weak elite and the poor, plus the ability of the strong elite
to prevent revolution. We will analyze the most strict case, which is about whether
democracy can prevent a revolution. Results can be generalized to other statements of
proposition 5.3.
The weak elite prefers to initiate a revolution, if V wie (R, µ) > V
w(D), which gives
Ω <
(1− θ)(1− µ)− γw −B(w)
γw(1− µ)(1− β)
,
where B(w) = τ p(λp−γp)−C(τ p)λp. Secondly, the poor prefers revolution to democracy,
if V pie(R, µ) > V
p(D) , which gives
Ω >
γp − θ(1− µ) + ελp(1− µ)(1− β) +B(p)
γw(1− µ)(1− β)
,
where B(p) = (τ p(λw − γw)− C(τ p)λw). These conditions, as well as the conditions for
other cases in proposition 5.3, can be summarized as
Ω < −aθ + b, (5.22)
Ω > −aθ + c, (5.23)















Inequality (5.22) is the resource constraint of the weak elite which defines the upper
bound, Ω̄. Inequality (5.23) is the condition for the poor to choose revolution instead of
some concession by the strong elite, which defines a lower bound, Ω. It can be verified
that all coefficients of this inequality system are positive. The condition in the text,
Ω̄ > Ω, for a revolution takes place is, therefore, b > c. Now we go on with the proof of
proposition 5.6 by assuming b > c.
θ < ελp. (5.24)
Note, we have to impose ε ≥ γp/λp, since intra-elite conflict arises only when the poor
is unable solve the collective action problem. In terms of preventing post-revolutionary
collective action, the most strict situation for the weak elite arises when this condition
holds with equality, ε = γp/λp. Substituting in (5.24) gives θ < γp.
Now assume that the weak elite makes no transfer to the poor, Ω = 0. Substituting in
inequality (5.22), gives θ > c/a, which contradicts with the condition that θ < γp, since
these conditions hold simultaneously only when γp > c/a, which never holds. Therefore,
an Ω which satisfies all the required conditions must be higher than zero. Secondly,
assume that the weak elite makes the highest possible transfer, Ω = 1. Substituting in
inequality (5.22), gives θ > (c − 1)/a. In order the condition, θ < γp, also to hold, we
must have γp > (c− 1)/a. This is the condition in proposition (5.6). This suggest that
there exists a θ < γp when Ω = 1, which is sufficient to activate the poor for a revolution,
and prevents post-revolution collective action. Only remaining issue is to check whether
this combination is beneficial for the weak elite. Substituting Ω = 1 in the resource
constraint of the weak elite, inequality (5.22) gives θ < b/a, which always holds, since
θ > (c− 1)/a and b > c by assumption. Therefore, there exists a Ω > Ω∗ = −aθ + c for
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